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Abstract 
The increasing reliance of organisations on ICT-enabled interconnectivity for value creation has 
redefined the boundaries and attributes of potential security vulnerabilities (i.e. causal 
intricacy, scope, non-locality and non-linearity). Cybersecurity presents an epistemic climate 
that is distinctly hostile due to its domain-specific dynamics, complexity, dichotomous 
objectives, and effect on behavioural tendencies. Within the thesis, the local manifestation of 
these dynamics is described as a heuristic – a ‘knowledge problem’. This epistemic hostility 
hinders efforts to address and pre-empt the emerging threat of cybersecurity incidents in a 
manner that is proportional and contextually appropriate. The research argues that the degree 
of epistemic hostility faced by organisations, and its underpinning systemic and behavioural 
mechanisms, are inadequately represented in common inference-based constructs, like risk 
frameworks, which guide organisational practice, resulting in a ‘context-construct gap’. 
Throughout the thesis, these premises are deconstructed, explored and addressed in three 
dimensions: a literature based, theoretical analysis focused on the interaction between risk, 
complex systems, and ‘rationality’; an empirical, critical realist case study which explores and 
calibrates the postulated explanatory mechanisms in an illustrative real-world context; and a 
prescriptive formulation of an Adaptive Cyber Risk Management framework based on the 
theoretical and empirical findings of the study. The contribution includes a potential avenue 
for further cross-disciplinary enquiry into organisational cybersecurity management through 
the ‘knowledge-problem’ heuristic, which explores the pragmatic barriers to inference-based 
adaptation efforts. In addition, the Adaptive Cyber Risk Management framework proposes a 
conceptual logic to mitigate against the issues raised by the theoretical and empirical analysis, 
which include deep uncertainty, actor and decision maker bias, limited situational awareness, 
and systemic communication/coordination difficulties.  
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1. Introduction  
 
“It's the great irony of our Information Age -- the very technologies that empower us to 
create and to build also empower those who would disrupt and destroy.  And this paradox -




Society is undergoing a technology-driven transition that is arguably unprecedented in its 
nature, scope, and scale. For organisations, both the proliferation and the democratisation 
of ICT have revolutionised the ways in which value is created and distributed through a tide 
of creative destruction which reshapes products, business models, corporate structures, and 
even markets on an ongoing basis. This phenomenon has accentuated competitive pressures 
by providing further incentives for technological opportunism and penalties for late adoption. 
But as companies compete to leverage the new dimensions of interconnectivity by immersing 
themselves in the “first manmade domain” (Kuehl 2009), they assimilate a growing base of 
vulnerabilities which are exploited by increasingly complex malicious actors (Kraemer-Mbula 
et al. 2013, Broadhead 2018).  
 
Cybercrime is recognised as a key threat at both an individual (Goldberg 2016) and a societal 
level (Ferdinado 2015, UK Parliament 2015) due to its resulting streams of economic and 
societal externalities. However, as will be argued throughout the following chapters, 
organisations, as the fulcrum of the problem, are poorly equipped both conceptually and 
epistemically to deal with the distinctiveness of the uncertainty posed by the dynamics of 
cybersecurity. The significance of this problem is further amplified by the increasing stakes: 
a growing dependence on cyber infrastructure yields an ever-growing attack surface, further 
attracting threat actors who leverage the disproportional impact potential of the domain for 
the pursuit of economic or political agendas. (Bauer and van Eeten 2009) 
 
In this emerging narrative, the role of supporting organisational cybersecurity is paramount. 
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Organisations drive economic value creation, own and defend stakeholder data, develop, 
manage and employ technical infrastructure. They are, thus, at the forefront of defensive 
efforts. Yet, locally, as function-specific systems, performance is primarily a function of the 
organisation’s ability to efficiently create value in a manner prescribed by its operational 
model. The inclusion of cybersecurity in this existential context is both relatively novel and 
increasingly important. However, identifying how important is both an essential and a 
difficult exercise in foresight for organisations as they pursue pluralistic, at times competing 
objectives using bound resources which are leveraged through strategy. 
 
1.2 Framing: Problem Rationale 
 
Throughout the thesis, an overarching account of organisational cybersecurity will be 
provided through a strategic lens, as a function that is pragmatic, epistemic, inferential, 
dynamic, adaptive, and construct-assisted. Briefly, its pragmatism partly derives from its 
economic logic, where investments in security are largely supported by other primary 
functions and should not outweigh the potential costs incurred due to their absence. In 
addition, epistemological limitations and empirical grounding lead to the primacy of ‘what 
works’, rather than ‘what’s true’. Its epistemic, inferential status is central to proactivity — 
(appropriately granular) anticipation drives pre-emptive adaptation, which requires 
information, knowledge and inference. Its dynamism and, subsequently, adaptive status are 
a product of the perpetually changing adaptive pressures imposed by both external forces 
(i.e. threat climate, and compliance directives) and internal drivers (i.e. shift in strategy, 
systems, and behaviours).  
 
Finally, the characterisation of organisational cybersecurity as construct-assisted is used to 
illustrate its reliance on normative representational and procedural constructs (i.e. 
frameworks, standards, methodologies) to frame its objects of analysis in a wider 
organisational context. The most prevalent example of this process is the notion of ‘cyber 
risk’. Cyber risk assessments are pragmatic, aiming to encode the proportionality of likely 
outcomes, while structurally providing a common denominator for otherwise epistemically 
heterogeneous eventualities. They are also: epistemic, relying on a plethora of 
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informational/observational inputs; inferential as they describe non-observable events; 
adaptation-oriented, as they are used to treat, mitigate, or accept risks; and, potentially 
dynamic, based on their implementation. However, the pragmatic, adaptive value of such 
constructs is a function of contextual fitness at an implementation level. As a result, 
functional performance is linked to the congruence between the environment and the 
constructs used to identify and structure adaptive efforts. As heuristic/inferential procedures 
carry embedded assumptions about the environment of their use-case, incongruences can 
yield maladaptive behaviour, by distorting analytical outputs, compromising inference, and 
misrepresenting the actual uncertainty faced (Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2014). Both the 
potential for the misapplication of risk constructs, and its subsequent effects are illustrated 





 The purpose of this research is to critically examine and conceptually address the tendency 
for a context-construct gap within organisational cybersecurity - cyber-risk applications. This 
exploration is conducted from the perspective of generative mechanisms and domain specific 
dynamics, which are identified as prescriptively1 distinct/novel for organisational practice, 
and yield epistemic hostility — a knowledge problem. These include environmental 
complexity (non-linearity), social/behavioural dynamics, and domain-specific tendencies. In 
this context, the notion of a knowledge problem is used specifically to describe an epistemic 
barrier faced by organisations towards the effective inference-based identification and 
selection of adaptive pathways which adequately encompass cybersecurity. Based on this 
definition, locally addressing the context-construct gap entails mitigating the impact of the 
knowledge-problem as a precursor to epistemic diagnosis and adaptation. Throughout the 
following chapters, this narrative will be explored in three interdependent dimensions: 
theoretically, empirically, and prescriptively. 
                                                             
1 1 Throughout the thesis, the notion of ‘prescriptive’ is used to describe outputs which are practice-oriented, 
and procedural in nature – i.e. in the context of decision analysis, McFall (2015:46): “how real people should 
and can make decisions;”. In this sense, ‘prescriptive’ is contrasted with ‘descriptive’ and ‘normative’. Thus, 
the term is not used to denote rigidity or suggest a necessity for absolute interpretational fidelity. 
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In order to guide the analysis, a conceptual framework will be built based on the premise 
that inferential constructs in cybersecurity must locally account for the systemic dynamics, 
behavioural mechanisms and tendencies, as well as domain-specific epistemic barriers. As a 
result, achieving and sustaining context-construct fit is a function of managing the knowledge 
problem faced in a manner that is compatible with the previously introduced functional 
characterisation of cybersecurity. In other words, the narrative will argue that the use 
inferential constructs to pursue adaptive cybersecurity practice is hindered by an epistemic 
bottleneck. In this context, increasing the effectiveness of adaptive pathway identification 
efforts is a function of both the available knowledge, and its absence. Prescriptively, 
approaches for the navigation of the evolving threat landscape in a pragmatic manner must 
nurture epistemic adaptation while leveraging the variability imposed by the ontological 
mechanisms at play. 
 
1.4 Aim, Objectives and Roadmap 
 
In summary, the thesis aims to support the organisational cybersecurity context-construct 
fit by providing a better understanding of the context, and by correspondingly adjusting the 
construct assumptions and architecture. The first half of the thesis will deconstruct the 
‘knowledge problem’ faced by organisations in managing their cybersecurity risks and 
provide an overview of systemic and cognitive mechanisms which underpin the context-
construct gap. In the second half, an empirical investigation will be conducted in the form of 
an embedded, vertical case study. The outputs of this investigation coupled with the 
theoretical premises developed throughout the literature chapters will be used to 
conceptualise an Adaptive Cyber Risk Management framework/architecture as an epistemic, 
evolving interpretation of Cyber Risk Management. A visual representation of the thesis 
structure is presented in Fig. 1. 
 
The structure reflects the following research objectives, which are further explored in 
section 3.1: 
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0. Construct a literature-based conceptual framework to represent the context-
construct dynamics within organisational Cybersecurity; 
1. Identify how Knowledge relating to Cybersecurity is produced, used and adapted at 
various levels within an organisation; 
2. Critically analyse the role, and epistemic requirements of Cyber Risk Management; 
3. Conceptualise a Risk based approach to address the Knowledge-Uncertainty 
dimension of cybersecurity management. 
 
Section 2 serves as a de facto Literature Review, and integrates a series of literature-based 
chapters which provide an overview of the research context, introduce and consolidate the 
main structural heuristics (‘knowledge problem’ and ‘context-construct gap’), discuss relevant 
systemic and behavioural mechanisms, and propose a theoretical foundation for the 
conceptual framework. Sections 3 (Methodology) and 4 (Case Study) introduce the research 
philosophy, empirical research strategy, and case study which, coupled with the preliminary 
framework introduced in section 2.4, address research objectives 1 and 2. They thus 
encapsulate the empirical dimension of the thesis which is instrumental the framework design 
process. Finally, section 5 explores the prescriptive implications of the research findings, which 
are used to formulate a theoretically compatible interpretation (a framework) of Adaptive 
Cyber Risk Management, and thus addresses the final research objective.  
 
 
Fig. 1. A structural map of the research objectives
 
14 
2. Literature Review 
 
Throughout its four sub-chapters, the Literature Review aims to support the development 
of a conceptual framework which can illustrate and explain the dynamics of the research 
problem. In order to achieve this objective, the first part contains a literature-based analysis 
of the cybersecurity macro-context, which is used to highlight the contextual link between 
uncertainty and cyber risk. This is followed by a critical overview of the various literary 
conceptualisations of ‘risk’ in relation to their application context, and by an overview of 
tendencies and mechanisms which underpin what the project describes as a ‘knowledge 
problem’ dynamic — an inhibitor of the contextual utility/fitness of ‘traditional’ risk-based 
frameworks. Based on the first stage of literature analysis, two theoretical dimensions 
emerge as relevant and complementary in providing a mechanism-based representational 
structure to the research problem: systemic behaviour, from the perspective of complex, 
hierarchical structures; and ‘rational’ actor behaviour, from the perspective of cognition and 
social adaptation as drivers of action. These two theoretical dimensions suggest a series of 
complementary mechanisms which underpin the ontological regularities targeted by risk-
based approaches through their emphasis on the likelihood and impact of incidents. Finally, 
the emerging conceptual framework is illustrated based on a relational representation of 
the chapter’s core constructs. This output is also used as a ‘logic-of-enquiry’ for the 
construction and implementation of the empirical stage of the project. 
 
2.1 Deconstructing a Knowledge Problem 
2.1.1 Macro Context 
 
 When deconstructing the escalating importance of organisational cybersecurity, three 
trends stand out. The first is the rate of expansion and growing ubiquity of technology. In 
their 2009 study on connectivity trends, Cave et al. (2009) identified the emergence of an 
‘internet society’ supported by an increasingly open communications infrastructure, the 
evolution of computing as a utility, and a growth in web intelligence which enables lower 
barriers between humans and computers. The popularisation of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) 
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and of ‘always on’ connectivity is generating an ever-growing footprint of technology and, 
subsequently, data which can be leveraged by organisations for both strategic and 
operational purposes (Bughin et al. 2015). Yet, this degree of technological omnipresence is 
a direct determinant of the attack-surface — the main space of potential interaction with 
cybercriminals. Despite evidence of amounting vulnerabilities (Greenberg 2016), the 
momentum of the ‘internet society’ seems stronger than ever. However, the spectrum of 
vulnerabilities emerging from this vector of societal change adds another layer of 
consideration for organisations, beyond their direct span of liability. As many consumers are 
also actors within an organisational setting, their personal vulnerability to cybercrime can 
spill over into their roles — an idea which blurs the line between personal and organisational 
cybersecurity. So, the growing reliance on the cyber domain has the unintended 
consequence of also expanding the ‘habitat’ of cybercrime. 
 
The second noteworthy trend influencing the importance of organisational cybersecurity is 
the accentuated evolution of cyber threats. Nielsen (2012:340) defines the notion of ‘Cyber 
Threat’ as the product of (ill) ‘intention and capability’, which corresponds with the CIS 
(Computer and Information Security) notion of an ‘attacker’ (Kraemer and Carayon 2007). As 
the activity of the attacker/threat is generally illegal, the notion of cybercriminal is also used 
to similar effect. Kraemer-Mbula et al. (2013) argue that cybercriminal networks are 
exhibiting the characteristics of a digital business ecosystem, forming ‘cybercrime 
ecosystems’ focused on illicit value generation. The growing complexity and presence of 
cyber-criminal groups/nation-state supported actors operating in the space is also 
highlighted by the NCA (2018) in its strategic assessment of serious and organised crime. 
There are multiple ramifications which can be inferred from the existence of a cybercriminal 
market exerting pressures on its members. These include incentive driven behaviour, 
competitiveness and collaboration between actors, adaptivity to relevant policy and 
legislative measures designed to counteract its operations, balancing labour supply and 
demand, and an ability to exhibit macro level contraction and expansion based on the wider 
context. As performance-oriented structures which can leverage comparative advantages, 
cybercrime ecosystems can also adapt to market forces. This means that they can invest in 
research and development, incorporate external innovation into their practices, diversify 
their output based on effectiveness, and modify their structure to circumvent defences and 
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obstacles. Furthermore, peaks in the threat climate hostility are further accentuated by the 
emergence of specialisation-based cybercriminal value chain divisions (Thomas et al. 2015), 
lowered barriers to entry from a technology and know-how perspective due to ‘off-the-shelf’ 
malware, toolkits, and openly available guidelines for various attack vectors (Winter and 
Brunker 2014). As a result, in spite of defensive advances and increased awareness, threat 
dynamics presents mechanisms for adaptation and innovation, leading to increased offensive 
sophistication and potency. 
 
The third trend is a function of the former two: the escalating impact of cybercrime. Visible 
high impact breaches are increasingly frequent. While only occupying a segment of the total 
number of incidents occurring (NCA 2018), they offer scarce insight into the scale of the 
problem, given the reluctance of organisations to disclose information on the topic, despite 
pushes from public policy and legislative bodies (US Congress 2015, NCA 2016), insurance 
companies (Association of British Insurers 2016), and academia (Casey 2004, Gal-Or and 
Ghose 2005). The 2015 Information Security Breaches Survey commissioned by the UK 
Government (PWC 2015) estimated that 90% of large organisations and 74% of SMEs 
suffered a breach in the preceding year. In contrast, the 2018 ‘Cyber Security Breaches 
Survey’ notes that 72% of large firms, 64% of medium and 47% of small firms experienced a 
breach or an attack in the preceding year (GOV.UK 2018). It should be noted that the two 
reports present methodological differences and rely on declarative data. Also, breach/attack 
spread is a valid yet limited indicator of impact, as demonstrated by the significance of 
landmark events, such as the (US based) 2017 Equifax breach (White 2017, GAO 2018). 
 
To anecdotally illustrate the financial vector of breach impact, Slaughter and May (2016) 
highlight the drop in share prices of a series of high profile UK and US public companies three 
days and a month after they reported a cybersecurity breach. The most dramatic decrease 
within the sample range was registered by Heartland Payment Systems — a security critical 
organisation — being recorded at -46.3% three days after the disclosure. The average price-
drop a month after the breach for the sample of 9 companies cited in the study was -13.2%. 
While this measure of impact is by no means holistic or generalisable, it does illustrate how 
costly cybercriminal activity can be. As these drops follow the disclosure of incidents, they 





Even apparently isolated incidents can, upon further investigation, reveal anecdotal 
evidence of the frequency and severity resulting from the interaction between evolving 
threats and a growing attack surface. The late 2014 Sony breach was noteworthy due to the 
amount of damage incurred, its media coverage and intentionally conspicuous attacker 
behaviour. However, Attrition.org (2014) documents tens of previous instances where the 
corporation, through its various operational branches, has been the victim of ‘successful’ and 
externally visible cyber-attacks. In response to the 2014 breach, Kevin Tsujihara, Studio Chief 
of Warner Bros. argued that: “[…] if someone is determined and spending the resources that 
[were] expended to try get into Sony, just about anybody’s vulnerable, and you’re seeing it 
in many different industries. The question isn’t ‘can you prevent it from happening?’ […] I 
think, from what we’ve seen, the key thing is ‘when it happens, what are you doing — how 
do you react?’…” (Chmielewski 2015). This perspective is consistent with the views of experts 
within the security community, who attribute a high probability of success to capable and 
focused threat actors (Schneier 2014). 
 
So, given the dynamics of aggregate vulnerability, threat actor development, and the 
repercussions of breaches, the costs of cyber incidents are seemingly an almost unavoidable 
part of the modern operational climate (Romanosky 2016). However, the resulting dynamics 
are increasingly recognised, with attempts being made to mitigate their effect, as 
demonstrated by the financial support of cybersecurity solution providers. Investments in the 
field break year-on-year records, while the market is expected to reach a global value of 
$170bn by 2020 according to a Gartner report (Billings 2016). In spite of this, in 2015, it is 
estimated that 700 million records were stolen as a result of data breaches (Gemalto 2016). 
Due to several very high impact breaches, the 2017 estimates for this metric are significantly 
higher, reaching seemingly unprecedented values (Daitch 2017, Breach Level Index 2018).  
 
The contrast between the consensus on the importance of cybersecurity (GOV.UK 2018), 
the increasing investments in the field, and the growing impact of breaches is 
counterintuitive. Yet, this disparity is persistent, and indicative of systemic tendencies and 
domain-specific dynamics. It delineates the uniqueness, the non-linearity, and the causal 
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disproportionality of the ever-changing cybersecurity context in which organisations operate. 
It also highlights a need for further supporting the development of locally evolving, adaptive 
approaches to organisational defence. Moreover, it highlights limitations in the efficacy of 
the conceptual tools used by organisations to frame and pre-empt cyber threats in their local 
context. Subsequently, organisations exhibit difficulties relying on foresight and inferential 
constructs in the pursuit of adaptive pathways. One of the main drivers of this difficulty is the 
uncertainty that characterises the domain. The following section will explore the dynamics 
between the organisational uncertainty presented by cybersecurity and cyber risk constructs. 
 
2.1.2 Uncertainty and Cyber Risk Management 
  
The most common construct-based approach for the mitigation of uncertainty and the 
coordination of cybersecurity processes, inputs, actions, and outlook is cyber risk 
management. Based on research conducted by PWC, 91% of the organisations sampled 
employ a risk-based cybersecurity framework (PWC 2016). Within the 2018 UK Cyber Security 
Breaches Survey data (GOV.UK 2018), 56% of business respondents have implemented some 
cybersecurity risk identification/assessment procedures in the preceding 12 months. The 
normative use of ‘risk’ to frame and describe cybersecurity situational assessment 
procedures in such reports is indicative of its status as a dominant paradigm. 
 
Within the context of cybersecurity, Nielsen (2012:340) defines ‘risk’ as function of threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences, while proposing that its reduction can be achieved by 
supressing the presence of these three components. The Information Security Risk 
Management Standard – ISO/IEC 27005 –, defines risk as the product of the likelihood of an 
unwanted event, and the potential impact caused by an occurrence of the said event (ISO/IEC 
2018). The two definitions can be used with complementary effect to illustrate the domain-
specific interpretation of the concept, as Nielsen’s (2012) expression of risk emphasises the 
three categories of variables which lie at the foundation of security risk thinking, while the 
ISO/IEC 27000/27005 definition illustrate the largely probabilistic nature of the concept 
(Nielsen 2012, ISO/IEC 2018). According to Hoo (2000:3), cybersecurity risk frameworks entail 
the assessment of risks through preference evaluation, which is established through the 
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estimation of the impact that can emerge from unwanted events, the likelihood of said 
events, and the evaluation of the attractiveness of potential courses of action. 
 
So, the purpose of cyber risk frameworks is to minimise the effects of the uncertainty faced 
and to enable the pursuit of an active stance in influencing the nature and likelihood of 
foreseeable outcomes. This is achieved in broad terms through a risk management process 
which, based on the chosen methodology, defines a set of sequential stages which aim to 
define the context (“Frame” in NIST 800-39, “Context Establishment” in ISO/IEC 27005), 
identify and assess risks (“Assess” in NIST 800-39, “Risk Assessment: Identification, Analysis 
and Evaluation” in ISO/IEC 27005), act on the conclusion of the assessment (“Respond” in 
NIST 800-39, “Treatment/Acceptance” in ISO/IEC 27005), communicate the output of the 
process, and monitor and review its effects (“Monitor” and “Information and Communication 
Flows” in NIST 800-39, “Risk Communication and Consultation” and “Risk Monitoring and 
Review” in ISO/IEC 27005) (NIST 2011, ISO/IEC 2018). Risk management is also described by 
Hoo (2000) as a policy process with the aim of enabling decision making — more specifically, 
the formulation and selection of strategies addressing risk. A more detailed overview of the 
conceptualisation of Information Security Risk in relevant industry frameworks/standards, as 
well as their context and management processes is included in Appendix 5. 
 
2.1.3 Conceptualising ‘Risk’ 
 
In order to critically analyse the application of risk thinking in cybersecurity management, 
its inception and evolution are worth noting. The foundations of modern thought on risk are 
traceable back to the establishment of Probability Theory in the 17th and 18th century, which 
have provided a platform for the quantitative evaluation of cause and effect relations as a 
way to deal with uncertainty (Covello and Mumpower 1985, Zachmann 2014). ‘Risk’ has 
gained further prevalence throughout the 20th century as part of an attempt to deal with 
uncertainty in a mathematical, scientific manner (Zachmann 2014). The history of estimating 
and managing risk has been strongly shaped by developments in the ability to identify the 
variables which can be linked to unfavourable outcomes and are plausibly interpretable as 
determinants. Thus, the usefulness of the construct was consolidated by a growing body of 
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tools and techniques designed to establish and test causal links under uncertainty (Covello 
and Mumpower 1985). In many of the incipient applications of risk analysis, such as the health 
risks imposed by various occupations and practices, frequency data preceded and guided 
causal hypotheses which, once formulated, required testing before being usable to support 
the development of efforts to counteract said risks. (Dake 1992) 
 
The heterogeneous nature of modern risk thinking is explored by Aven (2012), who 
distinguishes six evolutionary paths for the construct. These have emerged from the original 
perspective of risk as a function of expected loss/disutility and likelihood. In addition, they 
are interlinked by the presence of uncertainty, and the generally negative nature of the 
potential outcome. While also illustrating its modern societal role as the leading method of 
dealing with the uncertainty spectrum, Zachmann (2014) describes Risk as a subgroup of 
uncertainties which can be quantified through probabilistic measures. This implies a 
discrepancy between the construct’s inherently confined probabilistic nature and its late-
modern role in engaging most areas of uncertainty, and presents a point of potential 
conceptual divergence. Specifically, Aven (2017) notes that the concept, i.e. risk, should be 
distinguished from one of the ways in which it is measured, i.e. probability. In contrast, 
Mousavi and Gigerenzer (2014) present risk as distinctly probabilistic and differentiate 
decision making under risk from decision making under certainty or uncertainty. 
Furthermore, they present a typology of risk based on the means of employing probabilities: 
assessments based on a priori probabilities, which are known ‘by design’ given the 
parameters of the application system; statistical probabilities, based on experimental and 
empirical data extraction in conditions of ontological regularity; and, finally, assessments 
based on estimates, i.e subjective probabilities (Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2014, Beaudrie et 
al. 2011). 
 
While primarily semantic, this apparent divergence can carry significant practical 
implications. Mousavi and Gigerenzer (2014) hold that the differentiation between Risks and 
Uncertainties is important given their different ontological status, and subsequent 
association to distinct evaluative/epistemic toolkits (i.e probability vs. heuristics/’ecological 
rationality’). In contrast, Aven’s (2017) use of the term permeates the uncertainty spectrum, 
while recognising the effects of varying degrees of uncertainty on the adequacy of various 
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measurement/representational approaches. At the heart of this division lies the relationship 
between ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’. Within the context of Risk, ‘uncertainty’ is defined by Haimes 
(2011:1178) as “the inability to determine the true state of a system”. Furthermore, it is 
presented as a product of knowledge/its absence (epistemic uncertainty), and of 
randomness/ “emergent forced changes” (stochastic uncertainty).  
 
Cox (2012:1608) proposes a taxonomy of uncertainty built around the ability to determine 
the system context, model, outcomes, and their weights. These parameters are spread over 
four levels, ranging from absolute determinism to total ignorance. Levels 3 and 4 are classified 
as ‘deep uncertainty’, with level 3 comprising of a context where the future is predictable in 
a multitude of plausible alternatives, there are multiple, varied system models, and the 
outcomes can be reduced to a known range (without definable probabilities/confidence 
intervals) with known weights. Level 4 is defined by the absence of knowledge in each of the 
four categories. Under deep uncertainty, the definition of risk presents a heuristic character 
where epistemic gaps or systemic randomness are counteracted through inferential ‘rules of 
thumb’ and procedural adaptation.  
 
Thus, the philosophical, disciplinary, and implementation context of ‘risk’ can shape the 
fundamental approach used for its definition and application. For example, Aven (2012:34) 
highlights that, within logic and mathematics, risk is perceivable as a phenomenon which can 
be calculated, within medicine and science as an “objective reality”, within sociology as “a 
societal phenomenon” and, within linguistics, as a concept. Subsequently, nine definitions 
are identified, equating risk to: 1. An “expected value”; 2. The “probability of an (undesirable) 
event”; 3. “objective uncertainty”; 4. “uncertainty”; 5. “Potential/possibility of a loss”; 6. 
“probability and scenarios/Consequences/severity of consequences”; 7. “event or 
consequence”; 8. “consequences/damage/severity of these + uncertainty”; and finally, 9. 
“the effect of uncertainty on objectives” (Aven 2012:37). The various dimensions 
encompassed by the definition of the concept reflect the variability in the emphasis placed 
on the components of the construct in different disciplines.  
 
Out of the nine definitions, the sixth reflects the definition that is broadly used within 
cybersecurity management, as described in the previous section, and in Appendix 5. Based 
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on this interpretation of the concept, the effectiveness of a risk management implementation 
is reflected by its ability to accurately identify (anticipate) and (probabilistically) assess the 
risks faced in order to generate strategies that optimise the balance between the likelihood 
and the potential impact of a specific undesirable incident based on an understanding of its 
causal nature. However, beyond this high-level abstraction, the actual type of uncertainty 
that is faced within an application setting can have at least as much of an impact on the 
results of the process as its design (Aven and Zio 2011). As a result, a critical perspective on 
the role and the effectiveness of risk as a pragmatic construct must be anchored to a defined 
application-setting/problem-area, and subsequently, its uncertainty context.   
 
2.1.4 Cyber Risk: A Context-Construct Critique  
 
In the absence of clear patterns, sufficient data, and an accurate understanding of the 
causes which underpin undesirable outcomes, the pursuit of a (probabilistic) risk 
management framework can be detrimental as a source of false confidence (Aven 2013). In 
the context of impact assessment, Bond et al. (2015) approach risk as separate from 
uncertainty, ambiguity, and ignorance. This choice is justified by highlighting that “…a narrow 
focus on risk […] inadequately considers incomplete knowledge and can therefore lead to 
decisions that ultimately prove to be poor” (Bond et al. 2015:98). But knowledge sufficiency 
within the context of a given risk is also dependent scale of abstraction. Aven and Zio (2011) 
argue that in practical settings, systems cannot be described in totality due to an imperfect 
knowledge concerning the underlying phenomena, an idea which is tightly connected with 
the notion of scale of representation. Based on this premise, knowledge constraints can be 
masked from a process perspective through the alteration of the scale, or level of abstraction 
of the risk model.  
 
The detrimental effects of inadequately representing the strength of the background 
knowledge in a risk setting are also addressed by Bjerga and Aven (2015:76), who 
acknowledge that, especially when facing deep uncertainty, probabilistic measures are “hard 
to justify”. These premises are explicitly addressed within the literature as either points 
delimiting the applicability of the risk construct for specific types of uncertainty, or as critique 
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towards the misapplication of risk principles. Cox (2012) asserts that risks in circumstances of 
deep uncertainty lack a generally accepted set of decision models, while imposing one can 
oversimplify the analysis. (It should also be noted that ‘defence against cyber criminals’ is 
explicitly presented by Cox (2012) as an example of risk management under deep 
uncertainty.) 
 
The domain-specific hostile epistemic dynamics, which will be covered at more depth in the 
following section, yield a common ‘over-reliance on intuition’ for cybersecurity decisions 
(Julisch 2013). However, decisions based on intuition can be masked within the apparent 
rigour of a well-established methodology. Once adopted, risk processes structure and 
potentially normalise analyst inputs and assumptions, yielding assessments which are 
inferential, and pertain a quantitative logic (i.e. enable comparison). Subsequently, the 
models assimilate subjective influences from their author (Haimes 2012), while the outputs 
of risk analysis are malleable, especially in their contextualisation. The potential scope of 
subjective inputs in cyber risk efforts is noteworthy given that the use of available data to 
effectively determine and alter networked (i.e. with non-local interdependencies) causal 
chains, through measures of likelihood and impact, can prove to be difficult within the 
uncertainty dynamics of cybersecurity management; especially when considering pluralistic 
organisational objectives and limited resources. For instance, cyber vulnerabilities are 
contingent upon a wide range of factors, including choices in infrastructure, operational 
models, technological systems, investment policy, corporate strategy, human capital, culture, 
training, and capabilities. As a result, the management of such a complex and dynamic causal 
network can be prone to oversimplification/distortion through single vector measurement, 
abstraction and modelling. The heterogenous epistemic nature of the individual eventualities 
(cyber risks) that are subjected to direct comparison under risk analyses is also worth noting. 
Without an embedded mechanism to reflect the nature of the knowledge used to identify 
and assess individual risks, the probabilistic output of the process can lead to decision making 
failures. (Haimes 2012, Aven 2013)  
 
 Given its heavy reliance on traditional risk paradigms, organisational cyber risk 
management faces several challenges which are imposed by the distinctive nature of the 
context/phenomena of concern. This issue is not novel. Hoo (2000) shows that several 
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‘traditional’ approaches to cybersecurity risk management share a propensity towards 
impracticality. This can occur in a number of ways, including through a tendency to reach 
unmanageable complexity of process and output, distortive simplification of the concepts 
employed, the use of ineffective metrics, or a reliance on non-existent or unrepresentative 
data which is argued to lead to methodological redundancy. Furthermore, the asset-centric 
object of information security risk assessments is criticised by Shedden et al. (2011), as it fails 
to account for organisational ‘knowledge security’. Indeed, impact/outcome evaluation — a 
central component of cyber risk analysis/management — entails numerous complexities 
which are phenomenon-based and are difficult to consistently mitigate against locally 
through formal analysis processes (Thomas et al. 2013). These include: the inherent 
disincentives to disclose information concerning security breaches, difficulties in delimiting 
consequences and costs, intangibles and mis-estimated costs, consequences which are 
incommensurate, ambiguity, uncertainty, absence of information, and ignorance, near-
misses, pluralistic interests, and bias.  
 
In a broader context, Haimes (2012) notes a series of systems-based theoretical first 
principles for the effective use of risk (analysis, assessment, management), which provide a 
critical lens of analysis when considering cybersecurity as a use-case. Amongst said principles, 
a series of notable themes emerge. These include a necessity to incorporate/address holism, 
temporality, the inherent nature of conflicting and competing objectives, both epistemic and 
stochastic uncertainty, as well as the eventuality low probability/extreme consequences. 
Indeed, holism, temporal dynamics, heterogenous adaptive drivers, complexity, and phase 
transitions are all functions of ontological/systemic mechanisms which are likely to manifest 
themselves in a dynamic, complex, real-world setting. Estimating the likelihood and impact 
of an outcome must carry embedded assumptions about the scale-dependence of the effect 
(i.e. variation in the effects of a breach across the information system infrastructure, the 
organisation, the stakeholder network, the sector). Additionally, locally optimal outcomes 
can be holistically maladaptive (i.e. treating a cyber risk can impact overall operational 
performance).  
 
The eventuality of phenomena and outcomes is temporality-dependent, as it shifts based 
on the dynamics of the systems. This aspect is amplified within cyberspace, given the nearly 
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instantaneous pace of interactions, and the decreased role of geographical boundaries. Both 
dichotomous adaptive pathways and residual uncertainty are inherent for organisational 
cybersecurity, due to the limitations of foresight in this space. Low-probability, high impact 
occurrences are also foundational to defensive efforts, given the scope of the ‘unknown-
unknown’ and the significance of the potential impact. Based on the above measures, 
likelihood-impact risk constructs lack the inherent conceptual robustness needed to 
effectively respond to the environmental dynamics and ontological mechanisms that drive 
cybersecurity phenomena. Finally, given the extent of cognition as a driver of outcomes in 
organisational settings, there is also a need to incorporate an adequate representational 
mechanism/model to account for cognitive tendencies and social dynamics in matters of 
cybersecurity. (Haimes 2012) 
 
So, within the current paradigm of assessing the likelihood and impact of (undesirable) 
outcomes, the contextual effectiveness of cyber risk approaches is conditioned by: the 
potential for adequate (in volume, quality, and availability) information concerning the 
potential outcomes; an ability to extract and employ the information for inferential 
procedures; and a (reasonably) linear environment. This logic is also applicable to non-
probabilistic measures of likelihood. Even outside probability, the mechanics of inference 
used to describe potential/likely outcomes require an ontological regularity (a product of 
either linear or emergent dynamics), data to form a (series of) model(s) which captures its 
tendencies, and an inferential procedure to generate and employ an output that enables 
effective action. In contrast, the effectiveness of archetypical/traditional risk management is 
damaged by factors and dynamics which dilute its ideological utility: unpredictable outcomes 
due to epistemic scarcity, erroneous information, chaotic or complex systems/interactions, 
and a propensity for misunderstanding the causalities of significant events. The setting-
specific occurrence of such factors indicates a context-construct incongruence. To further 
explore this narrative, the domain-specific epistemic dynamics will be deconstructed in the 
following section through a phenomenon-based view of organisational cybersecurity. An 
overarching argument will be made that organisations face a ‘knowledge problem’ which is 





2.1.5 The Cybersecurity ‘Knowledge Problem’ 
 
Throughout the thesis, the notion of a ‘Knowledge Problem’ will be used to describe a 
hostile epistemic dynamic which affects adaptive inference within the functional context of 
Cybersecurity Management. Subsequently, it overlaps with the previously introduced notion 
of ‘uncertainty’ as it can focus on factors which prevent determining the true state of a 
system. However, unlike uncertainty, which is defined as systemic (within the study), and 
reflects an epistemic state, a knowledge-problem describes epistemic tendencies, is a 
product of ontological mechanisms, and is anchored in a pragmatic, behavioural grounding. 
Thus, the ‘knowledge problem’ framing emphasises the role, attributes and tendencies of the 
locus of knowledge — i.e. the ‘knower’ —  in relation to an evolving problem-setting. In order 
to break down the conceptual efficacy of using Risk Frameworks to tackle the organisational 
cybersecurity knowledge problem, the key trends which shape it as an application setting 
must first be explored.  
 
Establishing the dimensions of a knowledge problem is a key step in its analytical breakdown 
and, implicitly, in the pursuit of potential responses. As a result, the following sections of 
problem analysis address the context-specific environmental complexity, available 
information relating to the context, and the social drivers affecting its assimilation and use 
for decision-making purposes, as indicators of adaptive inference tendencies within 
cybersecurity management. Following this chapter, the cybersecurity ‘knowledge problem’ 
context will be explored from the perspective of its underpinning mechanisms. Popper’s 
three-world ontology (Popper 1978) is used to structure this line of enquiry, as an 
epistemological heuristic, indicating the locus of knowledge. Thus, a theoretical analysis of its 
systemic/‘real world’ component (World 1 - physical), and its social/’rational’ component 
(World 2 — conceptual), will be developed as a bedding for empirically and conceptually 
exploring their ‘objective knowledge’ (World 3 — construct), pragmatic implications based 





2.1.5.1 Information: Source, Availability, Validity 
 
The relationship between the cybersecurity decision making and its informational input is 
pivotal in ensuring an appropriate interpretation of the relevant problems that are faced. 
Within the context of quantitative risk assessments (probabilistic risk assessments), even at 
a high level of abstraction and simplification, obtaining the required information to compute 
risk factors effectively is not a clear process, as highlighted by Sommestad et al. (2010). The 
theoretical efficacy of probabilistic techniques of decision support is directly proportional to 
the underpinning sample size used, and to the fidelity of its represented attributes. So, a 
reliance on local breach data may be insufficient for the effective extraction of patterns, 
trends and likelihoods. Even internal insights may prove difficult to obtain objectively, due to 
limitations in awareness and capabilities. These limitations are manifested, for example, in 
the slow breach detection times, which have been argued to take an average of over 6 
months, with significant industry-based variation (Osbourne 2015), and a median of 146 days 
(Mandiant 2016). 
 
Subsequently, the importance of information sharing as an enabler of cybersecurity 
performance has been recognised in both academic literature and public policy for over a 
decade. For example, Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) argue that gathering, analysing and sharing 
data on both successful and unsuccessful security breach attempts are key components of 
improving security. This thesis is the premise of numerous cyber incident information sharing 
initiatives, which, particularly through public-private partnerships, are a reoccurring point of 
both national and international security policy. Just in the U.S, such initiatives include: 
PDD/NSC 63 (Clinton 1998); Section 225 of the HSA/Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002 
(GPO 2002); the output of the 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review (White House 2010) and the 
subsequent 2011 legislative proposal (White House 2011); EO 13636 (White House 2013) and 
EO 13691 (White House 2015); as well as the National Cyber Strategy (White House 2018). 
Similar initiatives are also in place within the U.K, in the form of the 2009, 2011, and 2016-
2021 Cyber Security Strategy (UK Government 2009, UK Government 2011, UK Government 
2016); and in the E.U through the Cybersecurity Strategy for the European Union (European 
Commission 2013), and in ENISA’s Information Sharing/Public Private Partnerships efforts 
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(ENISA 2019). The shared ambition of all these efforts to “bridge the gap” between 
organisations and national security bodies for the purpose of information sharing and support 
is in itself an indicator of both the importance of, and the reluctance towards/limitations of 
current breach information sharing.  
 
Due to limitations in actionable information sharing, there is a strong dependence on data 
acquired from third parties which can collect, aggregate, and share/sell it based on their 
operational model. However, the opaque nature of the informational product, and the 
financial incentives of the sellers generate a market characterised by information 
asymmetries (Moore 2010). Akerlof (1970) introduced the notion of ‘information 
asymmetries’ to highlight the aggregate effects occurring as a result of actor dishonesty in 
opaque circumstances. This concept is applicable to organisational cybersecurity in a number 
of ways: as vendors sell solutions of a relatively opaque effectiveness, the pursuit of longer 
development cycles, or, in the case of threat intelligence, increased sample sizes and data 
collection efforts, can lead to a competitive disadvantage, absent a truth-telling mechanism, 
when compared to ‘lemons’ (inferior products that are overvalued in a transaction through 
asymmetric information). Similarly, as organisations benefit from opaqueness in relation to 
their security capabilities, consumers can only gain insight regarding said capabilities as a 
result of atypical occurrences, such as high-visibility breaches or ‘whistle-blowing’. This 
affects the competitive feasibility of high investments in security, when having to compete 
with ‘lemons’. So, the potential effects on market confidence, quality, price and 
competitiveness resulting from the unbalanced informational availability and dynamics 
between interacting parties are significant. (Anderson and Moore 2006, Romanosky 2016) 
 
The implications of asymmetric information have been previously explored, particularly 
within the cyber intelligence market. In its report on ‘Estimating the cost of cybercrime’, The 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2013) presented the limitations of widely reported information 
concerning the aggregate economic impact of cyber-criminal activity by highlighting the 
major discrepancies found between existing assessments. In 2012, Symantec estimated a 
global cost of cybercrime to the economy of $110bn, which is significantly lower than the 
$1trn global cost approximation made by McAfee in 2009. McAfee’s 2014 and 2018 estimates 
are comparatively more moderate and consistent ($400bn-$600bn), accounting for an 
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approximate $45bn year-on-year growth, yet still present a $200bn range between the 
‘conservative’ and the ‘maximum’ values (McAfee 2014, McAfee 2018). While some 
inconsistencies between reports are to be expected due to differences in methodologies, 
sample sizes, and scope, the acute variation between values highlights the limitations of such 
information as a source of insight. This phenomenon is further exacerbated by the challenges 
presented for consistent, reliable data collection on cybercrime (Broadhead 2018). 
Nonetheless, such figures/estimates are influential in the public discourse.  
 
Greenberg (2012) quoted two contributors to the studies containing the previously 
highlighted figures (more specifically the 2009 McAfee report, and the Symantec report 
suggesting that cybercrime leads to a cost of $250bn/year for American firms), who were 
surprised by the end outputs which they characterised as grossly exaggerated. However, in 
spite of its disputed status (Greenberg 2012, Economist Intelligence Unit 2013), the $1trn 
figure was quoted by U.S. President Barrack Obama (2009) as part of his speech addressing 
the importance of cybersecurity, and thus populated beyond its initial reach. Incorrect 
estimations of the effects of cybercrime at a macro level can misinform decision makers, or 
force them to speculate what adjustments should be applied to the available data, both 
instances leading to potential inadequate response strategies, over or underemphasising the 
evolving significance of the problem. They also affect the perceived credibility of third party 
information due to its susceptibility to distortion and overgeneralisation. Even parties that 
are not commercially vested can output misleading or untruthful strategic information, as 
highlighted by Ziv (1993), who argues that, absent a “truth telling mechanism”, the gains 
obtained through private information sharing within oligopolistic circumstances are 
outweighed by the incentives of firms to misrepresent their position and strength.  
 
Attackers are also likely to leverage informational asymmetries by speculating adversarial 
dynamics. Within cybersecurity, their position entails numerous inherent strategic 
advantages which include: having an active role (first mover), an ability to employ 
disinformation and leverage defender uncertainty (Prince 2016) and to gain real-world 
feedback concerning their offensive capabilities. In contrast, the defensive position is largely 
reactive, supported by pre-emption consisting of general anticipation, deterrence, and 
mitigation. In addition, it is also susceptible to misinformation and deception having limited 
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means to verify threat specific hypotheses which include a reliance on simulated defence for 
feedback (i.e. penetration testing/white hat hacking), anecdotal evidence, and retrospective 
analysis of prior attacks (which can entail inferences from incomplete information, non-
actionable insights, or attack vector specificity). This asymmetry is further amplified by 
functional specialisation: attacker rent-seeking relies on offensive primary capabilities, while 
organisations, as defenders, are functionally conditioned by value generation through 
primary capabilities that are often dichotomous to security. All these factors play a role in the 
uncertainty faced by the actors, while also influencing the range of tools and mechanisms 
which can be used for its mitigation. Thus, due to the inherent informational and strategic 
disadvantages of the defensive position, such actors have to exhibit a higher efficiency and 
effectiveness managing the uncertainty they face.  
 
2.1.5.2 Assimilating and Acting on Information 
 
Beyond the availability of sufficient relevant security information lies the issue of its 
assimilation, contextualisation and use. For uncertainty to be effectively mitigated through 
predictive means, not only is sufficient valid information required, but insight has to be 
extracted from it and incorporated into an actionable format. When deconstructing the 
development of actionable insight/intelligence within cybersecurity, two interdependent 
aspects stand out: a capabilities, and a behavioural component. Reece and Stahl (2015) 
explore the cybersecurity aggregate capabilities availability gaps and development efforts at 
within the context of the UK market, with particular emphasis on governmental efforts aiming 
to stimulate such development through professional formalisation. The study illustrates the 
spike in demand for information security staff, citing a 74% increase between 2007 and 2013. 
The absence of a centralised, common body of knowledge, the evolving, context-dependent 
role requirements, as well as the emphasis on “experience and social factors over learned 
technical skills and graduate entry” are some of the barriers faced by centralised efforts to 
stimulate the supply of information security capabilities through “professionalisation” efforts 
(Reece and Stahl 2015:193). So, given this market context, as well as the novelty and 
inconsistencies of cybersecurity roles, it is clearly difficult to rely on the availability of tacit 
expertise and individual capabilities as a counterbalance to process inefficiencies and 
informational issues. An increasing cybersecurity skill gap is also identified by FireEye’s (2018) 
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M-Trends report as a function of disproportionality between the rate of growing demand and 
the available supply. 
 
In their investigation on the role of human behaviour in cybersecurity risk, Pfleeger and 
Caputo (2012) highlight the effects of bias and cognitive load limitations in the interpretation 
of security information (presented in the form of scenarios) by practitioners. It should be 
noted that the notion of ‘practitioner’ is used to describe participants to the study who have 
been selected based on their “decision making authority about cyber security products and 
usage” (Pfleeger and Caputo 2012:600). The findings of the study include a series of 
noteworthy conclusions, such as the lack of a shared understanding or distinct awareness of 
security amongst the participants, a failure to identify patterns and “connect the dots” when 
having to combine a narrow focus and a large volume of information, and a lack of experience 
in deconstructing situations in order to determine security relationships. The practitioners 
showed difficulties in their attempt to understand the nature of the risk presented in each 
scenario and evaluate multiple perceptions to determine the optimal decision within the time 
constraints — an issue accentuated by the high cognitive load (high stress applied to the 
working memory of the analyst), and discernible effects of bias. Biases are presented by 
Heuer (1999) as a common, yet highly detrimental factor affecting intelligence development. 
 
In addition, Pfleeger and Caputo (2012) argue that security is generally perceived to be a 
secondary task, and rarely a goal in itself, which is an indicator of incentive misalignments. 
The detrimental effects of misaligned incentives and principal-agent problems on managing 
(general) risk are well documented, being described by Haldane (2009) as one of the main 
causes of the financial crisis of 2008. Moore (2010) highlights the multitude of incentive 
misalignments which emerge within cybersecurity because of the efficiency-security 
dichotomy. This issue is accentuated by the division between the risk faced by the 
organisation/system and that faced by individual decision makers and security actors. 
Subsequently, the misalignments occurring between the individuals and organisations tasked 
with ensuring security and the beneficiaries of such efforts, are characterised as “rife” by 
Moore (2010) who argues that stakeholder incentives should be the starting point in the 
analysis of cybersecurity. Pfleeger and Caputo (2012) discuss the tendency of users to subvert 
security measures and systems which impede on the ability to carry out the primary task. As 
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a result, the motivations of the stakeholders can have a significant effect on the information 
that is collected, its validity, and its assimilation within a narrative. 
 
The literature barriers to effective cybersecurity/information security practice includes a 
variety of socio-behavioural factors. These include human errors (Kraemer and Carayon 
2007), perception and bias (Kraemer 2009, Pfleeger and Caputo 2012) and the organisational 
culture (2006). In addition, Kraemer (2009:510) identifies a series of additional human and 
organisational themes which underpin cyber vulnerabilities: technology, management 
(including resources and performance management), policy problems, and training. Given 
their distribution throughout the organisational cybersecurity function, these factors 
condition both the foresight and the likelihood of incidents. Furthermore, they are a 
manifestation of both of the behaviour patterns and capabilities needed to assimilate 
information effectively across organisational roles in order to make adequate inferences. As 
a result, in order to tackle cybersecurity as a knowledge problem, there is a need for a more 
robust conceptualisation of social/behavioural mechanisms within the prescriptive 
constructs used.  
 
2.1.5.3 Problem Context: Complexity and Foresight 
 
The degree of complexity attributable to the context of a risk problem is arguably the most 
generalisable determinant of the utility gained from traditional risk analysis methods. High 
levels of complexity affect the feasibility of anticipatory scenario-building, convolute the 
system models, and limit the effectiveness of probabilistic analysis — all indicators of deep 
uncertainty (Cox 2012). In his analysis of cyberspace, Phister (2010) emphasises the 
importance of the differentiation between its classification as a complicated system versus a 
complex one, proposing the latter to be correct. Complicated systems are deemed to exhibit 
high levels of dynamism while incorporating many moving components. However, they also 
exhibit linear cause-and-effect relationships that allow the prediction of systemic behaviour 
and phenomena with significant confidence. In contrast, complex systems present nonlinear 
interactions between components, an absence of centralised control systems, self-
organisation and co-evolution, as well as non-equilibrium order and collectivist dynamics. 
Thus, the pragmatic and epistemic implications of classifying a risk problem as complex rather 
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than complicated are highly significant. (Phister 2010)  
 
Benbya and McKelvey (2006a:17) suggest that (dynamic, open) systems can exhibit three 
possible states: stable, chaotic and an intermediate state of “critical complexity”, “emergent 
complexity” or “melting zone”. They distinguish complex systems based on the significant 
strength of the interactions between their elements, which is manifested through the 
potential effects of current events on a wide range of probabilities associated with future 
events. Thus, in complex systems small changes and perturbations can lead to large, 
seemingly unrelated effects through nonlinearity. Mason (2007) presents increasing 
complexity as inversely proportional to predictability and environmental adaptation. Given 
the volume of perpetually interacting actors and components which define cyberspace 
beyond its physical infrastructure dimension, and the dynamism of its interactions, it can be 
seen as alternating between critical complexity and chaotic states (Kuehl 2009).  
 
In this context, Sharma and Dhillon (2009) critique ‘traditional risk analysis approaches’ in 
Information Security, which are defined based on the premise that risk is quantifiable, due to 
their failure to accommodate the chaotic nature of the key variables and their context. The 
authors’ interpretation of chaos theory overlaps with the complexity narrative through ideas 
such as nonlinearity and high degree of dependence on the initial conditions within a system, 
but proposes the employment of ‘strange attractors’, which are defined by Rickles et al. 
(2007) as a chaotic system’s aperiodic, non-repeated patterns of configurations (phase-space 
points) manifested after recovering from perturbations. Chaotic systems are distinguishable 
from other complex systems in that they are not defined by the volume of interacting sub-
units, but by the intricacy of the dynamics which results from their interaction (Rickles et al. 
2007). Subsequently, complex systems can be chaotic, and chaotic systems are complex, yet 
the two are not equivalent. Despite the seemingly chaotic nature of security incidents, as 
manifested through their aperiodic occurrence and intricate dynamics which emerge from 
the permutations of rational adversarial behaviour and the dynamic asset-vulnerability base, 
the broader complexity construct presents itself as a more robust conceptual foundation for 
ontological/stochastic deep uncertainty within cybersecurity. While acknowledging the 
potential for oscillation between states of critical complexity and chaos, asserting that 
cyberspace — especially at a defined, organisational level — is inherently chaotic is hard to 
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justify. Nonetheless, if nonlinearity is recognised as a mechanism that shapes the ontology of 
cybersecurity, there are significant implications for the inferential paradigms and constructs 
used for decision making. (Gershenson 2013)  
 
The centrality of scale and granularity when discussing complexity and cybersecurity events 
is made apparent by the characterisations of complex systems. For example, Phister 
(2010:15) presents five components of complexity within systems. These are:  
• Complex and networked causality in the absence of simple cause-and-effect 
relationships;  
• Vast volume of plausible options which make the system impossible to optimise;  
• The behaviour of the system exhibits recurring trends and patterns;  
• Pattern and trend variation due to the co-evolutionary process, the absence of 
equilibrium-based order or centralised control systems; and  
• Minimal predictability of component variation.  
 
In contrast, Maguire (2011:82) provides a more elaborate characterisation of complex 
systems, which includes attributes such as:  
• Numerous elements which interact dynamically;  
• Rich interactions where any element can exert and is susceptible to influence from 
other elements thorough nonlinear, typically short-range interactions;  
• The overall system is open, far from equilibrium, and exhibits both positive and 
negative interaction feedback loops;  
• The availability of systemic histories; and, 
• Local, component level behaviour is ‘ignorant’ of the holistic attributes of the system. 
 
While using different lenses of analysis, both descriptions exclude, in principle, highly 
centralised systems. As a result, the use of complexity as an explanatory paradigm for 
organisational phenomena must account for the varying role of centralisation in most 
operational models. At an organisational level, the multitude of employees, vendors, 
stakeholders, and other third parties which interact to define a company’s cyber presence 
oscillate through a state of critical complexity. However, organisational dynamics are also 
shaped by top-down interventions, structural systemic constraints, and boundaries in a more 
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pronounced, scale-specific manner. Thus, the presence of (varied levels of) centralisation in 
organisations has led to a pluralistic interpretation of ‘complexity’ in management research: 
as a metaphor, an analogue, and a true descriptor of social systems (Merali and Allen 2011). 
This classification is partly philosophically driven. Within the current context, complexity is 
deemed as a true yet inherently incomplete descriptor of a series of ontological mechanisms 
which underpin the ontology and dynamics of organisational cyber risk problems (a line of 
reasoning further elaborated in the Research Philosophy). 
 
 Furthermore, within the context of cybersecurity events/cyber risk problems, systemic 
centralisation is a function of defined scale and locality — concepts which are at least partly 
eroded by the parameters of cyberspace as a domain of interaction. So, while organisational 
systems can indeed respond to centralised influences, by incorporating technological 
interdependencies with highly networked, nonlinear interactions, and an overarching 
sensitivity to feedback loops, the applicability of complexity as a lens of analysis is 
consolidated. Particularly within a cybersecurity narrative, the extent of centralisation is 
diminished by the inclusion of threat interactions and attack surface dynamics which are not 
a product of (the same) centralised efforts. It is worth noting that exceptions to this line of 
reasoning can be found for organisations which, either due to their scale or non-reliance on 
complex and networked information system architectures, exhibit predictable cybersecurity 
patterns that are a product of centralised characteristics and behaviours. Nonetheless, such 
organisational examples are not at the core of the cybersecurity debate, given the current 
state and direction of economic activity highlighted in the previous section on macro-
tendencies and cybersecurity. Instead, the increasing reliance on the cyber domain, through 
its effects on interconnectivity and potential interactions, serves as an amplifier of 
complexity, non-locality and non-linearity in organisational dynamics.  
 
At a domain-level, Phister (2010) classifies cyberspace as a Complex Adaptive System (CAS) 
and, in this context, defines the ‘adaptive’ component as the system’s tendency to change its 
structure and behaviour over time in ways which tend to improve its success. As a result, the 
term is often equated to an open, dynamic system’s sustained existence and growth. The 
author proposes a number of conceptual implications for cyberspace based on this 
classification, which include the applicability of the ideas of success and failure (fitness) 
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criteria, the existence of an internal source of variation, a selection process usable to 
retain/discard variations which have an effect on fitness, a performance evaluation 
mechanism, and over-time accumulation and internalisation of variations which maximise 
environmental fit. In turn, the success of the interacting components of the system (i.e. 
organisations) lies in their ability to adapt to the dynamics and pressures of the wider context. 
So, when coupled with the low predictability of system component variation, adaptation 
becomes a primary mechanism for the pursuit of fitness in Complex Adaptive Systems, and, 
thus, in cyberspace. (Lansing 2003) 
 
A different perspective on the highly networked interactions and the diffusion/non-locality 
of cybersecurity phenomena, is provided by Moore (2010) from a cyber economics 
perspective, through the notion of externalities. More specifically, this is achieved by 
illustrating three of the types of externalities which can occur: network externalities, which 
are used to explain the incentives behind the tendency of developers and vendors to 
prioritise market dominance rather than platform security, and why more secure new 
products often fail to gain momentum; externalities of insecurity, which can be observed 
through the variety of losses that are incurred due to a compromised unit (i.e. loss of 
consumer confidence, market value, intellectual property, opportunities, and other societal 
costs); and security interdependence, which can encourage ‘free-riding’, especially in 
circumstances where overall security depends on the weakest link. In spite of their different 
disciplinary grounding, externalities are a conceptualisation of the implications which emerge 
from interactions within complex systems, and encompass co-evolutionary behaviour, 
emergence, and nonlinearity. (Anderson and Moore 2007) 
 
2.1.5.4 Converging Mechanisms: Non-linearity in Organisational Systems 
 
The ubiquity of nonlinearity and its central role in understanding systems is highlighted by 
Lansing (2003). Due to its wide applicability, the meta-disciplinary explanatory potential of 
complexity theory has gained support in a variety of disciplines (i.e. Holling 2001, McKelvey 
2001, Folke 2006, Mason 2007, Allen and Boulton. 2011). However, it is important to 
distinguish between its explanatory and its prescriptive function for the current line of 
enquiry — cybersecurity as a knowledge problem, resulting in a context-construct gap. The 
 
37 
former consists of attempts to identify ontological mechanisms, systemic ontological demi-
regularities and patterns, as well as their characteristics. In contrast, the latter entails 
consideration for the social component of behaviour, cognition and its sub-constructs, such 
as time, available resources, and priorities of organisations as an application setting. Given 
the pragmatic, decision-making context of the problem, the two vectors of analysis must be 
reconciled in order to gain a flexible, phenomenon-based perspective as a point of departure 
for prescriptive outputs. On this point, Mousavi and Gigerenzer (2014:1674) note: 
“According to the ecological rationality framework, the knowledge of how people should 
make decisions cannot be studied without considering how people are able to make 
decisions.” (Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2014:1674) 
Thus, a sole focus on systemic behaviours can neglect the social parameters of both the 
problem, and its application setting. In contrast, a purely social perspective of the problem 
would be insufficient to tackle the complex dynamics exhibited by cybersecurity in 
organisations. By exploring these two dimensions, the mechanisms they exhibit within the 
context of organisational cybersecurity can be identified and used to design a conceptual 
framework which tackles the context-construct gap, and an empirical research strategy. The 
resulting outputs serve as a foundation for the conceptualisation of a theoretical construct 
able to facilitate emergence and adaptation/evolution within an organisation’s response to 
cyber risk, while acknowledging the implications — both systemic (Holling 2001) and 
cognitive (Heuer 1999) — of the application setting’s behavioural tendencies. The theoretical 
utility of such a construct/approach is unlikely to be local, as the core limitations faced by 
traditional applications of risk management within organisational cybersecurity are the result 
of emergence from market/system level properties (i.e. externalities, incentive 
misalignments, asymmetric information, capability gaps and propensity for bias), while the 
influence of non-linearity on the uncertainty faced within (holistic) organisational 
cybersecurity is axiomatic. As a result, the following chapters include a review of existing 
literature covering the systemic complexity, and the behavioural-cognitive dimensions of the 




2.2 Ontological Mechanisms: Systemic Complexity and Hierarchy 
2.2.1 Complexity, Metaphors and Mechanisms 
 
The use of systems and complexity theory to frame the knowledge-problem narrative 
provides a primary ontological foundation for the exploration of organisational cybersecurity 
as a phenomenon — a pre-requisite for the trans-disciplinary conceptual framework design. 
The previous section highlighted how systemic complexity is present to varying degrees 
throughout the cybersecurity context, in spite of the often implicit assumptions of defence 
paradigms which employ foresight and predictive heuristics. More specifically, a complexity 
based critical lens of analysis shapes the narrative on key issues such as the nature of the 
organisational cybersecurity management environment, scale of abstraction adequacy, 
causalities, dynamism, and linearity, which underpin traditional risk thinking. Ensuring 
mechanism-based assumptions in the implicit models of the organisational cybersecurity 
context dynamics allows for the design of a conceptual framework upon which pragmatic 
constructs, procedures, and action plans can be formulated. (Merali and Allen 2011) 
 
In other words, attempts to solve ‘real-world’ problems are constrained in their 
effectiveness by the adequacy of their assumptions concerning the problems themselves 
(ontological adequacy) and by the contextual efficacy of the methods of choice (analytical 
adequacy) (Henrickson and McKelvey 2002). The following sections will explore how such 
constrains can be minimised through an overview of the wider systems theory literature base 
from the perspective of mechanisms, and will provide a critical outline of the ontological 
implications these carry for the cybersecurity management knowledge-problem. This will 
primarily revolve around conceptualising cross-scale open system context (or lack-thereof), 
order and emergence manifesting (demi-)regularities, and adaptation as a central systemic 
mechanism in dynamic contexts. 
 
2.2.2 Deconstructing Organisational Systems: Adaptive Cycles and the 
Panarchy 
 
A core premise of complexity theory is that the degree of system complexity is a 
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determinant of both the ability and feasibility of understanding its localised dynamics 
(Lansing 2003, Gershenson 2013). As previously highlighted, through non-linearity, complex 
systems can amplify small deviations and exogenous stimuli in unpredictable ways (Benbya 
and McKelvey 2006a). Given that most real-world complex systems  are nested, context 
dependent, continuously interacting and evolving, such deviations are both ubiquitous and 
instrumental in shaping the patterns under which both organisations and society as a whole 
operate. In fact, the nested nature of organisations within wider social structures is an 
expression of the systemic tendency for cross-scale integration. 
 
Within complex systems, elements which interact at similar speeds and spatial attributes 
can create semi-autonomous levels, each sharing information and materials with the next 
(Holling 2001, Allen et al. 2014). These multi-level dimensions form “hierarchies” (“hierarchic 
systems”) — a concept that was coined by Simon (1962), who presents them as a frequently 
occurring structural pattern which enables faster evolution when compared to non-
hierarchies. Hierarchies also present distinguishable interactions, both between and within 
subsystems, thus enabling the analysis of their dynamics. Social systems such as organisations 
fit a hierarchical structure, encompassing a multitude of substrata which are supported 
through exchanges of information and materials. At the same time, organisations are 
subsystems supported by larger levels/structures, such as markets, and are subjected to 
similar exchanges. From this perspective, cybersecurity processes are nested in an 
organisational setting both structurally and functionally. 
 
Holling (2001) argues that each level of a dynamic hierarchy has two roles: to conserve and 
stabilise smaller, faster levels, and to develop and evaluate innovations through same-level 
experimentation. By containing the variation required to generate innovations within 
individual subsystems and preserving the fundamental exchanges between the various levels, 
the integrity of the hierarchy can be supported. Subsequently, altering the properties of the 
exchanges that take place between the levels of a hierarchy can result in its collapse and 
reconfiguration. The dynamic, innovation oriented function of hierarchies is represented 
within the Adaptive Cycle model, which proposes that the future states of a system are a 
product of three core properties: its change potential, or “wealth”; its controllability, as 
determined by the extent of the connectedness between the control processes and variables; 
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and, its adaptive capacity, presented within the model as the antithesis of vulnerability 
(Holling 2001:394). (Allen et al. 2014) 
 
While all three properties seem desirable, the Adaptive Cycle model proposes that complex 
systems typically navigate a cyclical trajectory consisting of four stages which alter the 
configuration of wealth, connectedness and adaptive capacity. Given its key role in survival, 
the tendency to behave in ways which increase potential is an evolutionary imperative for all 
open systems (‘object/structure necessity’ Easton 2010). Without potential, they lack both 
controllability and adaptive capacity, and are thus unlikely to be competitive in acquiring 
capital, instead being completely dependent on the inertia that is determined by higher 
levels. Thus, the slow accumulation of capital initiates the adaptive cycle and gradually 
increases the available potential for both existing and transformed states (exploitation stage). 
As capital is accumulated, it becomes tightly bound to the processes and variables of the 
existing system state, and increase system rigidity (conservation stage). The degradation in 
controllability makes the system vulnerable to “agents of disturbance” who can trigger a 
rapid release of the accumulated potential (release stage). As the rigid structures are lost in 
the release process, and the wealth is made available in the ecosystem, it generates new, 
potentially innovative combinations (reorganisation stage) which form the basis of the 
subsequent exploitation stage. Unlike the exploitation and conservation components of the 
cycle, the release and reorganisation are presented as highly unpredictable in both timing 
and results. The continuous, multi-scale nature of Adaptive Cycles is captured within the 
notion of a “Panarchy”. (Holling 2001, Walker et al. 2006, Allen et al. 2014) 
 
Holling (2001:401) argues that, in human systems, the performance of Panarchies is 
amplified by three factors: foresight and intentionality, which can mitigate the extreme 
outcome potential of cycles, but can be hijacked in the interest of subsystems (i.e. 
individuals), and can be of limited efficacy, particularly in highly complex settings; 
communication, which enables more efficient coordination between levels and can generate 
slow moving levels in the Panarchy such as culture and mythology, which affect intentionality 
(Tansey and O’Riordan 1999); and technology — a scale amplification mechanism that is 
unique to social systems. By leveraging these factors, organisations influence their navigation 
of adaptive cycles, through evolving representations of slower-level conditions, same level 
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innovation potential and presence of agents of disturbance, and faster-level tendencies. At 
each level, objects and structures compete in reconciling their necessity with the adaptive 
pressures imposed by wider-level context, creating a network of interdependence. In social 
systems, this amplifies the importance of adaptive representational efficacy, as positive 
feedback and pluralistic adaptive drivers are moderated by foresight and intent, 
communication, and technology.  
 
In spite of their sustaining properties, Panarchies are susceptible to collapse when triggers 
in the form of a crisis at a smaller, faster level coincide with the release stage of a larger, 
slower level (Holling 2001). If distinguishing the organisational cyber systems as a level within 
a hierarchy, the impact of a crisis can transcend its localised nature and reach both slower 
and faster levels. While it is more likely to affect its sub-levels which depend on it for stability 
and innovation, it can also trigger the release stage within larger levels, such as the 
organisation itself. Thus, the impact of sub-system failure on larger, slower levels of the 
Panarchy is influenced by the continuous dynamic of the Adaptive Cycle. Similarly, the release 
stage at a cyber systems level can be influenced by triggers from lower levels (i.e. single 
system component). Establishing subsystem-level foresight requires an understanding of the 
wealth, rigidity and adaptive capacity of not only the level itself but also of its hierarchical 
setting of influence. This enables the pursuit of a strategy that is anchored in the dynamics of 
the setting. Absent consideration for the setting of a specific system and of the properties of 
its hierarchical dependencies, analytically adequate analysis can yield ontologically 
inadequate inferences concerning both the probability and the impact of a disturbance.  
 
When used as an ontological heuristic for framing the cross-scale setting of the knowledge 
problem narrative, the ‘Panarchy’ construct provides a series of benefits. These include its 
trans-disciplinary explanatory potential, its compatibility with multi-granular complex system 
analysis, its spatiotemporal dimension as a source of context specificity, and its emphasis on 
adaptation and innovation as systemic, multi-dimensional constructs. However, it also 
provides a number of potential limitations. Firstly, its general explanatory power is contrasted 
with a limited predictive power — a point of contention affecting complexity studies as a 
whole (Lansing 2003:200). To address this, the prediction-adverse foundation of complexity 
thinking is complemented with an emphasis on adaptation which aims to provide an 
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alternative that strengthens its prescriptive utility (Gershenson 2013). Secondly, agent 
behaviour-driven variability can alter the apparent sequence progression of the adaptive 
cycles to an unclear extent. In spite of it being accounted for, the nature, scope and 
implications of rationality-induced variability in system behaviour can exceed the boundaries 
of the construct. This is addressed within the following sub-chapter (2.3) of the literature 
review, in an attempt to incorporate necessary behavioural/’rationality’ constructs within the 
conceptual framework. Finally, describing the dynamic structure of a Panarchy entails a 
grounding in systemic order and emergence, both concepts discussed at length in the 
following. 
 
2.2.3 Order and Emergence 
 
Given the reliance of adaptive agents (within the organisational cybersecurity narrative) on 
schema-based context navigation strategies, both the existence and accurate perception of 
patterns and distinguishable properties in systemic states — i.e. systemic order —  are 
paramount for adaptive success (Maguire 2011). As an exception, a chaotic state indicates 
system behaviour that is seemingly random (Levy 1994) and, thus, severely affects the scope 
of foresight and intentionality. Nonetheless, outside of chaos, non-linear agent interactions 
lead to the creation of distinguishable — “emergent” — system properties which cannot be 
inferred based on the mechanistic decomposition of the system into its parts. The notion of 
emergence was coined in a systemic context to describe properties rooted in scale-specific 
complexity within hierarchies (Merali and Allen 2011). Such properties are an expression of 
the interaction patterns between components, the system, and the environment. As such, 
they can be “multiply realisable”, i.e. can be achieved in a plurality of ways (Rickles et al. 2007, 
Merali and Allen 2011). (Goldstein 2011) 
 
From a cross-disciplinary perspective, Goldstein (2011:66) presents a shared narrative of 
emergent phenomena, which includes characteristics like: novelty in properties and entities 
at a macro-level in relation to their micro-levels; unpredictability and “non-deducibility”; 
macro-level “integrated coordination”; and dynamism. The nature of emergent properties is 
also influenced by the characteristics of the system. From this perspective, McKelvey 
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(2001:149) defines organisations as: “quasi-natural phenomena, caused by both the 
conscious intentionality of those holding formal office (rational systems behaviour) and 
naturally occurring structure and process emerging as a result of co-evolving individual 
employee behaviours in a selectionist context (natural and open systems behaviour)”. An 
alternative view of emergent order which reconciles its self-organisational and constructional 
dimensions (typical of organisational systems) is provided by Goldstein (2011:73), who 
proposes “emergence as self-transcending construction”. In such settings, the principles of 
self-organisation and emergence account for intent, and reflect the interaction between 
conscious efforts and ‘natural’ structures and phenomena. The prominent significance of 
scale in conceptualising emergence is of note when considering the effects of intentionality 
and locality of foresight. At a macro-level in complex, open systems, component-agent 
interactions can lead to self-organisation, order, and behaviours that are scale-specific, non-
mechanistic, and unforeseen at lower, faster levels.  
 
Rickles et al. (2007) emphasise the fundamental role of emergent properties in the 
formation of hierarchies, as each level affects the next. If viewing the cybersecurity function 
beyond its engineering/linear systems level, its effects on the dynamics of organisational 
properties such as vulnerability and adaptivity can be similarly seen as emergent, multiply 
realisable and non-mechanistic. Attacker access to specific assets can generally be obtained 
in a plurality of ways, with similar effect for the organisation. Retrospective analysis can 
provide insight into the nature of a breach, including the establishment of a causal narrative, 
however its accurate prediction can be unlikely, due to the vast potential spectrum of 
unknown variables and circumstantial behaviour. Even retrospection can fail at times to 
generate insight with a high level of confidence, as illustrated by the difficulties of attribution 
for specific cyber-attacks (Rid and Buchanan 2014). This is amplified by the direct effects of 
potential prediction on the narrative itself: foreseeing and addressing a specific threat-
vulnerability tuple which would have otherwise led to a breach can either deviate the 
narrative, pushing the organisation, as a multi-stable system, towards an alternative 
evolutionary path, or potentially lead to the same result depending on threat behaviour, 
alternative vulnerabilities, and other unforeseeable factors.  
 
However, Lansing (2003:185) highlights how patterns of emergence often become 
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apparent, despite the ‘unsolvable’ causalities which shape the behaviour of systems 
exhibiting nonlinear dynamics. Such patterns are pivotal for the rational interpretation of 
complex system behaviour, and can provide actionable insight concerning problems which are 
not decomposable. Due to the coevolutionary relationships shaping levels within hierarchies, 
distinguishable patterns of system or agent behaviour are the foundation of rational feedback 
and, implicitly, foresight and intentionality, communication, and technology (Holling 2001). 
For example, in spite of variation in both the behaviour and consistency of its individual 
members, the culture of organisations is generally stable and cohesive (Miller and Page 2007). 
Conversely, from an organisational perspective, Smith (2003:252) finds that “… culture change 
is one of the most difficult types of change to accomplish”. Authors like Thomson et al. (2006) 
have called for the “cultivation” of an IS culture as a way to address ‘the human component’ 
of vulnerability. However, even if assuming the human component to be a cohesive, 
distinguishable dimension of IS, proposals of culture design neglect its emergent nature. As a 
higher level of the organisational hierarchy, the functional role of culture is stability inducing, 
enabling the cohabitation and coordination of lower, faster levels. In the absence of pressure 
from even higher-levels, i.e. business environment, intentionally altering culture dynamics 
based on a hypothesised causal logic can prove to be maladaptive, leading to unintended 
consequences. This is supported by the findings of Harris and Ogbona (2002:47) who have 
found the unintended effects of top-down culture change efforts to be both “pervasive and 
profound”.  
 
Nonetheless, emergent patterns lie at the foundation of feedback and foresight within 
complex settings. Their probabilistic consistency is essential for effective planning, forecasting 
and analysis. However, the previously highlighted implications of multi-directional causalities 
and non-linearity as limitations in mechanistic (and even non-mechanistic) prediction also 
outline its boundaries and variable efficacy. It should also be noted that, despite the 
incommensurable range of potential interactions which can occur in a Panarchy, the range of 
total potential outcomes can be differentiated from the range of plausible outcomes. 
Predictive efforts within such settings are not all equivalent, and can be manifested in a range 
of initiatives: identifying predispositions at a specific level of a hierarchy within adequately 
chosen spatial and temporal parameters can seem significantly more likely to yield results 
than mechanistic forecasts. Even so, intentional attempts to alter emergent properties in 
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anticipation of perturbations and stress should acknowledge both the potential and the 
epistemic limitations of such efforts, especially if these rely on inference and extrapolation 
from level-specific indicators, as hierarchical system levels themselves often fail to align in 
predictable ways (Benbya and McKelvey 2006b).  
 
In line with Holling’s (2001) viewpoint, the co-evolutionary properties of hierarchies, 
manifested through the continuous nature of emergent parameters which shape fitness 
pressures, lead to the formation and destruction of competing structures for capital 
extraction and use. This phenomenon is at the core of conceptualising cyber resilience: if 
viewing cybersecurity as a dimension of an organisational hierarchy, environmental fitness 
pressures are buffered by rational structures which prioritise the hierarchy’s main goal: 
sustained performance in wealth extraction. Due to their hierarchical context, the fitness 
parameters of cyber systems are imposed and supported by the organisation, rather than the 
wider environment. As wealthy systems are able to pursue a wider range of potential states, 
wealth extraction effectiveness can lead to a potential disconnect between the wider fitness 
pressures imposed by the environment on an organisation, and their rational interpretation 
and implementation in lower levels. So, as a nested system, the ability of perturbations within 
cyber systems to be supported by their organisational setting is inversely proportional with 
rigidity of the organisation itself: if it doesn’t trigger the release stage, the wider level can 
support and alter the lower levels.  
 
 To summarise, a hierarchical and continuous view of complex systems can be used to 
explain the key ontological dynamics which underpin the cybersecurity management 
knowledge problem. Patterns within emergent properties are an essential source of foresight 
and feedback, however, even if accurately identified, their non-mechanistic nature makes 
their conversion into action dependent on heuristic assumptions rather than absolute 
relationships. The continuous spatiotemporal nature of intra and inter level dynamics is 
reflected in multiply-realisable emergent properties such as vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity, while foresight and intentionality, as well as exogenous pressures and triggers, can 
shape the trajectory of the system/organisation between different states of stability.  
 
Based on this framing, the likelihood of a cyber incident triggering a release stage at an 
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organisational level is dependent on the overall state of the organisation. Highly stable 
environments with sufficient adaptivity and wealth are able to maintain their integrity even 
after significant perturbations, whereas highly rigid or poor (lacking wealth) systems are 
inherently more vulnerable. Even in circumstances of vulnerability, the systemic collapse of 
an organisation can also be prevented by mechanisms and events in higher, stability inducing, 
societal level. This explains why, despite the significant and varied costs incurred by 
companies due to cyber incidents (Thomas et al. 2013), these do not regularly undergo large 
scale visible release stages. While the cyber-layer of organisations has shown exploited key 
vulnerabilities, the wealth, higher layers’ resilience and external support mechanisms have 
prevented their systemic unravelling. However, as the aggregate non-local effects of such 
incidents can shape the stability, dynamics and fitness pressures of the emerging security 
climate, the local avoidance of rigidity, low resilience, and competitive disadvantages relies 
on the use of adaptation as an evolutionary mechanism.  
 
2.2.4 Evolution, Adaptation and Exaptation  
 
“Adaptation at the macro level (the ‘whole’ system) is characterized by emergence and self-
organization based on the local adaptive behaviour of the system’s constituents. “(Merali and 
Allen 2011:41) 
 
The adaptation to, and navigation of complex, highly dynamic environments without 
schema-based rationality is arguably the norm for most open systems. Evolution, as a 
construct, conceptualises the mechanism which underpins blind adaptation and drives 
emergent structures/forms over spatiotemporal contexts. Beinhocker (2007:214) outlines 
evolution as a substrate-neutral, recursive “algorithmic process of variation, selection, and 
replication…” undergone by interacting agents, based on fitness constraints imposed by their 
environment. Subsequently, it addresses a dynamic search problem — finding and shaping 
suitable system parameters which enable adaptation — and demonstrates distinct 
effectiveness at balancing the exploration and exploitation of an environment. 
Interdependence also plays a significant role in evolution, as highlighted by Benbya and 
McKelvey (2006b:287) (“all ‘evolution’ is really coevolution…”). The following section will 
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address the notion of adaptation as both an emergent process, and as the product of 
intentionality.  
 
Garud et al. (2016:150) present the term “Adaptation” from an evolutionary biology 
perspective, in its noun form, as an “Aptation” — which is succinctly defined as “being fit” — 
containing a characteristic that results from natural selection for its current role. Thus, the 
adaptation process entails the development of such characteristics based on subjection to 
fitness pressures. In contrast, the term “Exaptation” describes a fitness improving 
characteristic which has emerged through natural selection for the fulfilment of a different 
use (Garud et al. 2016). The latter was introduced by Gould and Vrba (1982), who found that 
the use of adaptation as a blanket term for fitness enhancing features distorts the historical 
origin of said features, and fails to distinguish between their function (evolutionary role) and 
effect (the current usage). Larson et al. (2013) highlight how Gould and Vrba’s (1982) proposal 
has failed to gain traction within evolutionary biology, likely due to its limited differentiability 
from adaptation, given dynamic multiple selective pressures and the incremental nature of 
evolution: most existing features have evolved from previous iterations under which they are 
likely to have had a different effect (Larson et al. 2013).  
 
However, outside of evolutionary biology, where selection is a 'blind' process, the notion of 
exaptation has met significantly more success (Larson et al. 2013). In contrast, foresight, or 
guided variation, enables the clear identification of purpose thus facilitating the 
differentiation between (teleological) function and effect. This differentiation is particularly 
important within the context of disciplines which place an emphasis on the intersection of 
variation and foresight, such as innovation studies (Bonifati 2013, Garud et al. 2016) and 
evolutionary economics (Gowdy 1992, Dew and Sarasvathy 2016). The redeployment of 
existing resources to a different effect in response to changes in the environment is also 
represented in strategic management theory in the form of the “dynamic capabilities” 
construct (Teece et al. 1997, Eisenhardt and Martin 2000). As the latter has evolved from a 
different, semi-independent body of literature, it can be seen as an indicator of explanatory 
pressures within the organisational management literature concerning the importance and 




It is important to note that the presence of foresight is not an absolute determinant of 
exaptation. Guided variation can be complemented by “stochastic forces” (i.e. learning errors) 
and ecological adaptation (Larson et al. 2013:497). Furthermore, interacting agents with 
intentionality can collectively exhibit ecological properties — a core premise of the Complex 
Adaptive Systems perspective (Lansing 2003). Miller and Page (2009) emphasise the tendency 
of social agents to form connections, which lead to nonlinear interactions and the formation 
of complex systems used for the navigation of adaptive processes. It is also highlighted that 
change (variation) can be pursued by individuals through deliberations about the 
environment, which may result from either direct cognition, or from potentially mutable 
“stored heuristics” (Miller and Page 2009:10). The authors also illustrate emergent patterns 
of consistency and cohesion which characterise the dynamics of social CASs. Thus, 
coevolutionary pressures are manifested through adaptive and exaptive changes in the nature 
of the connections, which, in turn, affect the shared deliberations which underpin culture. 
 
According to Benbya and McKelvey (2006b:285), the coevolution between organisational 
levels and the environment “involves a continuous process of adaptation and learning along 
with some degree of experimentation”. The three factors are interdependent and seemingly 
generalisable even in ‘blind’ settings. Holling (2001) presents an intent-agnostic perspective 
of learning as a result of system change, i.e. transitions between stages within an adaptive 
cycle. Competing structures at each level of a hierarchy generate variation — analogous to 
the function of experimentation, while the foundation of the variation process consists of 
historically fit structures, or their remnants after a release stage. These predispositions are 
‘blindly’ learnt and form the basis for both adaptation and exaptation given the historical path 
dependence which characterises complex systems (Manson 2001). Through foresight, 
communication, and technology, rationality entails the availability of a significantly broader 
epistemic toolbox for the navigation of coevolutionary, adaptive pressures. As a result, 
targeted variation can decrease the rate of maladaptive properties and maximise the utility 
of available system wealth, while selection strategies enable the identification of exaptive 
structures and fitness pre-emption. Finally, through communication and technology, the 
replication pace and scale of the outputs of selection can be vastly amplified. Subsequently, 




2.2.5 First Principles of Adaptation 
 
As a foundation for the operationalisation of complexity theory, Benbya and McKelvey 
(2006a, 2006b) propose seven complementary principles of adaptation in social and/or 
biological systems extracted from an extended theoretical review. These principles are 
presented as “one logic step above self-evident foundational axioms…” (Benbya and McKelvey 
2006a:21), and encompass:  
• The adaptive tension principle, whereby the creation of adaptive order is stimulated by 
environmental tensions in the form of “energy differentials”;  
• The requisite complexity principle, which entails that the creation of adaptive order 
depends upon internal complexity exceeding external complexity; 
• The change rate principle, asserting that, in dynamic environments, an adaptive 
advantage is attributable to higher internal change rates; 
• The modular design principle, based on the premise that near autonomy in subunits 
can increase complexity and the adaptive response rate; 
• The positive feedback principle, which proposes that seemingly insignificant events 
amongst agents or modules can lead to order creation;  
• The causal intricacy principle, whereby complexity entails dealing with multiple causes 
(“bottom-up, top-down, horizontal, diagonal, intermittent, and Aristotelian”); 
• The coordination rhythms principle, built on the premise that alternating rhythmically 
between sources of causal dominance creates functionally superior adaptive responses than 
balance.   (Benbya and McKelvey 2006a:21) 
 
While non-exhaustive, the seven principles conceptualise a thorough, meta-disciplinary 
representation of adaptive properties within complex settings. Furthermore, they 
complement the emerging ontological representation of adaptation as a key determinant of 
open system ‘survival’ in dynamic, non-linear settings. Thus, similarly to the Panarchy 
construct, they serve a heuristic function in conceptualising the knowledge problem 
narrative. Absent adaptation, the selective pressures generated by the continuously evolving 
environment can impose a lack of fitness onto the organisational hierarchy, decreasing its 
competitiveness and sustainability. This inference is built on a conceptualisation of the ‘cyber 
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function’ as a manifestation of a system level which can be placed on the spectrum of 
openness, through what McKelvey (2001:149) describes as “quasi-natural phenomena”: a 
combination of conscious intentionality and naturally occurring emergence.  
 
An alternative perspective consists of decreasing systemic openness by restraining and 
delimiting an organisation’s cyber presence. Closed systems are not susceptible or responsive 
to external influences, exhibiting exclusively internal dynamics (Rickles et al. 2007). However, 
this view is contradictory to the fundamentally expansive, interaction-orientation of the cyber 
domain. Kuehl (2009) argues that cyberspace is not definable solely through electronic 
infrastructure and physical components, instead comprising of the emergent phenomena 
enabled by said infrastructure. This perspective is not uncontested. The use of the word 
‘cyber’ itself is frowned upon by many security professionals, being seen as meaningless and 
overly abstract, while indicating limitations in the operational understanding of its user 
(Dickson 2015). However, authors such as Kuehl (2009) or Nielsen (2012) do not use the term 
to substitute operational unfamiliarity. Instead, they use it to describe and contextualise an 
emergent domain of human endeavour — a holistic view. From this perspective, security 
proposals to constrict said emergence and pursue a transition towards a more ‘closed’ system 
approach is, with few exceptions, counterintuitive and inconsistent with meta-functional 
adaptive pressures.  
 
In summary, an ontological framing of cybersecurity management based on a complex 
systems perspective enables the development of holistic and generalisable explanatory 
framework. It also highlights the limitations of sole reliance on a mechanistic causal narrative, 
while providing a series of alternative heuristics and concepts, such as Adaptive Cycles, the 
Panarchy, Emergence, (Co)Evolution, Adaptation and Exaptation. An overview of the 
fundamental role of rationality, intentionality, foresight, communication and technology has 
also been presented within the context of non-linear dynamics, further enforcing the 
‘knowledge-problem’ perspective. The following sub-chapter will further explore the 
social/behavioural mechanisms of reason which influence organisational order creation and 
underpin organisational cyber risk practice. This exploration enables a critical examination of 
the nature, extent, and attributes of assumed contextual ‘rationality’ as a construct in 
prescriptive organisational cybersecurity management frameworks. In turn, coupled with the 
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systemic, ontological emphasis on dynamism, complexity, emergence and adaptation, an 
account of ‘rationality’ provides a bedding for empirical investigation, while also grounding 
assumptions in a general (epistemic) conceptual model. 
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2.3 Behavioural Mechanisms: ‘Rationality’ and Social Adaptation 
 
 
One of the highlights of the previous section has been that social levels/systems in a 
Panarchy can coordinate endogenous forces to alter their context and behaviour through 
their use of schema-based ‘rationality’ and intent. The ability to manipulate both systemic 
properties and the evolutionary process is fundamental for human/social endeavours. But a 
high-level representation of rationality and cognition within the context of what Holling 
(2001) classifies as the distinguishing traits of human systems: foresight and intentionality, 
communication, and technology — can prove to be incomplete across levels of analysis.  
 
Assumptions about behavioural/cognitive patterns and mechanisms are embedded within 
the likelihood evaluation of events which involve – i.e. can be altered by – actors as adaptive 
agents. Subsequently, this potentially affects both the accuracy and the effectiveness of 
inferences concerning the role and tendencies of organisational decision-makers who drive 
cybersecurity policy and strategy, the operational patterns of actors who engage with and rely 
on the ICT infrastructure to generate value, and the motivations and means of threat actors 
which introduce the vectors of adaptive pressure. So, as an emerging aspect of the research 
narrative, the section aims to provide a critical overview of rationality and reasoning as 
contextual constructs which underpin such behavioural inferences. March (1978:589) argues 
that rational choice is based on guesses concerning the potential consequences of action, and 
guesses of preference concerning these consequences. However, the assumption of a 
cohesive, collectively held view of the choices which shape an organisation’s cybersecurity 
management narrative which maps to an observer-independent reality is implausible within 
the context of the emerging conceptual framework.  
 
This section will explore the reasoning behind this implausibility, while attempting to 
establish an alternative, contextually adequate base of assumptions. By doing so, the level of 
abstraction of constructs such as ‘intent’ can be decreased, resulting in a more detailed, 
functionally oriented representation of the nature and effects of adaptive agent behaviour, as 
applied to decision making within a complex systems context. A critical representation of 
‘rationality’ is also paramount for establishing prescription, given the causal significance of 
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agent behaviour (variation) in cybersecurity outcomes. Emphasis will be placed on both the 
role of individual cognition mechanisms and on the influence of social structures for decisions 
within cybersecurity management, and its associated uncertainty. However, the literature 
review does not attempt to address cognition and decision making exhaustively — a vast, 
continuously developing area of academic enquiry. Nor does it aim to provide a rigid, final, or 
mono-disciplinary outlook of the problem area. Instead, it aims to advance the ‘knowledge-
problem’ framing and guide subsequent outputs by outlining some key considerations for 
(implicitly) modelling rationality within an organisational cybersecurity setting.   
 
2.3.1 Foresight and Intentionality: Reasoning and Inference Mechanisms  
 
 Attempts to mitigate uncertainty, optimise decision making and, thus, address 
cybersecurity management as a knowledge problem, inherently encompass a cognitive 
dimension. McKelvey (2001:149) identifies rational order in organisational systems as a result 
of “prepensive conscious intentionalities”. This is in contrast to open and natural 
systems/order, the former being defined by exogenous forces, with the latter emerging from 
actor interactions. As composite entities, social systems converge the top-down intent of 
structurally key individuals who are tasked to represent the necessities of the wider structure, 
with the bottom-up behavioural dynamics of actors who manifest a heterogenous base of 
intent. Thus, both top-down and bottom-up dynamics are a function of locally conditioned 
decision-making and action.  
 
However, modelling and supporting actors as decision makers can be a significant point of 
contention: assuming varied forms of irrationality — i.e. high behavioural entropy — may 
prove inefficient, whereas representing actors as homogenous and unboundedly ‘rational’ (a 
notion further explored throughout the chapter) may prove unrealistic (Gigerenzer 1996). 
This problem lies at the bedding of a plethora of social disciplines. For example, Tansey and 
O’Riordan (1999) contest the use of economic rationalism and the utility principle from the 
perspective of social risk theory. Sabau (2010:1194) highlights the shortcomings of unrealistic 
assumptions concerning the boundaries of foresight in constructs such as ‘Homo 
Economicus’. While seemingly preferable over assuming behavioural variability when 
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modelling an unknown decision maker, such a monolithic approximation of human 
tendencies, preferences and foresight, absent context significantly limits both the prescriptive 
and explanatory potential of resulting outputs — a key insight of behavioural economics 
(Krugman 1998, Thaler 2000, Manson 2001).  
 
The idea of schema-based adaptive agents was introduced in the previous chapter within 
the context of a systemic account of organisational actors. In this sense, it is used to describe 
behaviour guided by evolving (representational) models of reality upon which behavioural 
tendencies and intentionality are predicated. Thus, representational mechanisms are central 
to constructing ‘rationality’ which, expanding on March’s (1978) description, entails 
contextually normative guesses of potential and preferred consequences in a given situation. 
Similarly, Sloman et al. (2012) propose a causal model of intentionality judgement which is 
built on conceptualisations of representations (i.e. behavioural foresight) and meta-
representational processes (i.e. awareness). At an individual level, the development of new 
representations, such as the likely conditional outcomes of a given situation, based on 
previously held representations, such as beliefs about the nature of the situation, is a function 
of inference (Mercier and Sperber 2011). However, this process is not inherently conceptual, 
deliberate or conscious. In contrast, reasoning — a specific form of inference which is 
archetypically associated with rationality — describes the conceptual process of developing 
a new representation by consciously considering its previous representations/premises. 
(Mercier and Sperber 2011)   
 
Given its apparent procedural transparency, its compatibility with representational 
dissemination/communication, and its potential responsiveness to social moderation, 
reasoning is functionally linked to rationality through its role in yielding normative contextual 
representations and manifesting patterns in foresight and intentionality. However, the merits 
of such reason-based interpretations of rationality are prone to critique based on both 
descriptive and pragmatic/prescriptive grounds. Descriptively, Sperber and Mercier (2012) 
present reasoning as a social/argumentative meta-representational function that is distinct 
from the individual inferential generative mechanisms which drive novel representations. 
Thus, at a cognitive level, intuitive inferences are opaque to conceptualisation, while 
reasoning functionally enables social moderation and adaptation in representational models. 
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In other words, proponents of this ‘argumentative view’ (Mercier and Sperber 2011) hold 
reasoning to serve a primarily social meta-representational function that is distinct from 
individual inferential/representational mechanisms.  
 
Subsequently, the internally opaque nature of (most) individual inferences, and their post-
hoc meta-representational construction reaffirm the pragmatic interpretation of ‘rationality’ 
— a stance which will be prevalent throughout the remainder of the chapter. As a pragmatic 
concept, it can be used to describe inferential and behavioural patterns and tendencies, i.e. 
order, in dynamic environments. However, critical emphasis is placed on the mechanism-
derived limitations of rationality (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Kahneman and Frederick 
2002), on the contextually bound merits of ‘rational’ strategies (i.e. model-based), as opposed 
to heuristic (Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2014), or adaptive strategies (March 2006). Indeed, the 
development of pragmatic, mechanism-oriented assumptions for an organisational 
cybersecurity context must account for rationality in both its individual-cognitive and its 
social-adaptive dimensions. This division is reflected in the following sub-sections. 
 
2.3.2 Pragmatic Rationality: Heuristics and Biases 
 
The growing body of work addressing the limitations of a monolithic ‘rationality’ 
perspective, in its modern form, is traceable to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) propositions 
concerning the role of Heuristics and Biases as central mechanisms in decision making under 
uncertainty. At the core of their original findings is the assertion that in complex, uncertain 
circumstances, individuals consistently rely on judgmental heuristics which are used to reduce 
the complexity of the task. In spite of their overall functionality, these heuristic principles can 
lead to significant “systematic errors” (Tversky and Kahneman 1974:1124). Based on this, 
Tversky and Kahneman (2002:15) define the notion of a “judgmental heuristic” as “a strategy 
— whether deliberate or not — that relies on a natural assessment to produce an estimation 
or a prediction”. Thus, the reasoning errors which result from a reliance on cognitive shortcuts 
are distinguished by their deviation from normative decision-making behaviour, as opposed 
to the favourableness of the resulting outcomes. More specifically, Kahneman and Frederick 
(2002) argue that heuristic judgments can be identified through their replacement of a ‘target 
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attribute’ of a judgement object with a different, more accessible property of the object — a 
‘heuristic attribute’. Biases occur when there is a discrepancy between the target and the 
heuristic attributes, thus misguiding intentionality.  
 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) early experiments postulated three heuristics — 
Representativeness, Availability, and Adjustment and Anchoring — which underpin a variety 
of cognitive biases: the Representativeness heuristic describes the role of mental construct 
resemblance on probability assessments; the Availability heuristic indicates a link between 
the estimated frequency or probability of an event and the ease of its recollection; and the 
Adjustment and Anchoring heuristic proposes that sequential estimates are influenced by the 
starting point. In their revision of the original framework, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) 
argue that Anchoring falls outside of the stated definition of a judgement heuristic, and should 
instead be replaced with the Affect heuristic, which illustrates the role of the emotions and 
intuitive reactions (“affect valance”) associated with stimuli on decision-making. Slovic et al. 
(2005) highlight the centrality of Affect for “dual-process theories of information processing”. 
Such theories divide perception and, thus, decision-making into two systems: System 1, 
predicated on intuition and experience, and System 2 characterizable as analytical and 
rational. (Evans and Frankish 2009) 
 
The role of Affect in decision making is supported by independent lines of enquiry. Bechara 
and Damasio (2005:338) illustrate said role through the ‘Somatic Marker Hypothesis’, which 
is built on observations of tendencies towards detrimental decision-making exhibited by 
patients with lesions on their ventromedial prefrontal cortex. The effects of the damage are 
only manifested through a compromised capacity to adequately express and experience 
emotions, which, through experimentation, have been argued to lead to limit somatic 
response intake, and prevent future loss aversion. Based on this, Bechara and Damasio (2005) 
also argue that, when isolated, conscious knowledge — previously framed within System 2 — 
is insufficient for making advantageous decisions. The centrality of potentially contradictory 
interactions between System 1 and System 2 reasoning based on context is also empirically 
illustrated by Sloman (2002). Furthermore, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) highlight that 
heuristics are not an inherently System 1 phenomenon; instead, they can be used as a 




In spite of the Heuristics and Biases framework’s significant impact and volume of follow-up 
experimentation and analysis, critics have contested both individual results (i.e Koehler 1996, 
who found the Representativeness derived ’base-rate fallacy’, whereby subjects tend to 
ignore prior probabilities, to be overstated), and the broader approach taken by the authors. 
Most notably, Gigerenzer (1996) argued against the content-blind Bayesian normative logic 
used in the original experiments, especially within the context of single-event probabilities. In 
addition, he suggested that the results could have been conditioned by the experimental 
design, whereas the models underpinning the framework have limited explanatory power. 
These points of critique are addressed by Kahneman and Frederick (2002), who suggest that 
while they are conceptually plausible, they do not account for the consistency in findings 
achieved by follow-up, varied experiments.   
 
Mousavi and Gigerenzer (2014) outline an alternative view concerning the role of heuristics 
in addressing uncertainty. They argue that measurable risk is based on two possible types of 
assessment: ‘a priori’ probability, which is inferred from the known properties of an 
application setting, and produces deterministic knowledge; and statistical probability, 
obtained through data collected from repeated observations within a homogenous setting, 
resulting in stochastic knowledge. Given the limited applicability of such assessments in many 
real-world decision-making settings, Mouvasi and Gigerenzer (2014) suggest that action is 
often derived from estimates. Therefore, in the presence of uncertainty, actions rely on 
heuristics which are manifested through intuition and ‘satisficing’ solutions, rather than 
statistical thinking. Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011:1458) support this view, finding that, in 
addition to being less effort-intensive than more complex insight generation methods, 
heuristics can also yield superior foresight in strategic action. The authors also propose that 
the predominantly negative perspective on heuristics is attributable to the strategically 
irrelevant, artificial nature of the simulated decision-making environments which form the 
basis of much of the experimental research conducted within the field.  
 
The ubiquity of heuristics can also be explored in relation to the bound nature of cognition 
and perception. Within the context of theoretical biology, Mark et al. (2010) propose that 
human perception has evolved to discern an incomplete, estimated representation of an 
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observer independent reality. This is due to the fact that, from an evolutionary perspective, 
given equal resources, models of perception that are functionally fit and represent 
approximations of relevant occurrences outperform ‘naive realist’ models, under which 
perception “exhaustively resembles reality” (Mark et al. 2010:505). Thus, selective 
perception, as opposed to broader/more accurate alternatives, can prove to be a superior 
perceptual strategy. In this sentiment, Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) argue against the 
“accuracy-effort trade-off”, which they present as a theme of the Heuristics and Biases 
literature, built on the premise of a positive causal relationship between the amount of 
cognitive effort invested and accuracy of subsequent results. Furthermore, they argue that 
heuristics are neither inherently good nor bad; instead, they rely on contextual fitness 
(“ecological rationality”) for generating adequate results. In turn, this is not reflected through 
a single measure, but by a learning curve which considers the effect of accumulating 
observations on bias and variation. This assertion is contrasted with Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1974) approach of evaluating the presence of sub-optimal decision-making as a measure of 
deviation from a normative process rather than a specific result.  
 
Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009:128) present three underpinning components of heuristics: 
search rules, which set the criteria for the exploration of cues; stopping rules, which indicate 
that sufficient cues have been explored; and decision rules, which lead to the selection of a 
course of action. Through permutations of these three components — coined ‘the adaptive 
toolbox’ — a wide variety of heuristics can be generated. The selection of a heuristic is 
proposed to depend on at least three principles: memory, feedback/reinforcement, and 
environmental structure (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009). It is worth noting that this approach 
towards heuristics does not negate the link between System 1 representations and biases. 
Instead, it highlights that solely associating heuristics with biases paints an incomplete picture 
of their potential utility, and unavoidable role in circumstances where System 2 cognition is 
constrained, such as cognitive overload (Pfleeger and Caputo 2012), or unfeasible.  
 
Thus, heuristics can be explored through the ontological, complexity oriented constructs 
covered in the previous section as adaptive mechanisms used for exploring indicators of 
emergence while ignoring micro-causal information. When used within an appropriate 
setting, they have been argued to potentially yield better results than more complex 
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competing models (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009, Brighton and Gigerenzer 2015), especially 
as they show adaptation based on accumulating observations. While seemingly optional as a 
System 2 strategy, heuristics are fundamental for System 1 decision making, playing a key role 
in foresight and intent, especially under uncertainty or when faced with conditions which 
impede on the reliability of System 2 thinking. However, the limitations of heuristics are also 
reflective of boundaries in individual cognition. They can result in biases which impede 
perceptual adaptation, thus generating a disconnect between intent and outcome. This is 
particularly distinguishable within the context of affect as a determinant of System 1 
cognition. Given its externally opaque nature, the influence of individual affect can be difficult 
to gauge, which can lead to incongruity between explicit analysis and intuition, especially 
within collective settings. When conditioned by previous experiences that are anomalous, 
unrelated or non-generalisable, intuition can lead to myopic assessments of consequences, 
or unjustified levels of confidence. In contrast, affective insight can result in advantageous 
courses of action, even in complex or uncertain settings given contextual fit.   
 
So, when modelling individual intent and foresight within the context of cybersecurity 
management assumptions of omniscience, or even perceptual objectivity are unfounded. 
Gigerenzer and Brighton’s (2009) adaptive toolbox emphasises the role of heuristic learning 
through repeated interactions with a homogenous and repeatable problem in order to 
achieve ecological rationality. However, cybersecurity presents numerous instances of single, 
as opposed to repeated events, with varied affective impact: in complex social structures such 
as organisations, the individual affective perception of a systemic disruption is neither 
homogenous nor general. Such circumstances can impede on the potential of heuristic 
adaptation and learning in balancing foresight and intent.  
 
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) findings show numerous potential misapplications of the 
heuristic mechanisms that shape foresight, which include unjustified confidence in both 
predictions and instance predictability, as well as unawareness of perceptual limitations 
(Gilovich et al. 2002). These findings reflect that of Heuer (1999) within the context of 
intelligence development, and Pfleeger and Caputo (2012) within cybersecurity. Another 
issue within cybersecurity management foresight is that of feedback. As strategic success is 
indicated by the absence of an actively exploited Threat-Vulnerability tuple, threat behaviour 
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is a key determinant of success, yet is often opaque and exogenous, potentially leading to 
misleading assumptions concerning the effectiveness of decision making. Generally 
ineffective strategies can be pursued without detrimental consequences absent threat 
activity, whereas broadly effective strategies may fail to prevent low probability or high threat 
capability breaches. Thus the distinct nature of the problem can affect the efficacy of System 
1 adaptive mechanisms. Finally, while dual-process theories position individual decision 
making at the intersection of System 1 and System 2 thinking, the quintessential role of social 
structures, communication and coordination across social systemic hierarchies must also be 
noted. Furthermore, communication and coordination mechanisms condition the ability of 
individuals to project, shape, and adapt intent at a systemic level — all key aspects of 
conceptualising the organisational cybersecurity context-construct gap.  
 
2.3.3 Social Adaptation: Communication and Coordinated Representational 
Structures  
 
At a finer level of conceptual granularity, McKelvey’s (2001) previously quoted description 
of rational order in organisational systems entails the interaction of individual-actor mental 
models, which shape perception and estimates of consequences and preferences (March 
1978), with social models encompassing (social) norms, roles and meaning (Sunstein 1996). 
Norms are defined by Sunstein (1996:11) as “social attitudes of approval and disapproval”; 
‘roles’ are presented as social divisions associated with networks of appropriate norms, and 
‘meaning’ is used to describe “the expressive dimension of conduct” which “involves the 
attitudes and commitments that the conduct signals” (Sunstein 1996:19). These constructs, 
are used as building blocks for an outline of the social/collective dimension of influence over 
conduct and decision making — an extension of the individual perspective. It is worth 
highlighting that, through its cognitive nature, decision-making is individual-bound. However, 
as illustrated by Sunstein (1996), given the role of social structures on the context of 
individuality and conduct, these are analytically inseparable when attempting to explore the 
behavioural mechanisms at play in organisational cybersecurity management.  
 
Matsumoto (2007:1286) proposes individual behaviour to be “the product of the interaction 
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between culturally dependent social roles and individually different role identities”. As such, 
he outlines cultures as emergent constructs shaped by the interaction between the problems 
faced within an ecological context, which take the form of “biological needs and social 
motives”, and the approaches used by a group to solve them, which are constrained by the 
available resources. The resulting solutions — “environmental adaptations” — drive culture 
dynamics (Matsumoto 2007:1291). This perspective touches upon a series of themes: the 
contextual dependence of culture, norms and meaning; the role of culture in disseminating 
adaptive behaviour which enables biological and social problems to be solved; and the 
specificity of the configurations of social collectives and constraints in relation to specific 
environmental adaptations. Singelis and Brown (1995) also highlight the self-perpetuity of 
culture, the mix of physical and aggregated mental construction (‘subjective culture’) of its 
members, the two-way hierarchical nature (i.e it supports the lower levels which, in turn, 
underpin its dynamics), and individual-bound manifestation (its effects are observable within 
the behaviour of individuals).  
 
Thus, using Holing’s (2001) characterisation of social systems, culture serves a 
communication function that is manifested through both implicit and explicit exchanges. 
More specifically, implicit communication occurs in the form of interaction between actors 
and groups which share norms and meaning, coordinate in hierarchies beyond the constraints 
of direct interaction, and possess individual roles and shared objectives in the form of social 
and ecological imperatives. Furthermore, it serves as a platform for the identification of 
environmental adaptations, and their dissemination through adaptive pressures and explicit 
communication (Matsumoto 2007). Snowden (2002:103) explores the duality of culture as a 
catalyst for knowledge which is manifested as both a measurable, observable “pattern of 
residence and resource exploitation”, and as an “ideational system” embodying the less 
tangible implicit communication functions through shared ideas, conceptual systems and 
norms.  
 
But the delimitation of cultural homogeneity must also be taken into consideration. For 
example, Clarke (1988) finds that, within the context of risk analyses, their unavoidably social 
nature is also a source of potential distortion and biases of a political nature. As the analysis, 
decision making and implementation of a risk based policy often involves different actor 
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clusters (with different roles and norms), whose views must converge on a simplified outlook 
of a problem and its implications, structural influence imbalances can significantly shape the 
outcomes and impose ideological bias. Unlike intentional deception, Clarke (1988:161) 
positions ideological bias as a function of the “ontological assumptions that underlie an 
actor’s world-view” — which is consistent with Kahneman and Frederick’s (2002) outline of 
the construct. Thus, the power division of an organisation can deviate the contextual ecology 
of risk assessments, or other similar System 2 heuristics. Role-based structural divisions also 
incentivise the emergence of subcultures with distinguishable norms, adaptive pressures, 
affective contexts, and degree of influence over decision-making. Such divisions are likely to 
internally promulgate ontological assumptions as per Snowden’s (2002) assertions, which 
affects the ways in which adaptive feedback is internalised.  
 
Within the context of cybersecurity management, Pfleeger and Caputo (2012) found several 
decision-making cognitive limitations which illustrate the core points of the discussion so far. 
These include: the framing of security thinking as a secondary function; the detrimental 
effects of cognitive overload over the process of analysis, which also illustrates the limitations 
of System 1 thinking in security risk scenarios; the presence of inattentional blindness (failure 
to notice unexpected occurrences while focusing on a primary task); significant bias rooted in 
previous “experience, goals and expertise” (Pfleeger and Caputo 2012:602), which reflects 
Clarke’s (1988) narrative concerning ontological assumption variation within stakeholder 
groups, and, thus the political dimension of risk analysis; and the significance of perceptual 
limitations within time constraints.  
 
The social moderation of ontological assumptions is also dependent on externalised, i.e. 
trans-personal, inference procedure formalisation. In this context, Heuer (1999) explored 
cognitive limitations as part of intelligence analysis, concluding that, within instances of 
uncertainty (natural, or induced) and complexity, a reliance on implicit psychological 
mechanisms of orientation and decision making often leads to biases and low analytical 
efficacy. While not fully avoidable, he argues that the effects of such limitations can be 
mitigated through explicit tools and techniques which promote critical thinking in relation to 
assumptions, illustrate the extent of the uncertainty faced, and encourage the development 
of alternative points of view. These assertions do not conflict with Gigerenzer and Brighton’s 
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(2009) insight concerning the positive potential of heuristics and of the adaptive toolbox. 
Instead, they are based on the idea that, by externalising the adaptive process within a multi-
stakeholder setting, a broader contextual ecology can be pursued, reconciling the potentially 
pluralistic drives of sub-cultures. A critical, diverse base of adaptive feedback concerning the 
ontological assumptions which underpin organisational decision-making is more likely to 
perceive and correct inappropriate uses of heuristic attributes, from the perspective of 
different norms, roles, and meanings. Heuer (1999) argues that, for such a structure to be 
achievable, an explicit process of rational analysis that adequately employs tools and 
procedures for the development of a collective, transparent, and non-localised 
(interdisciplinary/ interdepartmental) perspective.   
 
To summarise, there is a growing body of literature exploring the descriptive tendencies and 
mechanisms shaping the pragmatic boundaries of rationality as a construct. Inconsistencies 
in decision making under uncertainty can emerge from perceptual approximations and 
cognitive shortcuts in the form of implicit heuristics, affective context and foresight, 
informational availability and format, cognitive capacity and availability, social structures and 
culture manifested through roles, norms and meanings, as well as personal goals, capabilities 
and available tools. While pragmatically unavoidable, and even potentially beneficial, as 
demonstrated by the potential effectiveness of Heuristics (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009, 
Bingham and Eisenhardt 2011, Mousavi and Gigerenzer 2014, Brighton and Gigerenzer 2015), 
or by the evolutionary success of incomplete perceptual strategies (Mark et al. 2010), such 
mechanisms can also generate significant representational deviation and lead to contextually 
inadequate strategies (Heuer 1999, Pfleeger and Caputo 2012).  
 
The tendency for representational deviation can also affect the communication of analytical 
outputs, due to the numerous mechanisms which shape their interpretation. Kahneman and 
Frederick (2002) propose that bias mitigation can be encouraged through System 2 reasoning. 
So, in joint stakeholder analyses where the decision-making process involves coordinating 
views and intent, minimising the reliance on implicit assumptions can help identify 
inadequate uses of heuristic attributes, in both foresight and retrospect. It also maximises the 
utility of the adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009), by tracing the historical 
perception and assumptions (memory), generates modularity in assumptions and better 
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transparency concerning inferences and uncertainty (feedback/reinforcement) and provides 
the ground for environmental calibration. Coupled with the previous sections, these factors 
can be used as a foundation of ontological and epistemological assumptions and constructs 
necessary for the formulation of a conceptual framework which reconciles the systemic and 
behavioural analytical perspectives. Once supplemented with an empirical/exploratory 
dimension, the conceptual framework can be used to guide the development of ‘objective 
knowledge’ constructs (i.e models) and heuristic strategies which adequately represent and 





2.4 Emerging Concepts: Towards the Conceptual Framework 
 
So far, both the organisational cybersecurity context-construct gap, and the knowledge 
problem it entails have been explored both descriptively, and as a function of fitness between 
prescriptive/heuristic constructs like risk management, the domain-specific complex 
ontology, and ‘rationality’ as a pragmatic heuristic for conceptualising contextual behavioural 
tendencies. These converging perspectives are used to describe and engage the research 
problem as a phenomenon and thus serve as an overarching conceptual framework. 
Conceptual frameworks are defined by Jabareen (2009:51) as “a plane of interlinked 
concepts” with each concept playing an ontological or an epistemological role. Furthermore, 
Berman (2013:3) presents their role and utility in their ability to: standardise the language 
used to address the research problem, determine the principles which underpin inferences, 
structurally support the organisation of content and conclusions, serve as 
theoretical/conceptual nodes, providing connection points with other theories, guide 
empirical research strategy and design, and aim to provide a coherent relationship between 
the conceptual and the empirical dimensions of study. In order to advance the empirical 
dimension of the project, the cross-granular nature of the core emerging concepts must be 
acknowledged and represented.  
 
At a finer level of conceptual granularity, the postulated logic underpinning the 




Construct Perspective/Dimension Sub-constructs 
Change 
A dynamic view of the ontology of organisational 
cybersecurity management which reflects the 
emergent, cross-systemic, vertically integrated 
structures and interaction patterns. These are the 
drivers of systemic ‘necessity’, or ‘adaptive tension’, 
and underpin the dynamism and locality of the context 
faced; 
• Complexity  
• Panarchy  





A pragmatic view of the modus operandi of ‘schema 
based’ agents which considers cognitive and social 
adaptive mechanisms; This serves the dual role of 
conceptualising behavioural tendencies as part of an 
inference-oriented prescriptive ‘schema’ and 
considering the implications of (agent) decision-
makers’ tendencies as recipients of prescription. In 




• Heuristics  





A contextually coherent, functional view of 
Knowledge as the precursor to inferential adaptation, 
which consists of conceptual and sub-conceptual 
(structural) representations of potential and actual 
systemic states, attributes, and tendencies; 





A complementary construction of Uncertainty as a 
state of hostility to adaptive inference which can 




• Contextual ecology 
Risk 
A risk-centric, contextual (organisational 
cybersecurity) exploration of the role of 
inferential/procedural constructs in conceptualising, 







A converging, systemic view of adaptation as 
structural/behavioural change towards necessity — 
the central mechanism for navigating context 
dynamics while preserving emergent 








Table 1. A Cross-granular ‘Context-Construct’ Conceptual Logic 
  
Together, these interacting constructs provide a pluralistic, navigational logic for 
organisational cybersecurity efforts, while also presenting a complementary set of ontological 
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and epistemological assumptions. At a coarse representational level, they provide a structural 
blueprint of contextually relevant topics for empirical enquiry (elaborated in section 3.1). They 
also enable the examination and calibration of the otherwise abstract conceptual framing 
through its underpinning assumptions. Finally, once calibrated, the outputs of analysis can be 
used to employ the theoretical dimension of the study in a prescriptive output aimed to 





The methodology section aims to use the outputs of the Literature Review as a platform 
for constructing an empirical research strategy to explore the notion of knowledge in a 
cybersecurity setting and its relationship to cyber risk practices. Using Contextual Constructs 
Theory, the first stage of the chapter entails formalising the project’s point of view and using 
it to generate the research questions. This is followed by a discussion of research philosophy, 
which argues that Critical Realism provides a theoretically compatible, contextually 
adequate base of ontological and epistemological assumptions. The third sub-chapter covers 
the process of empirical research strategy development. More specifically, it explores 
methodological influences of the research philosophy, disciplinary tradition, research 
objectives, literature based conceptual framework, and pragmatic constraints. 
Subsequently, it identifies the single, exemplary, embedded case-study as a feasible 
methodological approach. The remainder of the research strategy formulation sub-chapter 
explores the case selection and design processes, as well as broader methodological 
considerations such as case/output validity. Finally, the fourth sub-chapter provides both a 
conceptual and a  descriptive overview of the data collection and analysis processes, and of 
the specific outputs which underpin case building. 
 
The previous chapters presented cybersecurity as a dynamic phenomenon which, when 
manifested within organisations, generates a local strategic problem. This problem is both 
epistemic, given the inferential mechanics of strategy, and systemic, as it emerges from the 
dynamics of system behaviour. A first methodological/investigative challenge presented by 
this narrative lies in the partial disciplinary agnosticism it yields. While Popper’s (1978) three-
world model of knowledge was used for structural coherence — i.e. guiding the analysis based 
on the locus of knowledge — the core problem 'diagnosis' emerges from the interaction of 
heterogeneous constructs. As a result, the study’s methodology must account for the 
systemic, non-summative nature of the arguments put forward.  
 
To address this issue, the chapter structure will be informed by Knight and Cross’ (2012) 
‘Contextual Constructs Theory’, which takes a systems perspective on the research process 
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and methodological design. This entails an exploration of the research context, the selection 
of constructs, and the interaction between the two. The context includes factors such as: the 
discipline of the study, the phenomenon/object driving the exploration, its theoretical 
background, the researcher, and the research problem, which embodies the researcher’s 
approach towards the research object. Constructs within CCT are seen as building blocks 
required to assemble the research process. They serve the role of linguistically encoding 
concepts and phenomena which, within their defined context, carry the specific meaning that 
enables the development of the line of inquiry.  
 
According to Knight and Cross (2012) such an exploration can be structured based on the 
four stages of the project's life-cycle: 
1. The conceptual phase where the point of view of the project is determined based on 
the intersection between the researcher’s perspective, the discipline of the study, and the 
methodological meta-disciplinary context of the phenomena under exploration;  
2. The philosophical phase, where both the epistemology and ontology underpinning the 
project are established;  
3. The implementation phase, which encompasses the research methodology;  
4. The evaluation phase where the data generated is classified, analysed and used to 
extract the findings. 
 
Each of the four stages builds on the previous in defining the research narrative. In spite of 
this, the four phases are not treated as inherently linear/sequential. Instead, they are seen as 
evolving and interacting based on the progression of the enquiry. Furthermore, for pragmatic 
reasons, not all aspects of the research philosophy are contained within, or introduced based 
on the linear chapter progression. For example, epistemological constructs are not just a 
passive dimension of the study, but also actively employed in both the problem diagnosis 
conducted in the early chapters, and in the prescription-oriented later chapters. 
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3.1 The Conceptual Phase  
 
The problem at the centre of the study is twofold. In its pragmatic dimension, it identifies 
an inferential gap between knowledge availability and decision requirements in relation to 
organisational cybersecurity. From an epistemic perspective, this gap is critically explored 
through a risk-lens as a systemic function driven by non-linearity, behavioural heterogeneity, 
and inferential construct selection/adequacy. By emphasising a phenomenon-based view of 
cybersecurity, this diagnosis does not rely on, and is not conducive to a disciplinary 
interpretation of the problem area. Instead, it has evolved as various explanatory and 
prescriptive theoretical avenues failed to account for the indicators of significant epistemic 
limitations that managers face (outlined earlier in the study). Subsequently, a deconstruction 
of the ‘knowledge-problem’ was attempted based on Popper’s locus of knowledge through a 
(complex, hierarchical) dynamic systems perspective. This, in turn, has introduced core 
notions such as scale, emergence, and adaptation in relation to the research problem.  
 
However, as the systems-view provides little nuance in exploring the fine-grain, softer 
behavioural component of organisational behaviour, and the tendencies of actor driven top-
down order, a cognition-oriented exploration of both individual and collective/social 
‘rationality’ was introduced. A behavioural perspective is deemed meaningful within a 
complex system setting as social mechanisms and tendencies can shape interaction patterns 
which are either amplified or suppressed across the hierarchy. Furthermore, 
oversimplifications of agency are widely seen as problematic for models which aim to explain 
and assess the likelihood of given outcomes, i.e. risk. Thus, a nuanced interpretation of 
individual and collective behaviour as a foundation for assumptions is seen as paramount for 
understanding and bridging the diagnosed knowledge-decision gap. Finally, decision support 
systems and procedures are seen as a behaviour-guiding lens used to tackle uncertainty 
systematically. Most notably, risk constructs, in a plurality of manifestations, take a primary 
role as a procedural ‘knowledge object’ used to address the epistemic problem. A critical 
understanding of risk, in both the broader context of its application, and specifically within 
organisational cybersecurity is also deemed as an important component of addressing the 




Thus, based on the research problem, three remaining (four in total) research objectives 
have been formulated:  
 
0. Construct a literature based conceptual framework to represent the context-construct 
dynamics within organisational Cybersecurity; 
1. Identify how Knowledge relating to Cybersecurity is produced, used and adapted at 
various levels within an organisation; 
2. Critically analyse the role, and epistemic requirements of Cyber Risk Management; 
3. Conceptualise a Risk based approach to address the Knowledge-Uncertainty dimension 
of cybersecurity management. 
 
Together, these objectives enable engaging both the ‘knowledge problem’ and the ‘context-
construct gap’ heuristics which guide the investigation. Objective ‘0’ was achieved through 
the earlier stages of the study’s construction and entails the development of the conceptual 
lens through which the problem is diagnosed. As such, it corresponds with the literature 
review, and is presupposed by the later objectives, which is why it serves as a 
foundational/implicit objective. Through the first objective, the context of cybersecurity 
‘knowledge’ is explored. This entails a layer of theory driven analysis to functionally construct 
‘knowledge’ within the emerging conceptual framework by exploring its attributes within the 
phenomenon of study. In addition, this objective also introduces the need for an empirical 
investigation to calibrate theory driven insights. Following an understanding of the function 
and form of knowledge in cybersecurity management/strategy, its relationship to Cyber Risk 
Management practice must be explored. Again, this entails a two-fold critical evaluation, i.e. 
theory and practice informed, and is driven by a recognition of (epistemic) context as a 
determinant for the adequacy of risk outputs. The final objective consists of employing the 
findings and insights obtained in a prescriptive, Risk-based framework which is theoretically 
coherent and accounts for the contextual tendencies of organisational cybersecurity. In the 
absence of a clear disciplinary context, these objectives ground the research point-of-view in 
a series of complementary constructs which were selected based on the problem diagnosis. 
For example, the study’s pragmatic orientation is typical of organisational studies, in spite of 
the absence of such literature in the interpretation of the research-problem. This exclusion 
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was involuntary, based on positive-feedback in the identification of robust constructs which 
address aspects of the ‘knowledge problem’. These constructs are also indicative of an implicit 
philosophical stance, and carry methodological implications, both of which will be discussed 
in the following sections. 
 
A simplified relational logic of the problem’s dynamics based on the conceptual framework 
building blocks elaborated in Section 2.4. is presented in fig. 2. This model aims to provide a 
high-level structural overview of the epistemic dynamics and serves a skeleton for further 
enquiry. In addition, it abstractly accounts for the interaction between constructs which 
belong to each of Popper’s three worlds, thus providing a structural summary of the literature 
review.  
 
Fig. 2 Logic of enquiry: high-level overview 
 
Given its role in guiding the empirical dimension of the study, the relational logic can also 
normalise construct granularity, which enables guided communication with heterogenous 
actors and data-gathering without enforcing a specific interpretation of each topic. ‘Change’ 
is a proxy term for complex system dynamics and provides a trigger for the knowledge 
problem. In a cybersecurity setting, change is continuous, and underpins the adequacy of 
defensive measures. ‘Rationality’ is a loose construct, contextually defined as the individual 
or collective worldview which corresponds to, and is affected by the Change. ‘Knowledge’ is 
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a function of Rationality and enables adaptive-action formulation. However, it is also an 
inherently incomplete, limited, and context-bound construct. ‘Uncertainty’ is seen as a 
contextual limitation of knowledge which results from the complexity and pace of system 
dynamics, and from insufficient knowledge. ‘Risk’ is an objective knowledge lens through 
which a ‘known-unknown’ segment of the change is accounted for within the world-view. 
Finally, ‘Adaptation’ accounts for both intentional adaptive measures taken under residual 
uncertainty, and hard adaptations which are environmentally imposed and represent a 
release of adaptive tension. As this final construct also entails a form of meaningful change, 
it serves as a driver for the following cycle. Despite its relative lack of nuance, this simple 
model illustrates the key aspects of the knowledge problem narrative, and helps structure the 
empirical enquiry highlighted in the research objectives. 
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3.2 Research Philosophy: Contextualising Critical Realism 
 
Given the framing of the research, i.e. cybersecurity management as a knowledge problem, 
some core philosophical stances have permeated the narrative at an introductory stage. 
Nonetheless, the following section will make both the ontological and the epistemological 
grounding explicit to elaborate and justify the study's philosophical positioning and its 
implications. This exploration of the research philosophy also heavily influences the selection 
of research methods used to conduct the empirical dimension of the study. It is worth noting 
that the current section is primarily centred on the ontology-epistemology dynamic, as 
opposed to secondary dimensions of rhetoric which do not directly support the achievement 




So far, the ontological underpinnings have been implicitly introduced through constructs 
such as complex systems, adaptation, emergence, interactions, agents, and knowledge 
objects. These notions are indicative of critical realism (Wynn Jr. and Williams 2012, 
Zachariadis et al. 2013), despite differences in their ontological status (i.e. physical vs. 
informational). A critical realist ontology is underpinned by three core assumptions: the 
existence of an observer independent reality; the existence of necessity, whereby objects 
present both distinct powers/tendencies and susceptibilities; and, the stratified and 
differentiated nature of the world, which contains objects and structures with the ability to 
create events (Easton 2010). Each of the three assumptions will be critically explored in 
relation to the emerging narrative, to support this philosophical stance.  
 
The existence of an observer-independent reality is consistently assumed across the 
spectrum of ontological realism and is inherent in applications of complexity theory. In fact, 
Merali and Allen (2011) present the existence of explicitly identifiable (i.e. distinguishable) 
systemic entities as an axiomatic underpinning of system thinking, alongside their structural 
composition of interconnected parts which collectively yield non-summative properties. This 
presumes observer-independent, and even context-independent structural/ontological 
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regularities linked to generative mechanisms. Within Critical Realism, mechanisms are seen 
as “the way of acting or working of a structured thing […]” which has “causal or emergent 
powers which, when triggered or released […] determine the actual phenomena of the world” 
(Lawson 1997:21 in Zachariadis et al. 2013:3). Thus, within the conceptual framework, this 
first pillar of (critical) realism is implied through the use of postulated ontological mechanisms 
like evolutionary selection and systemic adaptivity as drivers of the research problem. Despite 
the epistemological implications of their social construction as concepts, the mechanisms 
underpinning these abstractions are addressed as observer-independent, and described by 
Tsang (2014) as intransitive objects of knowledge. While the argument for an ontological 
plurality/stratification is also recognised (Klein 2004, Popper 1978), non-exhaustive 
intransitive elements are seen as manifested generally. In this sense, physical and social reality 
present epistemological differences, yet are fundamentally converging domains of enquiry 
when exploring a phenomenon-based view of organisational cybersecurity. This space of 
convergence is the ontological core of adopted constructs such as the Panarchy.  
 
The second and third ontological assumptions pertain to ‘objects’, or ‘entities’ with 
heterogenous yet distinguishable attributes, which tend to form structures through internal 
relationships and practices (Easton 2010). Furthermore, these relationships are the basis for 
the identity of entities (Tsang 2014). Unlike variables which are measurements, entities are 
the object of measurement, and serve as explanatory building blocks (Easton 2010). 
Observable behavioural expressions of mechanisms through entities and structures form 
events (Wynn Jr. and Williams 2012). Dynamic systemic structures are underpinned by 
interacting entities across scales of emergence, i.e. if described in a single dimension, markets 
are structures of commercial entities, organisations are structures of actors. Adaptation is, 
thus, a function of entities that are undergoing changes which prevent the collapse of their 
relational identity. In this context, both the occurrence of adaptive change and systemic 
collapse are events. Furthermore, the nested/stratified nature of structures, expressed in the 
conceptual framework in the form of systemic hierarchies, entails existential 
interdependencies across structures.  
 
Bhaskar (2008) identifies three domains within critical realism: The Domain of the Real, of 
the Actual, and of the Empirical. The Domain of the Empirical encompasses events which have 
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been observed, making it uniquely experiential. The domain of Actual is an expansion of the 
Empirical and includes the totality of events. Finally, the Domain of the Real contains the 
mechanisms which yield the patterns that form events. This distinction is unique to critical 
realism and shapes its interpretation of causality. More specifically, based on this distinction, 
observation is deemed insufficient for the extrapolation of causal laws, which are a product 
of the Domain of the Real. A more pragmatic use of causality is presented by Easton 
(2010:120) in the form of “causal powers and liabilities”. The former describes the ability of 
entities to cause events while the latter describes a “susceptibility to the action of other 
entities”. So, within the current projects, cybersecurity vulnerabilities are a form of causal 
liability for organisations, and a causal power for threat actors.  
 
The limitations of the empirical (domain of) observation as a basis for extrapolating 
ontological regularities as causal laws are amplified within complexity theory. On this point 
Juarrero (2011:161) notes: 
 
“Although causes and effects cannot be the same in all respects, traditional views of 
causality also assumed that similar causes, under similar conditions, always produce similar 
results. The nonlinearity of positive feedback and circular causality present in complex 
systems vitiates these two assumptions. As a result, a different logic of explanation becomes 
necessary. When nonlinear interactions cause interlevel relationships like those described 
above, the meaning of individual events can be understood only in context: in terms of the 
higher-level constraints (the dynamics) that govern them. Those higher-level constraints, in 
turn, are produced by the very interactions occurring at the lower, particulate level. The 
logic of explanation of hermeneutic narrative and storytelling is therefore more appropriate 
for phenomena whose very nature is a product of the strange causal circle between whole 
and part, with feedback tentacles reaching out into the environment and back in time.” 
 
Thus, given the conceptual framework used to tackle the research problem, the importance 
of recognising context is paramount. In this sense, the correlation of patterns under 
complexity, at the expense of context, is inconsistent with the ontological arguments put 
forward. It is also worth noting that the effects of randomness, i.e. chaotic system behaviour, 
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driven by interactions amongst entities, are prone to causal disproportionality, particularly 
when accounting for the non-linearity and limited scale-constraints which characterise the 
cyber domain. This point illustrates that randomness and order are simultaneously actual 
(Tsang 2014) and experiential phenomena — the gap between the two lying between 
Bhaskar’s (2008) domains. The former involves degrees of informational entropy, while the 
latter is a product of, or nested within agency.  
 
Subsequently, the inherent duality of patterns and regularities as measures of order 
emphasises the epistemological significance of social objects as ontological entities surviving 
based on a ‘schema’ of both their internal and external reality (Maguire 2011). Given their 
inherently simplified nature (‘the map is not the terrain’), models of reality present a 
significant scope for the perceptual distortion of patterns. Furthermore, this duality also 
grounds the meta of the current discussion, as the desired output of the research is itself a 
social product, nested within function-specific, ‘necessity’ oriented structures (i.e. 
organisations). It is this necessity, as highlighted by Easton (2010), that sustains the cohesion 
of these structures. The pragmatic implications of this idea are further described in the 




As a post-positivist philosophy of science, the Critical Realist epistemology is derived from 
its ontology and its response to the critique of naïve positivism. This emphasis on ontology is 
used by Klein (2004:130) to (critically) characterise it as a “primarily ontological” stance with 
“epistemological implications”. Nonetheless, these epistemological implications are 
significant as they enable accounting for the role of social construction without abandoning 
the tenets of realism. Furthermore, given the dual ontology of organisational systems which 
is central to cybersecurity as a phenomenon, focusing on the social domain at the expense of 
the physical would yield an incomplete perspective. Indeed, agency, knowledge objects, and 
‘soft’ social variables are meaningful aspects of the problem. However, these are 
complemented by an overview of systemic mechanics, network effects, ontological hierarchy, 
emergence and adaptation — all of which describe mechanisms of the Real. While their 
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description is socially constructed, and seen as fallible, their observer-independent 
underpinning of regular ontological mechanisms is not. Furthermore, Easton (2010) highlights 
that the interpretation of social phenomena depends on concepts, and goes beyond a 
material explanation, towards establishing meaning. 
 
An overview of the Critical Realist conception of Knowledge is provided by Bhaskar (2008:15) 
who identifies it as ‘Transcendental Realist’. As a construct, knowledge is thus only passively 
defined based on its objects (i.e. “structures and mechanisms”), and its process (“social 
activity of science”). Bhaskar (2008:15) notes:  
“… (Transcendental Realism) […] regards the objects of knowledge as the structures and 
mechanisms that generate phenomena; and the knowledge as produced in the social 
activity of science. These objects are neither phenomena (empiricism) nor human 
constructs imposed upon the phenomena (idealism), but real structures which endure and 
operate independently of our knowledge, our experience and the conditions which allow us 
access to them. Against empiricism, the objects of knowledge are structures, not events; 
against idealism, they are intransitive…”  
While the absence of definitions of knowledge which are both explicit and differentiated is 
a source of criticism (Klein 2004), the Critical Realist conception of knowledge emerges as a 
function of its ontological claims. Given its dependence on social processes and agency, 
knowledge is both prone to errors, and theory laden (Easton 2010) — an unavoidable side-
effect of bound perception (Mark et al. 2010). Furthermore, it is functionally linked to the 
‘schema’ of reality upon which the survival of social entities is predicated (Maguire 2011). The 
hierarchical, coevolutionary nature of social ontology, and its reliance on foresight and intent, 
communication, and technology (Holling 2001) shape the evolutionary incentive for epistemic 
specialisation (Laland et al. 2000), resulting in both an individual, and a relational locus of 
knowledge. In other words, while beliefs, justifications and epistemic outputs can be, and 
generally are properties of individual agents, their meaning, utility, and role in action are 
generally functions of their wider epistemic/systemic context.  
 
Based on these premises, two partly divergent yet reconcilable points can be raised: 
statements, beliefs and externalisations of epistemic schemas can be interpreted as ranging 
 
79 
from true to false based on their correspondence to observable aspects of reality (realist 
stance); and, from a navigational perspective, the utility of knowledge for social entities and 
structures is not linear, summative, nor is it inherently a product of its truth-value, though the 
two may be linked (pragmatism). Given the social context of the current enquiry, the 
overarching epistemological stance is indeed a critical realist one, which acknowledges ‘truth 
seeking’ as a non-absolute, limited, yet meaningful arch-objective. This includes the 
exploration of Real mechanisms within the context of the research problem. However, the 
prescriptive component treats knowledge as nested within an organisational setting, which 
operates as a function-oriented system with clearly delineated necessities. Thus, in this 
dimension of the project, the pragmatic utility of knowledge construction will be emphasised 
in response to the priorities of its (organisational) social context.  
 
 Another epistemological aspect which results from the premises of Critical Realism consists 
of the positioning of knowledge boundaries — the unknown. Employing a complex system 
framing when examining a phenomenon is an epistemological choice which conflicts with its 
reducibility, predictability, and platonic essentialism (Gershenson 2013). Furthermore, the 
path dependent, evolutionary nature of knowledge building processes is also recognised. This 
is particularly relevant for the pragmatic exploration of cross-domain, complex, dynamic 
phenomena which are not solely the product of regular mechanisms, but also of cross-scale 
interactions manifested locally. So, a critical understanding of the inherent constraints to 
knowledge must precede and guide the process of empirically grounding prescription. This 
objective is addressed by exploring the dynamics of structure/system necessity and intent, as 




3.3 The Implementation Phase: Building the Methodology 
3.3.1 The Methodological Implications of Critical Realism  
 
Without a clear disciplinary context, the research design and method selection are driven 
by the problem framing, the research objectives (questions) and of the philosophical position. 
As these aspects have been elaborated in the previous sections, the role of empirical enquiry 
can be demarcated and used to infer a methodological toolkit.  
 
Firstly, the Critical Realist stance provides an overarching logic of empirical enquiry — the 
meta. From this position, the ontological regularities required for theoretical generalisation 
are explored as a product of mechanisms, which are distinct from the empirically accessible 
events they yield. As a result, abductive/retroductive logic is used in Critical Realism to 
investigate reality across layers from the perspective of its underpinning mechanisms and 
structures (Tsang 2014). Subsequently, retroduction entails a departure from the sole focus 
on the domain of the Empirical, in the process of developing meaningful explanations 
(Reichertz 2014). Based on this commitment, Critical Realism is described by Tsang (2014) as 
a largely a method-agnostic philosophy which places emphasis on the inherent complexity of 
the Actual, and the existence of the Real. From a critical realist stance, developing knowledge 
about organisational cybersecurity requires a retroductive, stratified account of the 
mechanisms driving the accounts of the Empirical. This, in turn, favourably positions methods 
able represent and account for nuance, a layered target segment of reality, and complexity in 
the convergence of the physical and the social domains. Finally, the Critical Realist 
commitment to objects rather than variables entails a reluctance to abstract measures as the 
focus of the investigation. 
 
“… the critical realist view on causality should not be about a relationship among distinct 
events (e.g., the fact that event “A” by and large has been followed by event “B”) but about 
realizing the process and conditions under which “A” causes “B,” if at all.” (Zachariadis et al. 
2013:3) 
 
Secondly, the parameters (assumptions) of the research problem also constrain the range 
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of adequate methods of enquiry. The research problem treats organisational cybersecurity as 
a complex, applied phenomenon which is anchored in its setting of manifestation. This 
anchoring leads to an interpretation of ‘actual’ cybersecurity events as heterogenous and 
causally local, while also manifesting (general) mechanisms. Thus, events in this setting, unlike 
their underpinning mechanisms, are treated as limited in epistemic generality.  An example 
of this distinction lies in the potential locality of the chain of behaviour triggering a specific 
breach, as opposed to the wider general mechanisms which yielded the event, i.e. poor risk 
management, myopic organisational priorities, ineffective representational models, 
exploitation of asymmetric knowledge. Furthermore, organisational adaptive pathways are 
explored through the relationships between cybersecurity knowledge, uncertainty and risk 
constructs, cross-scale interactions and functional hierarchies (structure), as well as systemic 
and social dynamics. Such an exploration requires an adequate, homogenous, and well-
defined research context which can be investigated across functional dimensions: 
panarchy/grander context (includes stakeholders, competitors, and threat actors); the 
organisation (system of focus); the function of cybersecurity (which can be structurally 
divided).  
 
As a result, the purpose of the empirical dimension of the study is the exploration of the 
topics supporting the previously introduced simplified relational logic of the problem’s 
dynamics (fig. 2.) from a variety of stances. These stances are established as relative to 
cybersecurity risk management as a function. Capturing nuance under complexity, while 
critically investigating the empirical adequacy of the conceptual framing and of the study’s 
core assumptions are both central to data collection. This entails a qualitative investigation of 
complementary narratives across layers in a homogenous setting. Based on the totality of 
requirements, stances, and considerations brought forward, the case study emerges as a 
philosophically and pragmatically appropriate method of empirical enquiry. 
 
3.3.2 The Case Study in Cybersecurity Management 
 
An immediate consideration when constructing an empirical strategy centred on the case 
study consists of ensuring its suitability within the overall research design. The compatibility 
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between case study research and Critical Realism is highlighted by a range of authors, 
including Easton (2010), Wynn Jr. and Williams (2012), and Tsang (2014:177), based on a 
shared open systems perspective, and due to the view that ‘closure conditions’ are a rare 
outcome in social scientific enquiry. These two points are also used to illustrate the inherent 
predictive limitations of theory in social science, given the absence of closed, controlled 
systems. Indeed, the main utility of the case study as a method lies in its explanatory power 
under contingent, irreducible conditions. It enables maintaining the holistic attributes of 
complex (social) phenomena, as manifested in their context of study, making it a versatile, yet 
not all-encompassing methodological tool (Yin 2003). However, case study research is not 
uncontroversial. Broadly, concerns over the method either address procedural tendencies 
which can negatively shape the output of such research, or, more fundamentally, question 
the validity of case-studies for knowledge building (Flyvbjerg 2006, Diefenbach 2009).  
 
Amongst the central points of critique addressed to case studies as a method of social 
enquiry lies the issue of generalisation, which is conceptualised as a function of population 
representativeness (Tsang 2014). Reichertz (2014) describes generalisation as the process of 
projection for the characteristics of a selection of elements (sample) as representative for all 
the elements of the group (population). Given that case studies present a trade-off between 
the depth and the breadth of study, proponents of the assumption that the number of 
observed elements is the basis for both the generality and the non-local validity of findings 
are likely to find the method lacking. This is largely a function of philosophical stance. Tsang 
(2014:183) highlights this by differentiating between a Positivist, Intepretivist, and a Critical 
Realist approach to empirical, as well as theoretical generalisation. Under Critical Realism, 
cases are presented as useful for both identifying "demi-regularities" which serve as a 
precursor to theoretical development, and for acquiring information concerning the 
contingent behaviour yielded by ontological mechanisms. Furthermore, case studies provide 
the opportunity to validate and adjust theories by comparing and adapting postulated 
mechanisms to those indicated by the case data.  
 
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the potential for divergence between methods 
rooted in a quantitative logic of representativeness, and case selection procedures. Due to 
the emphasis on qualitative depth, context, and locality, case-study research is more likely to 
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focus on specific instances and their attributes, at the expense of capturing a substantial, 
quantitatively significant sample from a given population. The importance of this potential 
trade-off depends on the research context and objectives. More specifically, when attempting 
to identify the attributes of a population, case study research may prove to be a useful, yet 
insufficient/incomplete tool for generalisable findings – i.e. based on a representative sample. 
In contrast, when attempting to gain a substantive understanding of complex, locally 
anchored phenomena or events, the absence of volume-based sampling procedures is less 
likely to have a detrimental effect on theory building. As a result, the methodological 
adequacy of case studies is largely shaped by the disciplinary, philosophical, and operational 
framing of the research context. Finally, Flyvbjerg (2006) highlights the importance of the 
“strategic choice of case” as a determinant of the generalisability of subsequent findings. This 
is predicated on the claim that observations from exemplar or revelatory cases can be used 
to infer behaviours and tendencies from intermediate cases (Flyvbjerg 2006, Diefenbach 
2009)  
 
The second dimension of criticism towards case studies relates to specific procedural 
tendencies which can affect the validity of the findings. Unlike the previously highlighted 
concerns over generalisation, procedural tendencies are not inherent, and can be largely 
mitigated against or avoided altogether. Diefenbach (2009) identifies a series of such concerns 
which cover the absence of an ‘objective’, fixed, scientific research design process; the 
potential for a non-systematic data selection and collection process that can be biased by the 
researcher; and, internal validity issues due to problematic, insufficient data which is not 
analysed through ‘objective’ means. It should be noted that these points of criticism are also 
grounded in a specific philosophical and procedural framing, favouring a (post)positivist 
approach to social sciences. While Diefenbach (2009) addresses each of the highlighted 
concerns at an abstract level, within the context of the current research narrative, these 
tendencies are addressed systematically throughout sections 3.3.3 and 3.4.   
 
Beyond philosophical considerations, method selection in research strategy development is 
a function of three factors, according to Yin (2003). These are: the nature of the research 
questions, the degree of investigator control over behavioural events, and the focus of the 
enquiry on either contemporary or historical events. Case studies are presented as 
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appropriate in instances where the research questions fall under “how” and “why” 
explanatory archetypes, while the investigation is not predicated on behavioural control, and 
its focus lies in contemporary events. By applying this conceptual lens to the current enquiry, 
the empirical research objectives address the “how”: how cybersecurity knowledge is 
produced, used and adapted across organisational layers; and how cyber risk management is 
conditioned epistemically in an applied setting. Additionally, the setting of interest is 
inherently contemporary, given its role in establishing prescription, while the empirical 
enquiry, manifested through data collection procedures, does not aim nor is it able to shape 
the behaviour of the research objects. Instead, a largely passive, observational perspective is 
needed to achieve the explanatory outcomes of the study.  
 
Exploring cybersecurity as a phenomenon entails construct flexibility, as it is manifested 
across functional layers within an organisation. For example, the experience of operational 
actors who rely on cyber infrastructure with the topics of enquiry is meaningful, yet 
potentially different from that of information security specialists, or organisational policy 
makers. However, exploring any such population in abstraction of its context inherently limits 
the explanatory potential of the enquiry. Thus, a holistic perspective of cyber risk, knowledge, 
and adaptation must account for the internal dynamics, tendencies and perceptual disparity 
throughout the layers of cybersecurity management as a function. Furthermore, given their 
emphasis on observational depth rather than breadth, case studies enable outlining the 
context of the enquiry — a key component in accounting for contingency. This includes 
considering measures of financial performance, macro-context, industry/sector specific 
variation and tendencies, role of cybersecurity in the operational model, staff base, 
capabilities, strategic direction, and so on. It should also be noted that some core constructs 
of the investigation, like the link between knowledge and the application of risk constructs, 
are not transmutable. As both entail local accounts and implementations of otherwise 
abstract constructs, there is significant scope for context specific contingency as a driver of 
event variation. Internal analytical consistency is therefore paramount.  
 
In addition, there are also pragmatic considerations which support the effectiveness of the 
case study as the main empirical method of the project. Firstly, given the sensitivity of 
organisational cybersecurity as a topic, the selection of a broadly defined, cross-
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organisational range of participants carries efficiency and analytical costs. The former is 
attributable to constrains on participant selection strategies, like snowballing (Saunders et al. 
2014), and gatekeeper plurality. The latter results from the inherent lack of horizontal 
population homogeneity assumed by the conceptual framing, and by the relative absence of 
structural and functional standardisation for cybersecurity management. Furthermore, 
without a plurality of perspectives which share partial environmental consistency on the 
topics of enquiry, the truthfulness, completeness, and depth of varying perspectives cannot 
be accounted for. Also, given the substantial volume of survey/aggregate data on 
organisational cybersecurity, and the relative deficit of in-depth, phenomenon oriented 
qualitative studies, there is a scholarly opportunity for substantive, case contributions.  
 
Such contributions are also compatible with the main research traditions which are used to 
construct the research narrative. In contrast, within the current context, techniques such as 
Agent Based Modelling that are employed in complexity studies were found to be reductive 
and unable to represent social and behavioural context and nuance. Experiments, focus 
groups and questionnaires have also been considered, however they were found to entail a 
disconnect from the systemic context, and to offer limited insight into ‘real world’ cross-
hierarchy interactions and phenomena. Additionally, the notion of a rigid conceptual 
structure prior that precedes data collection is met with reluctance, given the relatively broad 
findings of the literature review. In contrast, ethnographic research presents contrasting 
limitations: the absence of a theoretical foundation, which can impede on the explanatory 
and prescriptive potential of the study; and the limited presence/absence of previous 
ethnographic studies encountered in the main disciplinary traditions covered throughout the 
literature review. So, out of a broad range of methods which have been considered, (and 
attempted) throughout the duration of the research process, the case study emerged as a 
versatile and contextually compatible alternative, in spite of its potential and actual 
limitations. Attempts to mitigate against such limitations are described at length throughout 
the following sections, and inform case selection, the primary and secondary data collection 
and analysis processes, and the case narrative construction.  
 
The current section can be loosely summarised through three points: despite its limitations, 
the case study as a method is found to be adequate for the current enquiry, given its 
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philosophical and methodological grounding; subsequently, it has the ability to yield the 
empirical narrative coherence that is necessary for postulating (and prescriptively employing) 
ontological mechanisms through retroduction; and, the exploration of context verticality, 
which is manifested through systemic/functional layers, is an important driver of this ability. 
In the following section, the issues of validity and insight potential for the research narrative 
will be discussed as functions of case selection and design.  
 
3.3.3 Hierarchy and Verticality: Case design 
3.3.3.1 Questions and Propositions 
 
Despite their implementation heterogeneity, case studies share an overarching pattern in 
their design (Yin 2003). This includes an explicit set of Questions and Propositions, a defined 
Unit of Analysis, the logic link between Data and the Propositions, and the basis for 
interpreting the study’s findings. The questions guiding the process of data acquisition reflect 
the first two objectives. These are:  
 
• How is Cybersecurity Knowledge produced, used, and adapted at various 
(functional) levels within an organisational setting?  
• How is Cyber Risk Management used, and conditioned by available 
knowledge/epistemic constraints? 
 
These questions entail empirical nuance, and are responsive to narrative as a means to 
anchor the conceptual/theoretical framing. They are also supplemented by several 
underpinning propositions which guide the enquiry process.  
 
Within the questions, a dynamic, relational and hierarchical view of organisational 
knowledge is embedded. ‘Cybersecurity Knowledge’ is introduced as a contextually distinct 
epistemic construct, with meaningful manifested variations based on its locality. This means 
that epistemic efficiency and performance in cybersecurity, as a subsection of overall 
organisational performance, entails adaptations in form and content which serve its various 
specialised contexts of application. A knowledge-based view of cybersecurity management 
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also provides the basis for an epistemic functional division of cybersecurity actors. Thus, 
rather than taking a central, or departmental perspective of organisational cybersecurity, such 
a division explores the actor structures which shape systemic performance. This entails 
distinguishing between the Operational Actors which engage with the cyber infrastructure for 
value creation yet are not in security specific roles; Risk Analysts, who employ risk constructs 
to supervise, communicate, and address risk tendencies; and Decision Makers, who can shape 
policy, impose infrastructure changes and instil top-down change. All three categories of 
actors shape an organisation's cybersecurity, however they do so in meaningfully different 
ways, with different epistemic requirements.  
 
While not based on a specific, pre-existing taxonomical division of organisational 
cybersecurity knowledge functions, the three interacting categories are expected to show 
meaningful differences in their respective epistemic contexts. More specifically, the group-
based division aims to acknowledge the relationship between: the operational dimension of 
risk, and respectively knowledge, through their effects on both actors and processes; the 
procedural dimension, where formal risk analysis is conducted and integrated in function 
specific representational models; and, finally, the strategic/policy dimension which guides 
top-down efforts, and must address cyber risk in the wider organisational performance 
context. In isolation, data derived from each individual group can yield a myopic perspective 
of in-case dynamics. However, collectively, they enable a holistic exploration which includes 
both top-down and bottom-up phenomena and interactions through hierarchical layers, in 
accordance with the theoretical framing of the research problem.  
 
Potential limitations which can emerge from such a categorisation are acknowledged, and 
include: added constraints on the participant pool due to a necessity to shortlist for 
organisations with an explicit cyber risk analysis function; a detrimental effect on the 
feasibility of comparative studies due to inter-organisational functional differences across 
these three dimensions; and a potential imbalance between the three respective populations 
given their inherent asymmetry. Nonetheless, as an initial proposition, the participant 
grouping provides a meaningful epistemic distinction between interconnected yet distinct 
actor clusters which interact to shape the core facets of cybersecurity as an organisational 
function. This enables further focusing the data collection process in a manner that is 
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consistent with the theoretical framing of the study. As a result, the highlighted constraints 
are implicitly considered throughout the following sections, most notably in the processes of 
case (3.3.3.2) and participant selection (3.4). 
 
 
A second set of propositions was introduced through the relational logic of the core 
constructs (fig. 2), which illustrate the research problem based on loosely defined ontological 
and epistemological mechanisms. These narrow down the range of potential topics of enquiry 
and introduce a literature-informed cyclical logic of demi-regularity for organisational 
cybersecurity management as an adaptive, epistemically driven practice. They also expand on 
the link between knowledge, risk and adaptation by incorporating systemic change which 
serves as the object of epistemic adaptation, 'rationality' as the arch-structure of agency, and 
residual (or inherent/stochastic) uncertainty as the object of risk constructs. Together, they 
support the investigation of a dynamic, evolving view of knowledge which is explored through 
the first research question, and is assumed within the second. These propositions guide the 
case design by localising and structuring both the necessary data and the analytical approach 
that is required to address the research questions. More specifically, they position the 
objective of the emerging empirical enquiry as the engagement of agents across the 
functional division of cybersecurity risk in a homogenous (and exemplary) setting, on the 
topics introduced through the relational logic of the problem. This must also be coupled with 
context data which is needed to delineate contingency and locality, in an attempt to 
distinguish potential explanatory mechanisms. 
 
3.3.3.2 Unit of Analysis and Case Selection: The Single, Embedded Case Study 
 
Another aspect of case design which follows this line of methodological framing consists of 
defining the Unit of Analysis — or, simply put, what the case consists of. Furthermore, as the 
case questions are addressed under a relatively loose organisational framing, the choice of a 
single or multiple-case strategy must be made, and the actual setting of the case must also 
be determined. Based on the propositions and the case questions, the case itself is an 
organisation’s cybersecurity and risk function, in an internally stratified manner. This 
stratification leads to what Yin (2003) describes as embedded units of analysis (each proposed 
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cluster of participants) which converge to form the case, supplemented by context inputs. As 
a result, given the reliance on retroduction, the stated role of empiricism within the 
philosophical stance, the absence of preceding exploratory work which could guide the 
comparative logic of multiple case studies, and the importance of hierarchical consistency 
and systemic homogeneity, a single, embedded case study is preferred. In addition, 
ontological regularity, and access symmetry — both drivers of effective comparative studies, 
are seen as not applicable within the context of the study. In fact, the emphasis on analytical 
depth, the assumed empirical event causal-chain specificity, and the epistemological 
assumptions yield a prevalence of single case study/limited number of cases under the Critical 
Realist paradigm. On this point, Wynn Jr. and Williams (2012:804) note: 
“The distinguishing aspect of intensive case selection in CR is the focus on exposing the 
causal processes, expressed as causal mechanisms, which have produced a unique set of 
events and the specific structural/contextual factors that combined to generate them. As 
such, the results are not typically or necessarily generalizable across multiple contexts so 
that case selection is not made on this basis. The emphasis is on the detailed and precisely 
focused study of a limited number of cases, often a single case, in a specific setting in an 
attempt to build an explanatory theory that matches the empirical facts as closely as 
possible. […] This intensive study of a particular setting often results in an in-depth, 
contextually relevant analysis of a complex organizational process…” 
 
In light of this, a single, vertically embedded case is deemed as methodologically appropriate 
given the research design. However, a key issue of single case studies is the case selection 
process. The “strategic choice” of a case is highlighted by Flyvbjerg (2006:226) as a source of 
external validity in a social sciences context. An ability to postulate ontological mechanisms 
from events and observations presents challenges, especially for the identification of strictly 
local phenomena and dynamics, and for the explanation of systemic performance with 
consideration for contingency. As a result, the process of case selection must only shortlist 
institutions whose cybersecurity dynamics are not likely to be driven by local limitations, 
considerations and factors. A desirable case setting must exhibit a substantial informational 
asset base, and a reliance on cyber infrastructure for its operations. This condition selects 
against organisations which do not perceive cybersecurity to be an operational imperative, or 
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can justify disregarding cybersecurity concerns under pragmatic grounds. Such organisations 
are likely to have an inherent epistemic handicap relating to cybersecurity while events and 
occurrences in such a setting are unlikely to be illustrative of domain specific mechanisms and 
dynamics. The second condition relates to the existence of capital surplus, or evidence of 
financial health. Capital constraints are also a likely cause for pragmatically under-prioritising 
cybersecurity. Organisations with both financial flexibility and a significant informational and 
infrastructural asset base not only have the justification for pursuing cybersecurity as a matter 
of sustainability, but also have the means to conduct investments and changes that are 
deemed desirable. Thus, their domain-specific performance is not capped by financial 
limitations. A third condition consists of the existence of an active threat climate. Selecting 
against organisations which do not perceive the pressure of threat actors ensures that, within 
the case, not only there is a valuable asset-base and cyber infrastructure to defend, as well as 
the means to do so, but also that there is someone to defend against. Finally, in line with the 
previous conditions, a desirable case setting must exhibit a distinct capability, or know-how, 
in cybersecurity practices. The resulting organisational profile creates a best-case scenario 
whereby events and approaches are not the product of absent vulnerabilities, threats, 
capabilities or resources. Such a setting is likely to be exemplary of domain dynamics, yielding 
an opportunity to examine and engage the topics of enquiry.   
 
In addition to these theoretical selectors, a pragmatic ability to gain adequate access and 
pursue data collection is an inherent condition of case selection. Other secondary yet 
desirable attributes include the availability of sufficient context data, comparative 
performance visibility, and measures of sector specific contingency. Together, these factors 
describe a ‘critical case’ under Yin’s (2003) classification. Such a setting presents an 
opportunity to study epistemic dynamics which are not hindered by, or a product of local 
operational or perceptual limitations. Furthermore, it enables a critical analysis of the life-
cycle of risk constructs based on the perspectives of practitioners with demonstrable 
motivation, means, and know-how in cybersecurity management and strategy.  
 
Based on these factors, University X has been selected as an appropriate case setting. Its 
operational model is informational-asset dependent, while heavily relying on its cyber 
infrastructure. Furthermore, it is highly susceptible to reputational damage in the event of 
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cybersecurity incidents. The non-monetary value of data assets is also worth highlighting as 
the institution’s data stream can include both secret and sensitive data from a wide variety of 
partners/stakeholders. Financially, the institution is a high performer (first quartile) in sector-
specific comparative terms. Indeed, the institution also faces an active threat climate, a point 
which was confirmed in preliminary discussions. Such a threat presence at a sector level is 
also to be expected, based on existing secondary sources. Romanosky (2016) identifies 
Educational Services as having the second highest incident rate by industry, following 
Government, and fourth highest number of incidents in the considered data, after Finance 
and Insurance, Health Care, and Government. While the data-set is not specific to the UK, this 
serves as an indicator of sector-wide threat presence. As the last conceptual qualifier, 
University X is linked to know-how in cybersecurity from both an academic and an applied, 
commercial spin-off venture perspective. Additional comparative attributes and qualifiers as 
well as the context data for University X are described at greater length in section 4.1.  
 
3.3.3.3 Defining ‘Data’ 
 
From a data perspective, case studies are not restrictive, as they can accommodate a range 
of alternative data collection and analysis methods which provide an account of the units of 
analysis based on the study’s questions and propositions (Yin 2003). However, in spite of this 
flexibility, preferences and tendencies can be observed. For example, one of the most 
common approaches in case study data collection is the semi-structured interview (Easton 
2010). Indeed, Brinkmann (2013:21) describes semi-structured interviews as “probably […] 
the most widespread ones in the human and social sciences…”. They are presented as 
enabling greater levels of focus and, ultimately, greater control over the interview process 
than unstructured interviews. However, they also provide more leeway for narrative 
adaptation and conversational follow-ups than structured interviews. This versatility is 
advantageous for the current line of enquiry.  
 
As the collection of organisational data concerning the main topics of interest presumes the 
participation of diverse actors, interviews are one of the main available tools for the task. 
Additionally, while the line of enquiry does require a focus on core constructs, it also aims to 
explore variation in interpretation and experience. The semi-structured interview format 
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enables a responsive approach which can account for nuance, contradictions, clarifications, 
and adaptation. It also allows for a narrative convergence using experientially distinct 
populations. This is valuable given that, while participant clustering is primarily based on the 
functional division of cybersecurity previously introduced as a proposition, cluster 
homogeneity is not assumed. Thus, the topics of enquiry can be adapted based on the 
interviewee’s role, experience and worldview — all of which important when attempting to 
generate meaning from the data. Through such adaptations, the interview questions can 
accommodate participant contingency while also being linked to the logic of enquiry and the 
conceptual framework.  
 
It should be highlighted that the common reliance on interview data for case building has 
been the subject of criticism questioning the suitability of the method (some of which covered 
in section 3.3.2.). Most notably, Diefenbach (2009) highlights a series of such concerns within 
the literature, addressing various aspects of interview outputs. These include the internal 
validity of interview data, and its argued (in)ability to reflect objective reality; the low volume 
of observations generally associated with interviews; and, their ‘snapshot’ character’ in 
circumstances where longitudinal development is central to the research problem.  
 
Within the current project, the adequacy of semi-structured interviews has been considered 
in two dimensions: absolute – i.e. context independent validity of the method, and 
comparative – context dependent validity, in relation to alternative available methods. From 
an absolute perspective, the semi-structured interview is compatible with the critical realist 
grounding of the study, which does not equate the ‘empirical’ ontological domain with the 
‘real’. As a result, from this perspective, an inability to fully reflect objective reality, i.e. the 
real, is assumed across the range of empirical data collection methods, albeit with variations 
based on the research context. Subsequently, the interview data is not seen as inherently 
invalid or flawed. From a comparative merit perspective, based on the emerging research 
strategy, the number of observations is largely constrained by a mix of case attributes, i.e. 
number of relevant participants within the organisational structure, and operational 
constraints, i.e. data-collection cycle deadlines, informant availability and willingness to 
participate, and the overall organisational context – operational climate, cycles, and key 
events. As a result, interview data was not perceived as a comparatively limiting format in 
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terms of the number of observations, and the time sensitivity of the phenomena under 
observation. To further mitigate against these factors, a series of steps were taken, including: 
the use of additional sources of secondary data which can provide a historical context; the 
attempt to recruit heterogenous participants based on role and background; and the 
acknowledgement of time spent in the organisation as potentially significant. Based on the 
above, semi-structured interviews were found to be an appropriate primary data collection 
format for the emerging case study.  
 
Unlike the internal case data, the development of an in-depth account of the case context 
presents a greater opportunity for data diversity. In accordance with the philosophical and 
conceptual emphasis on ‘layers’ of reality, the case context must illustrate the nature and 
implications of sector-specific contingencies, and how both the case and the wider sector fit, 
from a cybersecurity perspective in a national setting. In order to achieve this objective, a 
variety of data sources are used in Section 4.1, ranging from descriptive open data sets, 
reports, surveys, and anecdotal accounts from the institution, sector-level bodies, as well as 
governmental and private enterprises. Again, the resulting description aims to converge with 
the primary data and support its interpretation/meaning generation process. An in-depth, 
retrospective account of the data collection, processing and analysis stages is provided in the 
following chapter.  
 
3.3.3.4 Interpretation of Findings: Linking Data to Propositions 
 
The final stages of Yin’s (2003) arch-structure of case design address the issue of the 
interpretation of findings, and the linking of the data to propositions. Given the form fluidity 
of ‘data’ in case studies, little method-specific guidance can be provided, other than anecdotal 
evidence of successful approaches. However, the lack of accepted methodological orthodoxy 
is not inherent to case studies. Maxwell and Chimel (2014) highlight this point within the 
context of qualitative methods in general, as the links between data are more substantive 
rather than formal in nature. Substantive relations focus on interactions, whereas formal 
relations focus on similarities and differences. In response to this distinction, qualitative data 
analysis in case studies, particularly embedded, exploratory ones, can be associated with 
what Maxwell and Chimel (2014) describe as ‘connecting strategies’. These include matrices, 
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which have a tabular structure, and networks, which visually represent relationships. Out of 
the two, matrices are particularly applicable for the current approach towards meaning 
generation from semi-structured interview data, as they can be used alongside 
thematic/content analysis to explore the interactions and conflicts described by the interview 
data with complementary effect. (Willig 2014)  
 
This complementary use of thematic analysis and a matrix display strategy present the 
opportunity of exploring interactions amongst interview data on the topics of enquiry 
amongst the embedded units of analysis/participants clusters. By analysing the narrative at 
the intersection of the various descriptions and viewpoints, while supporting it with context 
data, the case questions can be addressed in a substantive, non-reductive manner. 
Additionally, the propositions, which come in the form of both the topics of enquiry and the 
stratification of the case, form a structural backbone for the interpretation and analysis of the 
data. However, they are also potentially challenged by the enquiry itself, based on the 
responses of participants across the groups. As a result, this procedural approach ensures 
that the data, the case questions and the propositions are inextricably linked in the process 
of meaning generation. Furthermore, the case structure is flexible enough to accommodate 
perspective plurality, meaning that conflicts between data points are descriptively 
meaningful, and their nature is a source of insight, rather than an imperative for interpretive 
reconciliation. (Miles et al. 2014)  
 
3.3.3.5 Considering Methodological Validity and Validation 
 
The notion of ‘validity’ within the context of methodology is a heterogenous, contested 
construct, largely driven by the philosophical framing of the study. Subsequently, the 
assumptions of critical realism shape the present contextual interpretation of validity and are 
largely based on both epistemological considerations and on the defined role of empirical 
observations. From a critical realist perspective, Zachariadis et al. (2013) notes that Internal 
Validity addresses the link between postulated mechanisms and the events which are 
observed and form the subject of data collection. Ensuring that such a link is adequately 
represented has been a passive theme throughout method selection and design. More 
specifically, it is addressed by the research strategy in the following dimensions:  
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• Case Selection: In addition to pragmatic concerns, the case selection criteria have been 
constructed to minimise the effect of circumstance/contingency on the manifestation of the 
postulated mechanisms. 
• Data Selection: All secondary data sources are externally pre-validated and used with 
complementary effect to provide a nuanced picture of the operational context. Furthermore, 
the participant selection was conducted to ensure an adequate representation of 
perspectives and narratives based on the functional spread of the research problem (further 
elaborated in the following sub-chapter). 
• Data Collection: In order to mitigate against researcher projection, measures have been 
taken to maintain data-collection nuance and represent diverging perspectives. Thus, 
interview questions are structured around topics rather than specific construct 
interpretations and aim to capture both perspectives and events. Also, by ensuring that 
questions across units of analysis are structured around the same core topics of enquiry, the 
potentiality of conflicting/diverging data is maintained. 
• Structural Logic: Case findings are presented in relation to postulated mechanisms 
which, following the case-study, are readjusted and used to calibrate the problem-logic as the 
basis of prescription. 
 
External Validity is used to describe the degree of generalisability exhibited by the outputs 
of the study. So, within a critical realist paradigm, it addresses the extent to which the 
mechanisms underpinning events in the setting of observation are also likely to be linked to 
events in different domains of application. That is why Zachariadis et al. (2013:7) suggests 
that “the degree of external validity is subject to discerning between the contingent factors 
from the necessary ones”. In light of this, in an attempt to maximise external validity, 
emphasis has been placed on in-case perspective triangulation and context depth as a mean 
to develop a multi-granular, vertical/hierarchical, cross-functional interpretation of the in-
case data to support the process of retroduction. By providing an in-depth overview of the 
functional, organisational, and sector context of the data, contingency and locality can be 
better accounted for when discussing the relationship between mechanisms and events. 
Whenever possible, comparisons are also made to highlight the effects of differences in 
context. Finally, the interaction between the theory-based postulated mechanisms and the 
in-case data is explicitly addressed in a standalone section (5.1) which aims to calibrate the 
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assumptions under which the process of prescription development can take place.  
 
From a prescriptive output perspective (also covered in section 5), the notion of validity is 
largely inferred from the cumulative research narrative. In this context, framework design is 
seen as a process which leverages the foundation of theoretical and empirical findings to 
formulate a problem-specific adaptive pathway navigational archetype. In other words, 
prescriptive validity is approached as an extension of explanatory/representational validity. At 
the high level of abstraction entailed by the prescriptive contribution, the heuristic nature of 
constructs is predicated on axiomatic principles and assumptions. By emphasising the internal 
coherence and external applicability of these principles and assumptions, prescriptive 
contributions can be effectively formulated, assuming a better fit to the problem dynamics 
they address, i.e. organisational cybersecurity.  
 
In addition, the inherently pragmatic nature of the prescriptive contribution, which shapes 
the interpretation of validity in favour of comparative or absolute performance measures, also 
positions the post-formulation validation outside of the boundaries of the thesis. This is due 
to the fact that subjective validation, i.e. the formal approval of stakeholders, is incompatible 
with the mechanism-based logic of the research strategy. The case has a moderating role for 
postulated mechanisms, and is not the sole manifestation of the research problem, which 
means that the problem addressed by the contribution is not bound to the case setting. In 
addition, the empirical data strategy converges a plurality of potentially conflicting 
perspectives under the conceptual arch-structure to yield  findings, which excludes a 
monolithic representation of stakeholders/participants as vectors of prescriptive validity. 
Moreover, objective post-formulation validation presents a wide range of operational 
barriers, ranging from the ability to distinguish performance between the proposed 
prescriptive archetype and a baseline alternative; the inability to identify test-settings that 
are willing to implement the prescriptive output and accurately communicate measures of 
performance; and, the absence of an approach to normalise cyber security event contingency 
(defensive and offensive). As a result, both the added value and the practicality of 
constructing a post-formulation validation strategy for the study’s prescriptive outputs are 




To summarise, the single, vertically embedded case study was introduced as both an 
adequate approach for the empirical dimension of the project based on the research 
philosophy and objectives, as well as a pragmatic one. The issue of case design was also 
explored as a function of research questions, propositions, units of analysis, data definition, 
the link between data and the study’s propositions, and the approach for interpreting 
findings. The following section will explore a descriptive and procedural outline of the data 




3.4 Data Evaluation: A Procedural Outline 
3.4.1 Engaging the Case  
 
Prior to contacting participants, a series of procedural steps were taken. First, the premises 
put forward by the research design were used to develop supporting documentation. This 
includes: a Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 1), which provides a brief overview of the 
project, and is designed to accompany data collection/interview requests; a Consent Form 
Template (Appendix 2), whereby interviewees can explicitly review the potential uses for the 
data, and provide consent for the data capture method; and, an initial set of interview 
questions (Appendix 3), coupled with a rationale for enquiry, which are derived from the 
topics of enquiry in a group specific manner. Together, these documents were used to support 
a successful application for institutional Research Ethics approval.  
 
As a central point of operationalising the research strategy, the interview questions are 
predicated on the assumption that the topics, which reflect the logic of enquiry (section 3.2), 
are linked to the core mechanisms underpinning the research objectives. Also, it is assumed 
that each topic is expressed/manifested differently based on the participant perspective and 
context. Thus, the initial questions were derived from the intersection of the topic of enquiry 
and the associated sub-constructs of the conceptual framework, with the broad attributes of 
the participant role clustering, in categories based on the functional division of cybersecurity 
management described in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the questions are seen as a 
point of departure, as adjusting the line of enquiry to reflect the specific insight of each 
participant is part of the research strategy. So, while the interview rationales remained 
constant for each group throughout the process of data collection, the questions themselves, 
as well as the emphasis placed on each section, were adapted throughout the process based 
on accumulating experiences, emerging opportunities, and participant responsiveness. The 
flexibility of the format was used to leverage a conversational dynamic for follow-up or 
elaboration requests on emerging themes. This flexibility was also used to de-emphasise 
group-based questions which seemed inapplicable for specific informants. Finally, driving the 
interview question formulation is the assumption that the link between relevant, empirical 
events and their underpinning mechanisms can be explored through a convergent narrative, 
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structured around the topics derived from the conceptual framework (described at different 
levels of granularity in sections 2.4 and 3.2);  
 
Unlike the primary data, the mix of quantitative and qualitative secondary context data was 
collected both before case-selection, in order to ensure that the case meets the key selection 
criteria outlined in the previous chapter, and throughout the data collection stage, to follow-
up and clarify emerging issues. The available quantitative data was used to provide a 
descriptive account of the context, developing a profile for University X in relation to both its 
sector, and the broader economy. This profile was then used to anchor open threat data and 
to support inference by appropriately positioning the case, while also establishing areas of 
possible contingency. The reliance on quantitative open data-sets and available descriptions 
of University X meant that representational detail can compromise anonymity efforts. Thus, 
efforts were made to ensure that sufficient context data is provided without compromising 
the identity of the case. Examples of such efforts include computing and describing economic 
performance in comparative rather than absolute terms, i.e. percentiles, or year on year 
performance compared to the sector average. As the sources and procedures used are 
described within the context development section (section 4.1), the remainder of this chapter 
is largely focused on the primary, qualitative data collection process and its subsequent 
analysis.  
 
Given the low degree of structural transparency presented by University X’s cybersecurity 
function, the interview questions have had to be adapted based on the emerging background 
of each participant. One notable point of departure from Brinkmann’s (2013:21) overview of 
semi-structured interview practice consists of the inclusion of both descriptive and 
analytical/theoretical accounts as meaningful. While always discussed in a practical and local 
setting to the participant, the construct framing used by participants to conceptualise and 
describe occurrences is also captured by the questions. This also enables a better 
understanding of divergent data, particularly on abstract topics of enquiry where informant-
specific understanding and framing can shape responses. In this context, both analytical and 
descriptive themes are deemed potentially valuable as enablers of representational 
consistency between the theoretical/abstract intuitive framing and practice.  
A practical example of this necessity is presented by the critical representation of risk 
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constructs. Not only is a descriptive account of risk practices essential for addressing this 
avenue of enquiry, but the context, personal expectations, and their consistency with 
outcomes are also important to acknowledge. By exploring how the constructs are both 
understood and implemented from a plurality of perspectives, the congruence between the 
two accounts can be examined. So, while a descriptive account of events, evidence, processes 
and structures is indeed at the foundation of the case, some descriptive illustrations rely on 
theoretical/analytical interpretations, which make construct clarity valuable for narrative 
convergence.  
 
3.4.2 Data Collection and Management Overview 
 
The interview data has been collected over a period of three months, between the 25th of 
April and 27th of July 2017, and encompasses 11 interviews with an average duration of 
approximately 40 minutes. However, duration is not constant across groups. For example, 
Interviews with Group 3 ‘Operational Actors’ were overall shorter, with an average duration 
of approximately 25 minutes, while Groups 1 and 2 interviews are correspondingly longer. All 
participants were sequentially contacted through e-mail — a process which has largely proven 
to be efficient, yielding mostly positive responses and further recommendations of individuals 
that were relevant to the study. Logistically, ten interviews took place on the premises of the 
institution, while the eleventh was conducted through VoIP. The organisational support of the 
study has enabled its logistical accommodation, which helped mitigate against logistical 
constraints. The most significant such constraint was presented by the limited time availability 
of some participants. This, however, has not compromised any of the interviews, as all the 
core topics have been covered in each instance.  
 
One of the main challenges in implementing the research strategy has been the 
identification of a candidate pool that is diverse, relevant, and able to exhaustively address 
the research topics without over/under representing specific viewpoints. Given the low 
degree of visibility concerning University X’s structure, and the specific qualifiers for each 
group, no a priori participant targets were set (Sim et al. 2018). A key part of gathering 
descriptive accounts of the processes and rationales behind in-case cybersecurity efforts and 
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conceptualisations was ensuring that informants have sufficient exposure and awareness to 
be able to accurately reflect the in-case reality. But this emphasis on interviewee exposure 
and awareness has yielded a series of additional aspects to consider. Firstly, for key strategic 
roles, even within a large institution, the pool of potential participants is very limited, which 
constricts choice — an issue further amplified by candidate availability and willingness to take 
part in the study. An in-case example of this issue lies with ‘Category 2 - Cyber Risk Analysis’ 
actors; after gathering a structural understanding of the case and its CS/IS risk analysis 
function, only three potential Category 2 actors were identified. This created a situation with 
very little room for error, as an understanding of this function is essential for outlining the 
case (the structure and role of in-case risk analysis will be further discussed in the following 
sections).  
 
Secondly, by only selecting candidates based on their cybersecurity exposure and 
awareness, there is a risk of skewing the data based on specific areas expertise, at the expense 
of alternative views. This issue has been anticipated at the research design stage, and has 
been mitigated against through the interview categories. Whenever possible — most notably 
within ‘Category 3 - General Actors’ —  efforts have been made to include a variety of 
perspectives, ranging from Academics (includes teaching and research responsibilities), 
Pedagogical Support Actors, Research Admin Staff, to Technical Staff (IT Development and 
System Maintenance), and Decision Makers — from different parts (I.e. 
Schools/Departments) of the organisation, with different backgrounds and levels of 
experience within University X. This varied pool of potential candidates is contrasted with that 
of key decision makers, or niche-expertise roles, where the scope of candidate selection 
variation is little to none — which can also inhibit the efficacy of anonymisation efforts 
(Saunders et al. 2014).  
 
Keeping a balanced pool of candidates has also been difficult, given the lack of 
proportionality between the categories. General actors greatly outnumber decision-makers 
and risk analysts, however the addition of indefinite participants within the category changes 
the nature of the data-set in a way that does not address the primary case objectives, and 
provides little insight regarding postulated mechanisms. As the specifics of the organisational 
structure are largely externally opaque, a key step was identifying key informants and 
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establishing how to progress the candidate selection strategy. This has entailed a mix of 
Criterion and Snowball sampling approaches (Patton 1990). More specifically, once key 
informants were identified based on their organisational function, the subsequent interviews 
presented opportunities for additional insight into other roles of interest, and potentially 
valuable perspectives. This has meant that, while participation was constrained by a fixed, a 
priori set of criteria (i.e. adherence to the Group division), the perspectives of collaborators 
and the accumulating understanding of the operational environment have both influenced 
the ongoing candidate selection.    
 
Stakeholder feedback indicated a necessity for the inclusion of an extended enterprise 
perspective to delineate and contextualise the case data. This was addressed through the 
inputs of a Cybersecurity-oriented informant from a sector oversight body within University 
X’s extended enterprise, and that of a senior IT decision-maker within one of University X’s 
commercial spin-offs. The former enabled capturing a perspective informed by a wide 
exposure sector-wide cybersecurity, while the latter helped gain an understanding of the role 
and relationship between University X and its commercial spin-offs, especially in relation to 
cybersecurity. Both perspectives played an important role in better understanding the 
dynamics, the context, and the contingencies of the case. Finally, the phrasing of questions 
and the specific areas of emphasis have also evolved throughout the three months of data 
collection based on perceived effectiveness. After each interview, the notes and recordings 
were reviewed and evaluated for preliminary themes and interview practice efficacy. The 
findings were then used to inform the following interviews. 
 
3.4.2.1 Describing the (Anonymous) Case and Participants  
 
Given the potential sensitive nature of the research area, anonymity for interviewees has 
been explicitly included within the research design to stimulate participation and ensure that 
both individuals as well as the institution do not face repercussions because of the study. 
However, Saunders et al. (2014:617) present the pursuit of complete anonymity within 
qualitative studies as an “unachievable goal” and, instead, highlight the need for a “balancing 
act” between protecting the identities of participants and preserving the data’s integrity and 
value. The most notable example of this tension within the current project lies with the 
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description of roles and professional background of participants. Both attributes were used 
for interviewee selection and are meaningful for accounting for the context of the interview 
data. However, overt descriptions of roles and backgrounds raise the issue of potentially 
compromising participant anonymity in relation to other actors within the research setting.   
 
Several measures are taken to balance the two objectives. Pseudonyms in the form of 
gender-neutral names have been randomly assigned to each candidate. The individual 
pseudonyms are extracted from an online database of such names. The resulting list of names 
is also culturally standardised, as both participant personal background and gender are 
irrelevant for the object of study. Furthermore, gender pronouns are avoided in favour of the 
third-person, singular “they”. If individual quotes are perceived as sensitive, attribution is 
made based on respondent group, I.e. “Member of Group 3 - General Actors”. It should also 
be noted at this stage that, within the context of data analysis, a broadly ‘empathic’ 
interpretative stance is taken, as the nature of the enquiry does not rely on assumptions of 
implicit meaning and motives outside of the statements of participants (Willig 2014). 
Nonetheless, inferences are made from the comparison of individual statements, whenever 
adequate, to account for plurality of perspectives, inconsistencies, and ensure that nuance is 
adequately represented.   
 
However, not all personal attributes have been suppressed. To maintain the value of the 
collected data and provide adequate context, relevant individual characteristics are 
presented. Examples of this include the time spent in the organisation where this is seen as 
contextually relevant (adjusted/approximated so that it is not a direct identifier), or, when 
explicitly stated, broad descriptions of background and experience which inform various 
positions. As a rule of thumb, such attributes are made explicit when they are essential 
towards understanding the context of the data. The full list of interviewees, their assigned 
pseudonyms (used throughout section 4.2), and their descriptions/profiles have been 







Pseudonym Group Description Notes 
Charlie 1 
Mid-management role, with 
direct input over technological 
behaviour. Non-academic; 
Feeds into senior 
management; Role entails 
wide exposure within the 
organisational structure; 
• >3 Years in Institution; 
• Management Role for Secondary 
Technology Infrastructure;  
• “Feeds into Senior 
Management” – Outside of traditional 
Hierarchy; 
• Wide exposure and oversight, as 
the role covers multiple ‘schools’ 
Val 1 
Part of leadership team; 
Organisational growth-
oriented role; Substantial 
background experience 
relating to cybersecurity. 
• Senior role grounded in growth 
and innovation 
• Additional policy, advisory and 




ICT Senior Management 
Role; Direct decision-making 
responsibility; insight into the 
IT function’s approach to Risk 
• CTO equivalent – role emphasis 
on ICT/Technology and Strategy. 
• Oversight of ICT technical 
programmes, development and strategy.  
• Operational perspective on 
cybersecurity and risk analysis 
Ash 1 
Senior Management role in 
ICT for Subsidiary; Decision-
making function within the 
technical facets of the 
Subsidiary 
• Senior Managerial ICT within 
‘for-profit’/ventures institutional 
subsidiary.  
• Role entails decision-making and 
strategy development for the technical 
dimension of operations  
Brooklyn 1* 
Cybersecurity Management 
Role in Industry Oversight 
Organisation; Broad exposure 
to sector issues; Access to a 
wide variety of institutions. 
• Management role in 
Cybersecurity; 
• Part of an industry body with 
cybersecurity responsibilities and 
oversight; 
• High levels of exposure to 
sector-wide trends and patterns; 
• Macro compliance expertise. 
Rudy 2 
Information Security 
Management and Risk Role’ 
Direct engagement with the 
risk analysis process; Feeds 
into decision makers/senior 
management; Meaningful 
professional background 
• Responsible for formal IS Risk 
Analysis; 
• Directly feeds into policy and 
senior management; 
• Varied technical/managerial 
background outside of the sector. 
Eli 3 
Academic role within School 
A; Significant experience 
within the institution (~10 
years); Daily tasks fully 
dependent on ICT 
infrastructure; 
• Operational role: teaching and 
research in Faculty A. Above average 
seniority (given staff turnover): exposure 
to restructuring/ 
• Representative in day-to-day 
role and tasks 
Kendall 3 
Non-academic role; Involved 
in research/project 
management and support. >20 
years of institutional 
experience in various roles 
(including technical); Direct 
exposure to high value data. 
• Administration, project 
management, and research support role; 
• Exposure to externally opaque 
projects, research and data; 





Table 2. Participants overview and selection rationale 
 
Finally, despite its flexibility, the participant clustering described as part of the research 
strategy has been, in practice, less than obvious. So, for example, ‘Alex’ as a Senior 
Manager/Leader within the organisation’s IT function, could have addressed both ‘Group 1 - 
Decision Makers’, and ‘Group 2 - Risk Analysis’ perspectives. As this categorisation impacts 
the set of questions that guide the interview, adequate categorisation is important to 
maximise the value of the data. In such instances, a judgement call was made based on the 
individual participant exposure and oversight, the primary function of their role, and the 
distinctness of their perspective. So, in such instances, the scope of the conversation was 
broadened beyond the Group-based questions in order to maximise the insight gained from 
such candidates. As this limitation of the Group clustering became apparent within the first 
interviews, the mitigative steps were designed early in the process, leaving room for 
‘opportunity questions’ and narrative variation, at the expense of a strict adhesion to the 
question sets. 
 
3.4.2.2 Mitigating Data Collection Bias 
 
While efforts to mitigate against researcher bias have been made implicitly throughout the 




Oversight and management of 
core (pedagogical) systems. 
• Core technical support actor 
• Oversight of operations for 
operationally vital technologies (i.e. VLE) 
• Dual perspective, exposure to 
and familiarity with aggregate user 
behaviour 
Sage 3 
Non-academic dual role: staff 
training and technology 
support; Academic research 
background. 
• Responsibilities include learning 
technology support, staff-oriented 
workshops. Research adjacent. 
• Role entails engagement with 
both operational actors and senior 
management 
Fin 3 
Academic role within School 
B; Significant international 
experience 
• <3 years in current role 
• Role entails a mix of research, 
teaching and admin tasks representative 
of School B; 
• Cultural point of reference, 




internal validity — they have also played an explicit role in engaging the case. Miles et al. 
(2014) address the issue of analytical bias from two perspectives/origins: the influence of the 
site, i.e. case, on the researcher, and vice versa. Examples of explicit steps taken to address 
these can be loosely clustered around:  
• participant selection: the participant spread was maximised, where possible, to 
potentially reflect status/perspective divergences (such divergences are reflected in 
the interview data); the informants’ duration spent in the organisation was used to 
identify opportunities for capturing historical context, including cultural and 
procedural background dynamics which contrast the status-quo; in order to 
maximise transparency, all participants were briefed about the objectives and the 
rationale of the study prior to data collection; 
• engaging the case: the data collection architecture entailed triangulating 
perspectives on the key topics of enquiry; external (secondary) sources of 
information where also used when available, most notably to frame the 
organisational context; the interviews were anchored in the core constructs and 
research objectives, which provide a conceptual point of convergence for the 
research narrative; obtrusive observations and measures were avoided in order to 
ensure a collaborative dynamic; ongoing feedback was sought from the doctoral 
supervisory team as a source of procedural calibration and objective/third-party 
input;  
• subjective/behavioural measures: internally conflicting viewpoints (i.e. conflicting 
accounts from the same participant) were used as indicators of potentially ‘loaded’ 
question framing, explicitly noted in the preliminary data analysis, and used to adjust 
follow-ups; even when sought by participants, potentially biasing researcher inputs 
on the research narrative and objects were postponed until after the interviews;  
finally, given the contextual logic of empirical enquiry and the coarse granularity of 
the postulated mechanisms, there were no embedded incentives to favour specific 






3.4.3 Data Management and Analysis 
 
Interview data analysis is broadly described by Roulston (2014) as a three-stage process: 
data reduction, data reorganisation, and data representation. Within the current study, the 
first stage corresponds to interview data processing and coding. The second step entails 
exploring for patterns connections within the data — achieved through a matrix display (Miles 
et al. 2014). Finally, these patterns are explored fully and represented within the case 
narrative. It is also worth noting that, in addition to the formal analysis process, a preliminary 
analysis of the emerging data was conducted in parallel to the collection process, as proposed 
by Miles et al. (2014). This preliminary analysis was cyclical and ongoing throughout the 
duration of the data collection stage, and it was primarily used to refine the questions and 
assess converging insights in relation to their potential for case-building. From it, a series of 
relevant aspects have emerged, which have included the necessity of incorporating an 
organisational commercial spin-off point of view, the opportunity for greater context insight 
provided by sector-level oversight actors, and the perception of structural data saturation 
which triggered the progression of the study.  
 
3.4.3.1 Interview Data: Transcription and Management 
 
Prior to the formal analysis stage, the data was first prepared in alignment with the research 
assumptions and strategy (Roulston 2014). Following the interviews, the audio recordings 
were manually transcribed in their entirety. This process was software assisted, which enabled 
Duration/Location coding for time-tagging text to its corresponding position in the audio 
recording. In addition, due to software time-stretching and dynamic navigational shortcuts, 
as well as high fidelity recordings captured in largely controlled environments, the process of 
capturing audio-content has been generally unhindered by unintelligible/unclear recordings. 
Furthermore, as the transcription was not outsourced, potential interpretational disparities 
were also mitigated through the recollection of the interview narrative and notes, as well as 
the researcher familiarity with the source material. A ‘Standard Orthography’ (Kowal and 
O’Connell 2014) representational approach was used, meaning that no emphasis was placed 
on preserving dialects or phonetical variations. However, when deemed meaningful, 
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paralinguistic components such as laughter or tone (i.e. indicating sarcasm) were highlighted 
and captured as an annotation to ensure that the context of individual statements is not lost. 
Finally, preliminary anonymisation measures were also taken in the transcription process, 
which primarily consisted of replacing key names or unique identifying attributes with codes. 
(Kowal and O’Connell 2014) 
 
When not in use, both the notes and transcripts were password protected and stored on 
256AES encrypted drives. Transitioning towards the qualitative data analysis stage entailed 
importing all relevant text files into NVivo, where they were preliminarily processed through 
meta-data generation, ensuring transcript format consistency, and general data cleansing.  
 
3.4.3.2 Coding Interview Data: Reduction 
 
The coding approach used for the data reduction stage is based on Miles et al. (2014), who 
describe the practice as labelling data segments based on both their meaning, and on their 
broader epistemic attributes. This approach is centred around two cycles, the first of which 
aims to assist with categorising the data, while the second is used to reorganise it in order to 
yield patterns.  
 
As a result, after the appropriate meta-data was produced, a preliminary coding structure 
was established. At this stage, ongoing engagement with the interview data was a key step in 
establishing and reiterating on codes and themes. From this process, five distinct types of 
codes emerged. This categorisation relies on the wider spectrum of coding approaches 
introduced by Miles et al. (2014). Individual codes contain their category embedded as a 
prefix, followed by their corresponding topic, and, when appropriate, an additional qualifier. 
The prefixes and their corresponding categories are:  
 Des. — Descriptive Coding: includes procedures, circumstances, events and outcomes; 
 Em. — Emotion Coding: identifies affective statements, attitudes, trust, and intuitions; 
 Hol. —  Holistic Coding: describes macro themes, and generally covers larger sections 
of text; 
 IV. — In Vivo Coding: code reflects direct phrasing of participant 
 Hyp. — Hypothesis Coding: a largely secondary code encompassing statements relating 
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to the Knowledge Problem heuristic.  
 
Throughout the second cycle, codes were bundled where possible based on themes, 
explanatory content, or the underpinning construct they address. A practical example of the 
ouptut of this process is: “des.Anecdotal Evidence_Computing Behaviour”. This code was 
used to identify the sections of interviews where participants anecdotally describe 
occurrences related to their computing behaviour. ‘Computing Behaviour’ is one of four 
categories of anecdotal evidence descriptions identified. Following a reiteration process in 
which unnecessary codes were collapsed or converged, a total of 68 codes remained, 49 of 
which being categorised as descriptive. Each of the codes was individually defined, while 
some were hierarchically organised based on their topic and content commonalities. 
Following this stage, the data was reorganised in the form of a matrix display, as an extension 
of the reorganisation role prescribed for Second Cycle coding. Matrix displays are described 
by Miles et al. (2014:108) as a “…tabular format that collects and arranges data for easy 
viewing in one place, permits detailed analysis, and sets the stage for later cross-case analysis 
….”.  
3.4.3.3 Representing Connections: Themes and Patterns 
 
The purpose of the matrix representation was to restructure the heterogeneous interview 
content from across the participant groups/embedded units of analysis to connect the 
findings around the case questions and topics of enquiry, and enable their convergence into 
a case narrative. It was also used as a final filter against interview content which does not 
support achieving the research objectives while at the same time further reducing the volume 
of the insight gained. As the case questions were not designed to yield a simple truth-claim 
answer format, the need to capture the dynamics, layers and potential mechanisms driving 
the research topics for case building placed substantial emphasis on structural clarity. 
 
These requirements are reflected in the adopted structure. The headers used are: ‘Case 
Question/Objective’; the respective ‘Sub-objective’, which is derived from the Logic/Topics of 
Enquiry, and enables a systematic deconstruction of each primary objective into segments; 
the ‘Theme’, derived from the coding cycles; ‘Interview Identifier’ for each participant; 
relevant ‘Quotes’ and data excerpts; ‘Point’, which encompasses a quote summary and 
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categorisation as either descriptive or analytic; ‘Notes’ for each point made and its non-local 
implications from a narrative standpoint; and ‘General Notes’ used to summarise cross-group 
patterns at a theme level. Furthermore, the theme level summaries captured in the ‘General 
Notes’ column were also colour coded based on their relevance towards the emerging 
narrative. Table 3 exemplifies 3 (randomly selected) nodes out of the 114 included in the 
matrix representation of the data. It thus serves as an illustration of the analytical process 
used to connect and represent themes and patterns. A more in-depth overview of the 
structure and contents of the matrix display as outputs of the reorganisation stage of analysis 
(Roulston 2014) is introduced in Appendix 6. This provides a clearer picture of the analysis 
process, and further illustrates the transition between the raw interview transcripts and the 
case narrative as a function of data and pattern analysis.  
 
Macro-objective Identify how knowledge relating to cybersecurity is produced, used and adapted at various levels within an organisation 
Sub-objective Role of KNW 
Theme (des).Uncertainty in CS 
Interviewee *Participant* GR1 
Quote 
I think it is speed. Speed of impact, I think, with cyber. Lots of the other 
uncertainty, around government changes, around Brexit… it’s a much 
longer lead time. You’ve got some planning, you can put plan a, plan b, 
plan c, and you can make representations, you can lobby, you can build 
the networks. Cybersecurity - it’s there when you’re dealing with it. Or 
cyber-attacks. So, yeah speed. #00:39:23.99# 
 
Speed is the definite thing. And also, I suppose, the breadth of impact. 
#00:39:31.81# 
Point (Des – An) AN: Uncertainty in CS is Distinct due to Speed and Breadth of impact 
Notes (Entry) 
Pace and Breadth of impact (variance): Ties in Knowledge with Change as 
Topics. Also consistent with risk/systems theory assertions concerning the 
role of risk in high uncertainty. 
Aggregate Notes* (Theme) 
Uncertainty in CS distinct due to: Speed and breadth of impact, scope of 
'Unknown unknowns', and their impact, and consequence of 
unpredictability 
 
Table 3. Example A) 1 out of 5 entries for “des.Uncertainty_in_CS” Node; *Aggregate Notes reflect all entries in 
a Theme; 
 
Macro-objective Identify how knowledge relating to cybersecurity is produced, used and adapted at various levels within an organisation 
Sub-objective How KNW is Validated 
Theme (des).Knowledge in CS_Validity 
Interviewee *Participant* GR1 
Quote 
But I think… the thing is, it’s almost a bit of learn by doing. You’re going to 
have a few false positives initially, or things that you miss. And as you get 
more experienced, you learn the things that you really have to take notice 
of. It’s almost back to that conversation we’ve talked about training the 
machine intelligence - it’s that same process. So yeah, you do have to 
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validate it. Again, an external company can help with that cause it just 
gives you a different set of eyes. Our internal people, our ethical hacking 
students, again - that’s where they’re quite useful for, cause they’re 
coming at it with no preconception, you know? #00:24:15.20# [...] So, be 
outward facing and be unafraid as an (ICT function) to accept that what 
can be perceived as criticism. Nobody is doing this perfectly. And what 
people will appreciate is that you’re doing your best, you’re 
communicating, bringing people in, and you learn, by doing in essence. By 
partners - the HE community is quite good in the IT space, they’re talking 
to each other. #00:25:04.99# 
Point (Des – An) AN: Knowledge validation - An adaptive iterative process built on feedback. External feedback is encouraged. 
Notes (Entry) 
Process outline: The structure of the process of validation is described, as 
iterative, collaborative and bias-mitigative through the involvement of a 
'different set of eyes'. Emphasis on empirical testing/feedback, 
communication, adaptation and iteration.   
Aggregate Notes* (Theme) 
Value of knowledge validation is undisputed amongst the interviewees. 
Methods for validating knowledge include: consideration for temporality 
and contextuality, iteration and collaboration with external entities, 
empirical testing, trust in source; 
 
Table 3. Example B) 1 out of 4 entries for “des.Knowledge_in_CS:Validity” Node; *Aggregate Notes reflect all 
entries in a Theme; 
 
Macro-objective Critically analyse the role and epistemic requirements of CRM 
Sub-objective Cyber Risk and the Knowledge Problem 
Theme (des).Awareness_and_Communication 
Interviewee *Participant* GR2 
Quote 
The university has its sets of policies that are not known to everyone. […]- 
It’s difficult… No one wants to be involved in a breach. And, in the security 
health check visits we’ve made people are very very keen to speak to us. 
But first they’re often quite nervous. They think this is going to be some 
sort of grilling, it’s going to be an audit. No - we’re here to help, we’re here 
to advise. If we find a problem, we’re not going to point a finger, we’re 
going to help you to mitigate it. And it’s very difficult - people have got 
their day job. They’re very very busy, and sometimes security isn’t top of 
mind, and they’ll do something quick and not realise it’s dangerous. So this 
is very very hard, to try and instil this culture of security. #00:35:42.29# 
Point (Des – An) 
DES: Policies are not known to everyone; AN: 'No one wants to be involved 
in a breach' DES: people 'very busy' - ' security isn't top of mind'; DES: Very 
hard to instil a culture of security 
Notes (Entry) 
Procedural opaqueness seems to be a reoccurring theme. Pockets of 
knowledge and awareness prevent more effective user defensive 
behaviour, and also bypass IT and [Information Security Function] 'radars' 
Aggregate Notes* (Theme) 
Policies not known to everyone. High value of feedback obtained through 
informal means; ‘ICT Risk’ must be translated to business speak; Breaches 
occur in spite of intent, not because of it; Anecdotal evidence of staff 
interest in technological safety (*GR3 Participant Link); Organisational size 
means that ‘it —communication — depends on process’; Asymmetry in 
staff capabilities (*GR1 Participant Link) and awareness; Posture depends 
on member of staff (technical or managerial); Actor awareness and self-
evaluation ability seem limited; Limited threat awareness - bottleneck; 
Education deficit perceived 
 
Table 3. Example C) 1 out of 11 entries for “des.Awareness_and_Communication” Node; *‘Aggregate Notes’ 




In its totality, the resulting structure can be described as a meta-matrix which enables 
multiple levels of representational granularity, ranging from the broad case question, down 
to individual quotes and their contextual implications. It also provides structural clarity 
concerning the link between the filtered data and its relationship to the wider case questions. 
In addition, it enables a relational understanding of the connections amongst themes across 
the embedded units of analysis, and of the ways in which these impact the principal 
objectives. The resulting insights were converted to a case format — the final form of the 
study’s empirical output (Section 4.2). However, the process of representing and structuring 
the case in the form of a narrative is a function of the preceding stages of data analysis.  While 
the case-study aims to preserve and maximise the insight generated from the data, to reduce 
its volume, and to maximise coherence, its reliance on the matrix display is manifested 
structurally, and is paramount for ensuring narrative fidelity and representational nuance. A 
word-cloud visualisation of the interview transcripts was also included in fig. 3.  
 
 
Fig 3. Word-cloud visualisation of interview transcripts  
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4. Case Study 
The case study section serves as the final output of both the primary and secondary data 
collection and analysis processes, and is the principal empirical contribution of the research 
strategy. It aims to provide a hierarchical, cross-functional perspective of the dynamics 
between cybersecurity, knowledge and risk in an exemplary setting. In order to achieve this 
aim, it is structured in two different sub-chapters. The first employs a variety of secondary 
data sources in order profile and position the case, University X, in its operational context, 
while also illustrating the attributes of said context. The second sub-chapter consists of the 
case narrative itself, and is primarily structured around the two research objectives which it 
aims to address. The case text explores the various perspectives captured through 
descriptions and direct quotes, while also providing commentary on how these affect the 
conceptual picture built by the preceding theoretical analysis, in relation to the overall 
organisational context. In its conclusion, the case study attempts to summarise the emerging 
findings in anticipation of the framework development section. 
 
4.1 Case Context: Sector Outline 
 
The research strategy built throughout the previous sections emphasises the role of 
ontological mechanisms manifested across systemic layers in understanding the dynamics of 
an applied phenomenon like cybersecurity. As a result, the context of the case in relation to 
the sector and the wider economy is important for considering contingency in empirical 
outputs. The following section will attempt to present the backdrop of the case data through 
a compilation of quantitative and qualitative secondary sources. These include government 
and third-party reports, industry open data sets, as well as research conducted by sector 
overview agencies. Through such sources, the wider relevance of the case, as well as the 
generality and, respectively, the locality of its attributes, structures, and events can be 
considered. However, this objective raises an important challenge: presenting detailed case-
data without compromising anonymity. Subsequently, descriptors and indicators of 
performance will be presented in a comparative rather than a direct manner whenever these 




The hybrid nature of the Higher Education sector within the UK entails a rare mix of 
transparency and accountability in financial activities beyond that of private enterprise. It 
exhibits economic integration, supported by incentives for monetisation and income 
generation that are uncharacteristic of other public-sector ventures. As a result, through non-
profit bodies like HESA (2017), in-depth descriptive data is available, covering the precise 
scope of the sector in terms of its year-on-year financial performance, number and attributes 
of accredited active institutions, as well as metrics on the role these play in engaging and 
supporting communities, generating intellectual property, employment and education, 
research, and pursuing spin-off ventures. This context data provides a distinct opportunity to 
account for externalities in understanding the role and impact of individual cases beyond that 
of fully private ventures where performance and societal function is quantified in a primarily 
financial manner. 
 
From a financial perspective, the sector-wide state of affairs is convoluted. Despite exhibiting 
a growth in total income of 31.3% between 2008-2009 and 2014-2015, which substantially 
exceeds the rate of inflation (CPI 16,2%) (Grant Thornton 2016), political turmoil and 
uncertainty are likely to impact future performance to an unknown extent. At the time of 
writing, the latest available sector-wide financial data covering 2015-2016 indicate a 3.6% 
increase in total income, and a 48.8% increase in net surplus when compared to the previous 
year. The overall sector income for 2015-2016 amounted to £34.739bn, with a total number 
of 163 universities represented by HESA within the year’s data set. Within this context, the 
case — University X — significantly outperformed the year-on-year average income growth, 
as shown in fig. 4. University X is placed amongst the sector’s top quartile regarding financial 
performance. The quartile-based division is also employed in the Grant Thornton (2016:9) 
report, highlighting a disproportional income growth trend for quartile one institutions when 





Fig 4. University X year-on-year % change in income and expenditure compared to the 
sector average (based on HESA 2017) 
 
Staff and student numbers are tangentially relevant to sector and institutional cybersecurity 
as determinants of operational scale. Furthermore, institutions are owners of both staff and 
student data. Thus, an understanding of the sector average, total, and University X’s relative 
actor footprint can help better outline the context, while enabling cross-sector comparisons 
with data from sources such as the yearly Cyber Security Breaches Survey (Klahr et al. 2017). 
At a sector level, HESA’s (2017) 2015-2016 staff data-set indicates a total of 201380 Academic 
contracts, out of which 135015 are full time, 208750 non-academic contracts, and 72015 
atypical contracts, accounting for 163 institutions. Based on its full-time staff footprint, 
University X is positioned in the top quartile. From a student perspective, the total population 
accounted for 2.28mn in 2015-2016, which indicates the first positive year on year change 
since 2010/2011 (fig 5.). Again, University X is positioned in the top 25% of UK universities 
based on total student numbers.  
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Fig 5. Total Student Number Dynamics (HESA 2017) 
 
In addition to their direct economic footprint, higher education institutions also play a role 
in a range of spin-off companies which can exhibit varying degrees of institutional 
involvement and ownership. These include staff start-ups, graduate start-ups and social 
enterprises, which, in 2015-2016 employed 44335 people, almost half of which through 
graduate start-ups (22592) (HESA 2017). The total turnover of these companies amounted to 
£2.51bn for the year, a 4.89% decrease from the previous year’s figures. In addition, the HESA 
data accounts for institutional contributions to economic development through a series of 
‘soft’ criteria, including widening participation and access, supporting regional graduate 
retention, facilitating knowledge exchanges, supporting SMEs, encouraging student and 
graduate entrepreneurship, providing support through incubators, attracting inward regional 
investments, conducting research collaborations with industry, attracting non-local students 
to the region, supporting community development, establishing local partnerships, 
developing management, meeting regional and national skills needs, commercialisation, and 
network facilitation. Through self-evaluation, University X indicated activity in all the above, 
with emphasis on knowledge exchanges, SME support, and research-based collaborations 
with industry partners.  
 
So, beyond their (significant) teaching and research activities, institutions within the Higher 
Education Sector can act as hubs within diverse networks of actors and value streams. Their 
Some materials have been removed from this thesis due to Third Party Copyright. 
Pages where material has been removed are clearly marked in the electronic 




involvement in subsidiaries and spin-offs, technology transfer initiatives (HOC 2017), as well 
as various types of partnerships and services provided to industry, creates a highly complex 
environment from a cybersecurity perspective. More specifically, such institutions must 
defend a diverse, valuable and sensitive informational asset base, complex infrastructures and 
system designs, while also providing support for stakeholder dependencies — all valuable 
attributes when exploring cybersecurity as an applied phenomenon. In addition, 
infrastructural common denominators such as the JANET network, non-adversarial operating 
models, sector bodies, and comparatively high openness and transparency (as opposed to 
other knowledge intensive sectors) all underpin the potential explanatory value of the 
research context.  
 
Institutions within the sector largely face two distinct sources of pressure to engage with 
cybersecurity: threat actor behaviour, and regulatory/legislative compliance. Before 
proceeding to the case-data, sector level context will be provided on each of these. 
 
While the scope of the threat presence faced by the sector is hard to objectively gauge due 
to the general institutional reluctance to disclose security breaches, several proxy indicators 
can be gathered from secondary data. The JISC (2017) Cybersecurity Posture Survey indicates 
an increase in both the proportion of Higher Education institutions with a dedicated 
cybersecurity budget (excluding staffing) from 40% in 2015/2016, to a projected 58% for 
2017-2018, and in the scope of the average budget. While not a measure of threat activity, 
this growth can indicate increasing concern and/or awareness from institutions. The 2016 
VMware report on UK Higher Education cybersecurity provides additional survey data, on a 
sample of 75 respondents/50 universities, which suggests that 79% of responding universities 
had suffered reputational damage, 36% face hourly attacks, and 87% have been breached at 
least once.  
 
These findings are comparable with data from the Cyber Security Breaches Survey (CSBS) 
(Klahr et al. 2017). The latter spans outside of the sector, and clusters responses based on 
organisational size, and broadly based on sector. According to the survey, 60% of ‘Professional, 
scientific or technical firms’, and 68% of Large firms have experienced a security breach or 
attack in the previous 12 months. It is worth noting that, according to HESA staffing data for 
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2015-2016, the vast majority of UK HE Institutions can be classified as ‘Large firms’, having 
over 250 employees. If using investment in cybersecurity as a proxy measure, the 2015/2016 
yearly average budget of £374.250 for higher education institutions within the JISC (2017) 
data, and the ‘Average investment in cybersecurity in [the] last financial year’ (given the report 
publication date, assumed to be 2015/2016) for large firms within the CSBS, which amounts 
to £387.000, the classification of HE institutions using the ‘Large Firms’ data cluster seems 
adequate. However, despite a seeming consistent narrative, it is also important to emphasise 
that the degree of representativeness of universities as a sub-cluster of ‘large’ enterprises in 
terms of cybersecurity posture cannot be fully extrapolated from the available data.  
 
Nonetheless, the survey (Klahr et al. 2017) also found a correlation between the occurrence 
of breaches and the existence of defensive efforts, as the clusters of respondents which have 
provided cybersecurity staff training, have made investments in defence, have implemented 
governance measures, or risk management efforts, all present a larger number of incidents 
than the total population. Potential explanations for this counterintuitive phenomenon 
include the possibility of more extensive defence efforts being more frequent in organisations 
which face comparatively high threat activity. However, the existence of such defensive efforts 
could also indicate a higher ability of identifying the occurrence of a breach. Similarly, the JISC 
(2017) survey finds Further Education respondents to be more confident in their 
cybersecurity posture (average score of 6.8) than Higher Education counterparts (5.8), in spite 
of having a significantly lower proportion of institutions with a dedicated budget (~23%), 
lower average budgets, and a lower presence of dedicated cybersecurity staff (72% HE vs 3% 
FE). From a case selection perspective, both potential explanations for this correlation favour 





Fig 6. Average dedicated cybersecurity budgets, where ‘known’ (JISC 2017) 
 
From a compliance perspective, UK Higher Education institutions do not, at the time of 
writing, face any sector-specific regulatory frameworks (Hogan Lovells 2016). However, the 
transition from the UK Data Protection Act of 1998 to the EU wide General Data Protection 
Regulation (ICO 2017) is a substantial step affecting all universities, due to their use of 
personal data. GDPR Compliance is identified as a top “cybersecurity area of importance” for 
both HE and FE institutions within the JISC (2017) Survey Data. The significant effects of this 
transition for HE institutions, and more specifically the case, have been highlighted within the 
interview data. Based on context and scope, the notion of compliance can also be applied in 
relation to stipulations of cyber insurance policies, institutional policy and strategy, as well as 
specific frameworks, standards and accreditations which are pursued. The most notable 
examples of the latter, as applicable to HE institutions are the UK Government’s Cyber 
Essentials and Cyber Essentials Plus (GOV.UK 2018), as well as the ISO27001 Standard (ISO/IEC 
2013). JISC (2017) data indicates that 20% of respondents have achieved the Cyber Essentials 
accreditation, while 38% are working towards it — a significant difference from the ISO/IEC 
27001 Standard which was achieved by 3% of respondents, with 12% working towards it. It is 
also worth noting that this preference seems sector specific, as the CSBS (Klahr et al. 2017) 
data indicates significantly more ‘large firm’ institutional awareness concerning the ISO/IEC 
Standards (57%) versus the Cyber Essentials scheme (28%). A case-specific discussion of the 


















So, to summarise, the UK Higher Education sector provides a unique opportunity of insight 
concerning cybersecurity in a knowledge-intensive environment. Beyond their wide variety of 
stakeholders, and broad involvement in a range of economic and social growth initiatives, HE 
institutions operate within accentuated dichotomies, most notably openness and security. 
Universities are also presented by the UK Government (2016) as part of its National Cyber 
Security Strategy 2016-2021 as creators and owners of intellectual property, partners to 
industry and government, as well as assets in addressing a cybersecurity skills shortage. An 
operational model heavily reliant on reputation and stakeholder confidence ensures strong 
incentives for breach avoidance. Finally, in spite of substantial expenditures, the sector 
operates under a surplus, with top performers (Q1) exhibiting substantial year-on-year 
growth. Thus, such institutions also possess the capital required to pursue changes which are 
deemed appropriate in relation to cybersecurity pressures. The importance of gaining a 
vertical understanding of the case data has been emphasised in accordance with the 
conceptual framework, which places a high importance on analytical scale granularity and 
context specificity in exploring an applied phenomenon. 
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4.2. Case Data 
 
The exploration of the case data will be primarily centred around the first two research 
objectives: to develop a substantive understanding of how cybersecurity knowledge is 
understood, produced, used and adapted across hierarchical levels within an organisation; 
and, to critically explore the role and epistemic requirements of Cyber Risk Management 
efforts. The two objectives are complementary, and enable the pursuit of the third, 
prescriptive objective — to conceptualise a risk-based framework rooted in the knowledge-
uncertainty dynamics that are characteristic of organisational cybersecurity. Beyond the two 
objectives that are directly anchored in the case-data, the interview topics also provide a 
common strand of narrative support and theme clustering, as will become apparent in the 
following. In spite of the seeming separation between the topics, they are deeply interwoven 
when examined in an applied setting. That is why, if structuring the case data around the 
research objectives, neither the topics nor the themes can be exclusively clustered to fit a 
single section. So, it is worth noting that the data and its contextual meaning are not 
inherently linear, as themes and topics are covered based on the narrative of the research 
objectives, which can lead to instances of repetition. It is also worth noting that overall 
narrative content, quotes and general conclusions are a product of the multi-stage data 
analysis sequence described in section 3.4 – most notably, the matrix display which is 
structurally exemplified in Table 3.   
 
4.2.1 The Applied Dynamics of Cybersecurity Knowledge: University X 
 4.2.1.1 Context and Case Description 
 
In order to discuss cybersecurity knowledge within the context of the case, the scope of 
cybersecurity as an area of interest for University X should first be established. Both academic 
and non-academic participants presented cybersecurity as a current concern within their 
roles. However, the nature and the extent of said concern varied significantly across 
interviews. For example, Eli, as an academic actor classifies cybersecurity (CS) as “a major 
concern” that is personally “very important”. More specifically, Eli recognises the disruptive 
potential of a breach for their ability to conduct their tasks: “For me, I mean, almost all the 
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work that I do [is] online. So, if anything should happen to that, it’s like I’ve got nothing to do”. 
In contrast, Kendal as a non-academic actor views cybersecurity as potentially concerning in 
relation to the “very sensitive data” used by his organisational function. However, this view 
tends to be abstract, due to an avoidance of ownership for such data: “The sensitive data, I 
try not to get involved with. That is down to […] the person who is in charge of the research”.  
 
The relationship between an active concern regarding potential breaches and the 
perception, or awareness of personal liability is also made apparent by Fin, who recognises 
the confidential nature of some of the data under their ownership, however views 
cybersecurity as a primarily institutional issue: “I am not particularly bothered about it, in the 
sense that I think that while here, the institution takes care of many aspects. And I just take 
care of certain aspects that are related to myself particularly”. The primary criterion for this 
division is presented as the ownership of the hardware/infrastructure: actors should show 
vigilance (“shouldn’t […] open all sort of e-mails that are not trustworthy and so on”), 
especially when working off personal devices (“I also have a personal laptop, and I need to 
take care of that, naturally”), while the institution should provide “a safe environment” 
consisting of “secure servers and all the systems that we’ll be using to share files, emails, etc.”  
 
As a leader/decision-maker, Val presents cybersecurity as an implicit aspect of their role, 
which, while not “at the top of [the] list” of priorities, has the potential of becoming a 
“disabler” for change and growth — both essential aspects of organisational performance and 
strategy. Similarly, from an IT Management perspective, Alex paints a nuanced picture of 
cybersecurity that is shaped by dichotomies. As a result, they highlight the necessary 
pragmatism on issues ranging from internal capability development and outsourcing, to 
prioritising efforts based on available resources (on GDPR compliance: “To be honest, the 
amount of work to be done there, and the amount of stuff that comes in is far greater than 
the people you’ve got, so the way you deal with that is you take a risk-based approach.”), 
recognising the distinct operational challenges posed by both policy and processes (“at a 






4.2.1.2 Threat Perception 
 
The frequency and impact of malicious activity are two important and sensitive aspects of 
the case. Threat presence is the main trigger of security efforts and adaptation, alongside 
legislation and compliance. However, the case is not selected based on, nor is it defined in 
relation to specific incidents. So, while no questions concerning attacks were explicitly asked, 
indicators of general threat activity have come up in several interviews. Val asserts that attacks 
occur regularly/“everyday” (“Right now, somebody is trying to attack us”), and are, in general, 
successfully defended against. From an IT management perspective, Alex highlights the 
uncertainty associated with discussing the likelihood of a breach having occurred: “Can I say 
hands on heart that we’ve not been successfully penetrated? Of course I can’t, cause if I had 
been, I wouldn’t know about it. Can I say, that the business is operating, and that it’s risks are 
appropriately managed, and that we’re continuing? Yes, that’s something I can measure. “. In 
a more direct manner, Rudy acknowledges some, albeit limited, success of threat-actor 
efforts: “of course we’ve been hacked. We’ve probably had (hacks) we don’t know about yet. 
But nothing major”. Together, these perspectives from individuals with exposure to the 
available insight concerning malicious actor efforts justify an active organisational stance in 
relation to IS/cybersecurity. On the issue of attack vectors, the anecdotal evidence and the 
trends presented by participants are consistent with the sector data covered in the previous 
chapter, the most notable form of attack being Phishing. This pattern does not occur within 
the commercially focused spin off venture, which, for the 18 months prior to the interview, 
has been “bombarded by ransomware”.  
 
In order to address the perceived threats, University X has developed a number of measures 
which include functional division based on specialism, decision making support, policy, staff 
training, perimeter defence, technological investments, and a focus on Cybersecurity within 
executive recruitment profiles. The traditional ICT-based operational security defence and 
planning functions are supplemented with a dedicated, specialised cluster consisting of data 
protection specialised staff, legal support, and risk analysts. Structurally, the cluster is 
autonomous, and it reports directly to the executive board. The recruitment of a 
cybersecurity focused executive was also perceived as an indicator of commitment towards 
addressing the issue. On the issue of changes within the institution as a result of security 
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efforts, Remy, as a technical actor, notes: “... I think a lot of change is actually driven by 
incidents and problems, be they within this organisation or elsewhere. […] And I mention this 
because we’ve had people join the university recently in quite senior positions who take a much 
more serious view of security than their predecessors”. Similarly, within the context of 
critiquing the security paradigms employed by the institution, Charlie states: “I do have 
confidence in our new IT director because I think he’s warm on the button.”  
 
 4.2.1.3 Cybersecurity Dynamics 
 
Given the relative novelty of the threat, the effects of the university’s cybersecurity efforts 
are described by actors in the form of changes to policy and processes, training, managerial 
pressures, and increased overall awareness. The significance of these changes emerges as a 
theme, as does its ongoing nature. Sage notes: “…so if you started working here three years 
or four years ago, or ten, yeah, the practices would be different… different, completely 
different, so you have to adapt. And I think that [given] the nature of this topic you are learning 
every single day…”. Sentiment concerning these changes is less homogenous, ranging from 
the positive, i.e. “… the university is doing everything to get each and every one protected.”; 
to the sceptical, i.e. Cybersecurity is a “buzzword”, thus the university’s stance raises concerns 
of “over caution”. Participants with operational oversight highlight recent efforts to 
implement new operational tools enabled by technological advances, most notably Artificial 
Intelligence and Machine Learning. These are seen as a task-specific departure from a human-
centric approach, which is limited in its ability to deal with the volume of data produced by 
the institution.  
 
From a leadership perspective, the perpetual feedback loops between offence and defence 
which underpin the nature and pace of change requirements are seen as the driving 
mechanism of cybersecurity as an inherently dynamic endeavour. As the object of defence 
consists of a fluctuating, generally expansive base of assets, security tools evolve, and threat 
actors subsequently adapt their practices based on effectiveness: “both sides need to be 
dynamic…”. This view is consistent with the year-on-year growth in the number of incidents 
at a sector level, highlighted by Brooklyn, and the unanimous perception of escalation in 




Based on the decision maker responses to change that they have encountered within the 
context of cybersecurity, Charlie identifies two contrasting extremes: an “almost neurotic” 
approach whereby decision makers strive to “secure everything they can — to the extent that 
it impacts adversely on the way we work”; and a “lackadaisical” approach characterised by a 
general disregard for possible impact in favour of the status-quo. Both approaches are 
presented as prevalent across the organisational hierarchy. The same tension is described by 
Val as underpinning leadership efforts, given that, at an executive level, conflicting interests 
converge. Furthermore, dichotomous stances amongst stakeholders are presented as a 
frequently encountered product of differences in responsibility, or accountability, making 
their reconciliation central to decision making in cybersecurity. 
 
 4.2.1.4 In-case Epistemology  
 
The high pace of change/system dynamics characterising cybersecurity is reflected within 
the interview data primarily from the perspective of decision-making and risk analysis. This is 
a meaningful aspect of the epistemic difficulties faced by the organisation, especially within 
the context of the previously described adversarial dynamics. The necessity for time-sensitive 
action supplements the pre-requisites for awareness, coordinated intent, and pragmatic 
knowledge which underpin a social system’s top-down responses to adaptive pressures. The 
idea of temporality within systemic change is also associated with the topic of knowledge 
validity. Charlie presents ‘valid knowledge’ as being ‘up to date’. Rudy, representing a risk 
analysis perspective, also discusses the pace of change within the context of knowledge 
validity/strength: “So, we’re suspicious — we’re never sure that we know everything. Things 
tend to change very quickly.” This lack of certainty is presented as a strength, as it justifies a 
position of caution and instils a necessary awareness of epistemic limitations. Pace of change 
is seen as meaningful for assessing the strength of the knowledge upon which 
prescriptive/risk claims and subsequent actions are predicated. This is due to the inherently 
pragmatic conceptualisation of knowledge, which anchors the notion to action, and its 
desired effects. As these effects relate to dynamic systems, the representations of system 




Beyond the unanimously pragmatic interpretation of knowledge (i.e. the predecessor to 
action-results), several epistemological themes emerge from the interviews. Firstly, a 
collectivist/relational interpretation of knowledge is favoured, whereby individuals rely on the 
available network of expertise, which they navigate in order to reach an objective. Val uses a 
metaphor to illustrate this position: “… so you’ve got an iPad there in front of you, that you’re 
working. You don’t know how it works inside — you might do. But most… 99.9% of people do 
not know how it works. You just know about its utility and you know how to use it. So, I think, 
as a user, what I want is to understand ahead of time what things might need to change if 
things need to change, and I need to understand with some confidence that there is some 
protection in place”. From a personal perspective, Ash notes: “In my role (cybersecurity) 
Knowledge is about the risk — it’s about where are the breaches likely to come. And then, 
knowing where to go to get help and advice. It’s… knowledge is about trying to minimise the 
unknown unknowns. It’s about making sure that, at my level, I’m aware of what I need to be 
aware of, and where to go to get the expertise.”  
 
A second theme is the recognition of context-dependent epistemic form. The association 
between knowledge and action with desirable effects, also implies variation in its 
manifestation depending on its context, even when it relates to a central phenomenon. When 
asked to describe cybersecurity knowledge, actors in different roles have different 
descriptions of the idea, all informed by what they see as potentially valuable in addressing 
the phenomenon within the context of their role. These include: experience, case-studies and 
scenarios, new attack vectors, risk, awareness of relevant occurrences and means to access 
expertise. Charlie illustrates this point: “I think that knowledge needs to be different for 
different audiences, so the knowledge for our IT professionals, needs to be: ‘How did this 
happen’, ‘What was the methodology used’. But for decision-makers who are not necessarily 
quite as technical, probably it needs to be the scenario driven type of knowledge.”  
 
The conceptual framework provides a potential explanation: in line with the Panarchy 
heuristic, adaptive pressures imposed by threat actors at an organisational level have different 
implications for behaviour selection across the levels of the hierarchy. Furthermore, these 
compete with the grander selectors, which, for University X, relate to the fulfilment of its 
primary functions in relation to its stakeholders. So, put simply, even for a common 
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phenomenon such as cybersecurity, in order to enable desirable action, knowledge claims 
must vary in form and content. This results in a sense of epistemic locality, where top-down 
signals must account for potential variation/distortion across levels within the hierarchy. Val’s 
broad description of effective cybersecurity strategy (“It should enable us to do everything we 
want safely. That’s what it should look like — it should be about letting everybody in the 
organisation achieve their objectives, achieve the organisation’s objectives safely”) illustrates 
how security enables the pursuit of primary adaptive pressures (which subsequently enable 
sustained system growth). However, it also carries very different prescriptive and epistemic 
implications throughout the various sub-systems which form the organisation. 
 
At a more abstract level, Alex argues that there are three aspects to cybersecurity 
knowledge: “the threat analysis space”, also described as “the risk space”, “the internal 
business knowledge”, and “the technical phase”. According to its description, the threat 
analysis space involves actively scanning for threats, and, given the specialism and resources 
it requires, it is seen as a task which should be outsourced or managed by a partner company. 
In contrast, the internal business knowledge is inherently local, and essential for “translating” 
general threats into business specific threats. Finally, the technical, mitigative knowledge is 
presented as the precursor to risk mitigation and treatment, and is described as potentially 
encompassing “retrospective actions” or feedforward actions, shaping future system design 
choices. This makes it heavily reliant on the previous two aspects, which determine an 
organisation’s understanding of its cyber risks, without which, mitigative practices can be 
inefficient, ineffective, or both. While all three aspects are generally covered by Risk 
Management frameworks (they address Threats, Vulnerabilities, Impact and Treatment), this 
taxonomy is meaningful as it is based on distinct capabilities, actors, and approaches, all 
centred around a singular function.  
 
 4.2.1.5 A Knowledge Based In-case Comparison 
 
These three aspects also provide an opportunity to explore the distinctiveness of the case, 
from a ‘knowledge problem’ perspective. As a result, a broad in-case comparison can be made 
between University X, as a large, higher education provider, and its subsidiary, as a profit-
oriented, smaller, integrated yet separate entity, through the interview data. Within the threat 
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analysis space, the university is favourably positioned. This is due to formal partnerships and 
information exchange programmes which leverage the sector’s unique competitive dynamics 
(on threat information feeds: “JISC have some, there are several e-mail group amongst our 
peers, which run by UCISA, and then we all individually follow various blogs, websites… and if 
something interesting [comes up] then we’ll share it amongst colleagues in [IT Function] and 
[Dedicated Information Security Function]”), financial flexibility which enables outsourcing to, 
and investing in dedicated third parties, as well as available support from sector specific 
bodies such as JISC.  
 
In contrast, the subsidiary relies exclusively on informal networks, staff interest, and on the 
input of the University, in spite of its distinct operational model. An anecdote illustrating the 
threat analysis limitations of the subsidiary addresses the significant gap left by the departure 
of a single highly knowledgeable staff member, with a personal interest in cybersecurity: “So 
in a small organisation like ours, we are, to an extent, dependent on people that they have a 
fundamental responsibility to security […] but to get beyond that, to have somebody that is 
actually scanning the horizon… you really… it depends on the individual. We’d love to be able 
to have someone who is doing that“. The primary focus on profit also constricts budgeting and 
investments, as prioritisation is based on financial ROI and clear necessity: “… if you’re looking 
at the difference between us and [University IT Function], then the fact that we are pretty 
hard-nosed and commercial is probably the thing that causes the greatest bias. For example, 
we don’t have an IT budget. We operate on an as and when and a needs basis”.  
 
However, the University’s large infrastructure, complex operational model supported by 
knowledge intensive processes, its heterogeneous staff base — both culturally and 
experientially, as well as its adherence to values such as openness and academic freedom, all 
make the internal business knowledge space a challenging one. On the topic of developing a 
data asset register, Rudy notes: “It’s a huge, huge amount of work. It usually unknown 
unknowns which [are] the big challenge. We know the big systems that we have. Our big 
financial system, our student databases… It’s the small pockets that are holding personal data 
particularly which is what [my function] are very much interested in. Although, […] wider 
people will be interested in Intellectual Property data belonging to our research partners. We 
hold governmental information as part of research and projects. So, although that doesn’t 
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concern [my function] particularly, or even GDPR, but it’s still data that we want to protect 
and we wouldn’t want it stolen. Or leaked.”  
 
When University X operational actors were asked about their adherence to formal processes 
and the effect it has on the predictability of their professional behaviour, several patterns 
emerged. For academic actors, low-variation, mature processes like teaching (i.e. lecture 
delivery) are seen as inherently predictable, whereas research related tasks are more opaque. 
From a non-academic perspective, the ad-hoc nature of many of the challenges faced was 
highlighted, limiting the inferential value of process descriptions. Adherence to policy and 
process was also highlighted as culturally informed, as actors with international experience 
perceive organisational culture to be more (too) restrictive within the UK. In contrast, the 
subsidiary operates under a significantly simpler business model which does not rely on 
intellectual property or informational assets, and presents an inherently clear understanding 
of financial streams, and of the potential impact associated with cybersecurity risks. This is 
also due to the significantly smaller organisational scale and higher degree of operational 
homogeneity. Unlike the threat space, the asymmetry between the organisations’ 
accessibility of internal business knowledge favours the smaller, for-profit, less complex 
operation. 
 
From a technical, ‘mitigative knowledge’ perspective, the comparison is less substantiated 
through the data than the previous two aspects. However, a number of noteworthy facts 
emerge from the interviews, mostly relating to the academic institution. University X benefits 
from a unique opportunity enabled by know-how, in the form of its White Hat Hacking 
students who are used a penetration testing resource. In comparing the nature of the 
institution’s cybersecurity challenges in relation to the sector, and other sectors, Alex notes: 
“… So that [hacking students within the network] gives you a dynamic in terms of threat, but 
it also gives you a dynamic in terms of opportunity. Because if we can actually have — and we 
do — we have conversations with our colleagues on the White Hat Hacking courses. If we can 
use those students… ‘now if you’ve got a project you want to do, and you can do it in a 
controlled environment. Test our systems. Work with us’”.  
 
Ash also notes that the difference in financial leeway, and the effects this has on decision 
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making, means that the University will be significantly better equipped from a technological 
perspective, whereas the subsidiary will have to justify mitigative decisions, such as upgrading 
systems, from a cost-benefit perspective. However, as ‘mitigative knowledge’ is contingent on 
the understanding of the threat space interpreted from the perspective of the business 
knowledge, accurately establishing such a cost-benefit baseline can be less than obvious. This 
can amplify the role of cognitive biases when considering both the likelihood and the impact 
of a breach, as the vividness of the main heuristic pattern described — i.e. Tangible profit is 
the primary objective — can affectively suppress the seemingly less concrete eventuality of a 
breach. While clearly stated as the most notable local source of bias in relation to 
cybersecurity decisions, this heuristic is by no means unique to the subsidiary. The pattern of 
underestimating risks prior to a breach, and overestimating them after a breach occurred is 
also observed at a sector level by Brooklyn, who presents it as a common. In fact, both 
institutions are vulnerable to the subjective, contingent nature of their action-triggering 
beliefs held by individual decision makers. This raises the importance of the systemic 
structures and approaches used to create and select for feedback across hierarchical layers. 
In this sense, the smaller organisation has fewer corrective opportunities, given its flatter 
structure, relative operational homogeneity, and the immediacy of its financial orientation. 
 
4.2.2.  The Epistemic Substrate of Cyber Risk 
 4.2.2.1 Rationality and Dichotomies 
 
Beyond its implications for the role of context, nuance, and contingency in discussing the 
‘rationality’ of organisational actors within cybersecurity, this final aspect of the comparison 
between the two distinct yet related institutions exemplifies an interplay of some of the 
study’s core themes: knowledge, uncertainty, and risk as a construct. It is also worth noting 
at this point that, in spite of the explicit emphasis on the topic of rationality within the 
interviews, the concepts which have emerged from the literature review are most clearly 
observable within the data through adjacent topics, such as risk and uncertainty. As a result, 
behavioural tendencies, biases and heuristics are discussed as complementary to the other 
topics, and will not be covered as standalone themes. They are, however, valuable for 
achieving the study’s second objective: developing a case-based critical understanding of the 
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epistemic requirements of cyber risk frameworks. 
 
A first thematic example of the convergence between Rationality, Knowledge, and Risk is 
presented by dichotomies as a conceptual frame of reference which serves to add nuance to 
the representation of organisational cybersecurity dynamics. While not explicitly addressed 
by the interview questions, dichotomies were used by both decision makers and actors to 
express the variability of possible stances to be taken, and the sense of a cost associated with 
each approach. Addressing risk as the tuple of likelihood and potential impact which 
characterise an undesirable event assumes a sense of objective valence. However, both the 
data and the conceptual framework suggest that, in complex settings, the impact of local 
changes can be non-local, disproportional, and hard to predict. As a result, decision-makers 
highlight that an over commitment to security can be detrimental to accessibility, freedom, 
or responsiveness to change. In contrast, neglecting security is perceived as an increasingly 
costly, potentially existentially threatening position.  
 
Within the case, balancing dichotomous objectives is unanimously seen as a top-down, 
leadership/institutional responsibility. However, any such balance must account for 
dynamism, evolving pressures, and interdependence, while enabling the fulfilment of the 
organisation’s/system’s primary function. Alex notes: “There is a fundamental tension 
between ideas of security, data protection, that sort of thing, and the university culture, which 
is open, collaborative, freedom to innovate, freedom to share, all that. Those two things, you 
can almost draw a line and put them in opposite ends of the line”. ‘Academic freedom’ and its 
preservation are seen as a sector specific value which generally tips the scale in favour of 
openness. While academic freedom is, as the name suggests, a sector-specific cultural 
construct, within the context of cybersecurity, it is described as exhibiting a broader range of 
tolerance to departure from process, and an empowerment of actor choice. Neither of these 
two tendencies is inherently academic, and both are likely to underpin knowledge-intensive 
operational models outside of the sector.  
 
As dichotomous objectives/values are individually desirable, through functional divisions, 
organisational structures can exhibit sub-optimisation and localised incentives. A myopic 
preference for one aspect of a dichotomy, without adequate consideration for its counterpart 
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is classified by Val as bias: “… it happens all the time. You have — and it depends where the 
responsibility, or the accountability lies. If you’re talking to the person who will get their head 
kicked in if we have a meltdown, they are very keen on one end. If you are looking at somebody 
who is trying to be as open and as sharing as possible, they will sit on the other side. And I 
think, for decision makers, it’s about trying to find that — the right level… And that’s difficult.“. 
This classification is consistent with the definition of bias presented in the literature review, 
as a heuristic preference is applied to a grander, different context, resulting in a mismatch.  
 
Even amongst the interviewees, on the issue of openness vs. security, expectations varied. 
For example, Eli argues: “Striking that balance is very, very important. But, at the same time, 
if need be, I would think that security trumps openness “. In contrast, Charlie states: “a large 
part of my thinking around this is that part of our defence is to share, and part of our defence 
is to be open with everything we can be”. While both actors express the importance of 
balance, and both share a desire for a thriving organisation, the difference in their priorities 
highlights the role of subjective perception when addressing shared, concrete phenomenon, 
and the potential conflicting views on how progress can be achieved. No ways of explicitly 
accounting for, or addressing bias within decision making and cyber risk analysis were 
identified by interviewees, in spite of the concept being recognisable, and discussed as 
meaningful.  
  
 4.2.2.2 Uncertainty and Predictability  
 
 This variability supplements the inherent uncertainty presented by cybersecurity. When 
describing this uncertainty, decision-makers presented it as either distinct from other facets 
of organisational activity given the scope of the “unknown unknowns” (a reoccurring 
paradigm amongst the responses), speed of change, and the potential impact of the 
unknown; or as not inherently unique, yet problematic for the same reasons. All of these 
characterisations are consistent with the anecdotal evidence presented by the introduction 
and with the assumptions made throughout the literature review. On the topic of uncertainty, 
epistemic granularity is presented as a meaningful variable. More specifically, at a coarse 
level, threat activity is generally seen as predictable, i.e. attacks are likely to occur on valuable 
targets. However, predictive accuracy decreases considerably when attempting to account for 
 
133 
the type of attack and likely impact. The unpredictability of distinct threats is presented as a 
key determinant of their success.  
 
As risk analysis is partly predicated upon an understanding of event likelihood, Rudy’s 
description best reflects the issue as applied to the case. They note: “You just cannot see any 
patterns. We have… I mean our reporting is all the same proportion of each type of incident. 
We have about 9-10 different categories of incidents, and we have sort of the same proportion 
each month. But the numbers will be different.” From the perspective of the conceptual 
framework, the emergence of bottom up higher-level order, such as the consistency in attack 
vector proportions, and the unpredictability of behaviour and volume, are both consistent 
with the behaviour of non-linear dynamics. This uncertainty sets the context for the 
conceptual application of risk, and shapes the scope and role of local implementations.  
 
 4.2.2.3 Risk Practices: An In-case View 
 
Within the case, the notion of ‘cyber risk’ takes three thematic forms: formal cyber risk 
management efforts, which consist of explicit assessments and mitigation strategies; narrow 
scoped, function specific risk-based tools; and risk as a conceptual heuristic which informs 
the framing of threat activity, and the subsequent organisational response. The first of these 
is identified as part of the core responsibility of the dedicated Information Security Function 
(ISF), which performs risk analyses focusing on both the organisation and its suppliers, in 
addition to incident monitoring and pattern seeking. The output of the function informs both 
board-level decision making and policy, and the stakeholders of the risk assessments who are 
approached in a collaborative tone in an attempt to align incentives. Part of this strategy 
includes the framing of ISF visits as ‘security health check-ups’ rather than audits, and a 
preference for positive feedback, in a systemic sense.  
 
Methodologically, no formal accreditation or standard is implemented, however ISO/IEC 
27001 is mentioned critically within the context of subjectivity within Information Security 
risk assessments based on likelihood-impact grids. These are seen as highly subjective (“you 
can ask five people and get five different answers”), yet lack adequate alternatives. On this 
point, Rudy notes: “A lot of these have got a simple three-point scale which I don’t think is 
 
134 
enough by any means, and one thing that there isn’t is — I would love it if there was 
something, some sort of consistent algorithm where you could assess a data base, say, and 
put a figure, a number on the risk — a risk factor that is based on, I don’t know, number of 
records held, how sensitive is the data contained within it, who would have access… There’s 
something we’ve been trying to develop ourselves because there doesn’t seem to be anything 
out there. Without that simple three point three grid it’s… You can probably figure what your 
higher risk is even without doing that. We really need something a bit more sophisticated.” At 
a more general level, an explanation for the low sector-wide adhesion to frameworks from 
accreditation bodies is presented by Brooklyn, who notes that academic freedom makes it 
difficult for compliance targets to be reached. This view is supported anecdotally through a 
description of an institution which failed its Cyber Essentials self-evaluation at the first step, 
given an inability/unwillingness to restrict admin privileges for its staff members.  
 
The interview data indicates an ISF awareness of the behavioural limitations of Risk 
Assessments, and subsequently Risk Management efforts. Human vulnerabilities are 
recognised as a generally unintentional product of lapses in awareness of both a temporary 
(i.e. security is not considered when acting towards a goal) or a general (i.e. not aware of 
policy or threat) nature. Similarly, the cognitive variability rooted in the subjective component 
of cyber risk analysis is also recognised from the perspective of the analyst, as the process is 
“very much based on assumptions” and intuition. These are both seen as inherent forces 
which shape the dynamics of the problem that the ISF faces, which are coupled with the 
previously described uncertainty, internal business visibility barriers, lack of inherent 
predictability of threat behaviour, and cultural barriers to mitigative efforts. The abundance 
of perceived relevant variables and the permutations of their locally manifested weights lead 
to a preference for modularity in the selection of operational and conceptual tools. The 
resulting, analyst-oriented approach enables leveraging subjective experience and expertise 
to account for known sensitivities and nuance, without the procedural homogeneity of 
methodological orthodoxy. So, rooted in a pragmatic, problem-oriented epistemology, the 
selection of tools and procedures is driven by opportunity, as well as contextual knowledge 
and feedback.  
 
A key challenge for ISF mitigative efforts lies in the process of communicating analytical 
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outputs. Once policy has been developed, it must still be effectively disseminated amongst 
stakeholders in order to instil the desired change. On this issue, Rudy notes: “The university 
has its sets of policies that are not known to everyone. It’s all very well having a great set of 
policies that are beautifully written, […] but if it’s not applied, and if people don’t even know 
the way they should be behaving, then those policies are worth nothing. And this is a big 
challenge —  it’s education, it’s training”. The notion of academic freedom, which affects the 
feasibility of restrictive measures and controls, shifts the balance of risk mitigation to 
individual awareness and voluntary compliance, as bottom-up efforts. However, the general 
actor interviews indicate an unanimous expectation of top-down cybersecurity support, while 
both capability and liability are delegated to an organisational function, i.e. ITC or ISF, with the 
exception of scenarios describing user incompetence.  
 
The role of communication in the utilisation of mitigative knowledge is also highlighted by 
Charlie, who argues that ‘good’ cyber risk management is “meaningful to people”, and 
enables stakeholders to answer “why should I care about this?”. This statement seems related 
to the previously covered discussion over the context dependence in forms of ‘effective’ 
knowledge. They also present the ICT policies as “something that people just roll over and 
forget about”. Similarly, Sage expresses scepticism over the value of “ticking boxes”, as such 
methods are limited in what they can address, and cannot substitute individual responsibility. 
Thus, two-way communication streams are a key enabler of cyber risk management 
frameworks, through their role on increasing operational transparency for the benefit of 
analysts, facilitating feedback exchanges, and ensuring that mitigative knowledge is 
disseminated in a context-appropriate form. In a large organisation like University X, the 
potential use of informal networks and personal exchanges for this goal raises concerns over 
efficiency, consistency, and scaling.  
 
Within the context of corrective feedback and mitigation-oriented decision making across 
hierarchical levels, Charlie highlights that reports concerning the organisation’s cybersecurity 
are only circulated at a senior-management level. This limits the exposure of other actors to 
such information, and thus affects their awareness and perception of the problem, while 
suppressing their ability to develop and adapt contextual heuristics: “So, therefore, we can 
develop our own heuristics on a different set of information, and I think until the information 
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is comprehensive across the audience, you’re always going to have those individual 
contextualisation of how people react […] because you don’t know about the threats, you 
don’t have the information to change your heuristics. So that’s an interesting one because it’s 
around communication. If you want people to change behaviours, you actually need to give 
them the information to prompt them to change those behaviours, or attitudes, or 
approaches.” Efforts to improve knowledge-sharing and collaboration amongst organisational 
functions (ISF and IT) are underway, as the development of a centralised knowledge-base is 
part of the vision of the ISF. This should contain “all of the risk assessments, third party 
compliance, due diligences, instant reporting…” as well as processes and policies. The 
existence of such a resource has the potential of significantly simplifying risk mitigation and 
communication efforts, while highlighting potential gaps.  
 
The second thematic occurrence of Risk within the data is a derivative of the first, in the 
form of function specific risk-based tools or heuristics. These include traditional aspects of 
cyber risk management frameworks, which are selectively used to achieve a specific function, 
and serve as explicit, shared heuristics. An in-case example of this lies with the IT function’s 
view of risk assessments, which consist of likelihood and impact score matrices, as “useful” 
prioritisation and communication tools. However, “you can’t get too hung up on” them given 
their lack of depth and the methodological distortion resulting from the reduction of risks to 
single values. So, the same aspects which serve as function-specific strengths — i.e. simple 
quantitative comparison for prioritising investments, and communicating specialised 
information in a general manner — are also weaknesses in wider contexts. This behaviour is 
consistent with Gigerenzer and Brighton’s (2009) description of ecological rationality, or 
contextual fitness, as a determinant of heuristic effectiveness. 
 
In this sense, the difference between the two views on likelihood-impact cyber risk 
assessments (IT — functionally adequate; and ISF — generally inadequate) is attributable to 
context. The IT function is operationally focused, and it benefits from a smaller gap between 
analysis and action in its primarily operational function. Thus, as a setting, it prioritises 
efficiency in resource deployment and diagnosis efforts, as well as an ability to quickly 
communicate the dynamics of individual risks internally, for a relatively homogenous actor 
base. In contrast, the ISF’s function is primarily analytical, as it provides insights across a wide 
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range of stakeholders. It is also expected to collect operational information, represent nuance, 
and relay its findings in the form of reports. In addition, its primary function is knowledge-
centric, inferential, and rooted in the uncertainty of Information Security. While Information 
Security is undoubtedly a focus of the IT function as well, its primary function is ensuring the 
optimal performance of the organisation’s ICT infrastructure. Thus, given the environmental 
pressures faced within the two related environments, the same heuristic yields different 
perceptions of adequacy. Furthermore, when noting the difference between the two 
functions, it must be noted that they actively cooperate and aim to achieve complementary 
functionality.  
  
Finally, the third thematic occurrence of Risk lies in the underpinning structure and language 
used to frame threat activity and subsequent organisational response scenarios. Indicative of 
exposure to Risk Management frameworks and training, instances of this theme were noted 
in the framing used by technical actors and decision-makers. Unlike the previous two, it entails 
a more abstract perspective, without reference to a specific event, framework, or tool. As a 
result, it could indicate that, even outside of the confines of a formal organisational effort, 
risk management methodologies serve as a heuristic lens for interpreting cybersecurity 
related offence-defence dynamics and condition the mental models of key actors. It is worth 
noting that the effects of pre-interview priming could also influence the framing of responses, 
as participants were briefed that the subject of the study will include ‘Cyber Risk 
Management’. As a result, the meaningfulness of this final aspect in relation to the interview 
data is hard to establish with confidence, and will not be emphasised. However, the risk-
conditioned intuitive heuristic framing of cybersecurity seems subjectively plausible for actors 
with some involvement in the field. 
 
Outside of these functions, Charlie notes that they have not witnessed a general risk-based 
approach: “… it [Risk consideration] does tend to be very contextualised. I’ve not seen a 
general approach towards risk. I haven’t come across conversations where we’re talking about 
strategies and policies and ways forward, that actually look at risk. It doesn’t seem to be part 
of that conversation. You know, what’s the risk of doing it, what’s the risk of not doing it. That’s 
never come up in conversation. […] It’s the only organisation I’ve worked in where that doesn’t 




 4.2.2.4 Adaptation and Adaptivity  
 
As the final topic covered by the data-collection strategy, Adaptation was relationally 
described as a function of Change, Knowledge, and implicitly Risk. In this sense, the logic of 
the framework positions ‘Adaptation’ as inherent in dynamic social systems (i.e. 
organisations), given that changes in the adaptive pressures must be perceived and 
conceptualised, potentially through heuristic functions such as Risk Management, in order to 
determine top-down uncertainty navigation strategies. In addition to the process of 
adaptation, the data indicates actor consideration for adaptivity (adaptive capacity) as a 
systemic attribute. This consideration does not only address the organisation, its systems and 
functions, but also the attributes of risk frameworks.  
 
In fact, adaptive mechanisms are described at all levels of decision-making, as exemplified 
by the previous outline of the dynamics of dichotomies. But the interview data most notably 
addresses the perceived importance of adaptivity in relation to cybersecurity as would be 
predicted from the conceptual framework. This includes subjective emphasis on its key role 
when considering the future of cyber risk management (“Your word — ‘Adaptive’ Cyber Risk 
Management is going to be really, really key…”) which is seen as being predicated on a 
foundation of institutional situational awareness (“gathering and analysis function”) that 
enables knowledge sharing and serves as an adaptive trigger for actors, systems and policy.  
 
The link between the organisation’s epistemic confidence in relation to adaptive strategies 
is highlighted in a manner that is consistent with the literature. Ash describes the absence of 
certainty (known unknowns) as a trigger for perpetual environmental scanning within the 
context of the subsidiary. Awareness of the epistemic limitations which underpin the local 
understanding of the cybersecurity climate instils a predisposition for continuously gathering 
information, rather than relying on static models and conceptualisations. Concerns over 
framework rigidity were also raised when considering ‘excessive’ formality in cyber risk 
management efforts. To this point, Ash notes: “Something as diverse and full of as many 
unknowns as [cyber] risk — the bigger the framework, the more comprehensive the 
framework, the more used it will be and the more assured you will be that you had as much 
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covered as possible. I do sometimes think that if you’re too formulaic and you’ve got too much 
reliance on something that is structured and mechanistic that you could well be at risk of 
missing something because it could make you complacent. “  
 
This overarching thematic strand addresses adaptation and feedback as functions of 
learning, which is consistent with the systems-theory framing. In this sense, “adaptability” is 
described as an empirically driven, experiential knowledge-process, which is “the real key to 
doing risk” given the fast pace of the dynamics of cybersecurity. Interviewees generally failed 
to identify a direct relation between adaptivity and resilience — a counterintuitive fact given 
the literary links between the concepts. This indicates a local perceptual predisposition more 
than anything else. Nonetheless, it serves as a reminder that, within organisations, potentially 
colloquial terms such as ‘adaptability/adaptivity’ and ‘resilience’ can have a different meaning 
than that prescribed by the literature. Overall, within the case data, facilitating adaptation is 
linked to an awareness of the unknown, the maximisation of feedback streams, 
acknowledging pace in a manner that corresponds to the temporal utility of knowledge, and 
correcting for deviations between intent and results that are rooted in non-linearity, or 
inadequate representational models. 
 
Significant variability is shown in descriptions of what feedback consists of, and what its 
acquisition entails. Non-technical actors invoked seeking the assistance of “experts”, “IT guys” 
and “the IT department”, however only one participant could give an example of such an 
exchange having taken place. When asked if they are aware of any formal policies or processes 
concerning general cybersecurity feedback exchanges such as reporting vulnerabilities 
(described loosely), or seeking advice, responses were hypothetical and intuitive, describing 
informal contact through e-mail or phone. No clear evidence of a concrete, demonstrable 
understanding of the available cybersecurity knowledge network could be identified for 
participants who are not exposed to it as part of their role.  
 
It is worth noting that informal contact with an organisational function is not argued to be 
an inherently ineffective primary feedback strategy for actors. However, it does impact the 
frequency and nature of any informational exchanges, and, ultimately, affects wider 
awareness of issues, resources and policy that are not directly communicated in a top-down 
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manner. Given that such formal approaches are constrained in scope and frequency, actor 
situational awareness is largely a matter of personal experience and informational exposure. 
So, in spite of the declared openness of actors towards collaboration and engagement with 
the IT function, both their lack of awareness concerning policy and feedback procedures and 
their limited technical awareness affect the likelihood of voluntary feedback exchanges.  
 
Two further aspects emerge on the issue of feedback amongst functions and actors as a 
driver of adaptation: the plurality of the declared adaptive reference points across 
interviewees, and the efficacy of the communication process. The former is an extension of 
the previously discussed dichotomies, and reflects the variation in the perceived object of 
concern and performance indicators across the organisation. While decision-makers 
accounted for threat behaviour and the achievement of corporate strategic objectives, actors 
described a narrower, internal orientation, seeking calibration from internal compliance 
proxies. This is an intuitive pattern, as it corresponds to the variation in organisational roles. 
It is nonetheless noteworthy, as top-down intent and policy must account for the potential of 
distorted adaptive triggers, and for misfires in their dissemination. 
 
The latter aspect — the role of organisational communication mechanisms for adaptivity — 
is an underpinning theme in participants’ descriptions of what ‘effective’ cybersecurity 
strategy and behaviour entail. However, decision-makers with direct cybersecurity oversight, 
such as Val and Alex, emphasise the nested strategic nature of cybersecurity efforts within 
the grander levels of organisational planning (i.e. the cybersecurity strategy is based on the 
ITC strategy, which is designed to enable the organisational strategy). As a result, an implicit 
aim is to minimise the footprint of operational disruption attributable to both threat 
behaviour and defensive efforts. The need for moderation from this balancing act which 
subjects cybersecurity to the organisation’s primary value generation functions, also shapes 
the perceived extent of feasible staff training, awareness and preoccupation. The aim of this 
operational branch is to minimise disruption, while enabling the pursuit of the essential 
operational functions. 
 
Val articulates this broadly in his previously mentioned description of an ‘effective’ 
cybersecurity strategy: “It should enable us to do everything we want safely. That’s what it 
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should look like — it should be about letting everybody in the organisation achieve their 
objectives, achieve the organisation’s objectives safely.” Other such descriptions include: 
“Contextual” and “appropriately communicated”, developed part of a conversation with 
stakeholders; Policy and procedure driven, supported by training and awareness 
maximisation coupled with periodic stress-testing; Effectively communicated, leveraging 
expertise; All-encompassing — beyond technical (holistic), coupled with awareness 
development; Based on an understanding of the specific level of risk, top-down driven, 
balancing training and education with policy, with a consideration for cost; Integrated to, and 
based on an understanding of business models and the operational lifecycle.  
 
Throughout the interviews, communication emerged as a common denominator for all the 
topics of enquiry. Within the literature review, the central role of coordination, and implicitly 
communication, within social systems was highlighted. This point is also observable within 
the research-context through the emphasis placed on knowledge networks as the main 
enabler of security efforts. Even through a high level view, in-case cybersecurity oriented 
functions rely on partners (internal and external) and vendors for threat related knowledge, 
actor compliance and contact for abstracting business knowledge, leadership support in order 
to appropriately scope resources within the organisation’s wider strategic context, and 
internal communication for the consolidation of shared situational awareness and the 
dissemination of mitigative feedback.  
 
So, under the previously described uses of risk constructs lies an epistemic ecology 
supported by a network of formal and informal relationships and interactions, all driving 
adaptive behaviour with varying degrees of efficacy across the systemic layers of the 
organisational hierarchy. Given the context bound, function-driven nature of risk as a 
heuristic, there is no objective foundation of inference for the traits of an abstract ‘effective’ 
cyber risk implementation or cybersecurity strategy. On this point, Rudy notes: “You can’t 
[distinguish a ‘good’ or ‘effective’ cyber risk implementation] … It’s certainly good and it’s 
successful until something goes wrong and someone gets in…”. This statement aims more to 
dispel a potential positivist, absolutist framing of strategy within cybersecurity, rather than 
propose that all strategic avenues are undistinguishable or doomed to fail. In fact, Val’s 
conception of ‘effective strategy’ aims to nullify cybersecurity as a ‘disabling’ factor, while 
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integrating it within a homogenous operational approach. This framing is a culmination of a 
dynamic and complex narrative, shaped by dichotomies, judgement calls, and ever changing 
threats, while adaptive efforts are harmonised within a network of complementary 
specialism. The epistemic gap filled by strategy is, thus, non-trivial, time sensitive, local, and 
evolving — especially from proactive stance.  
 
The case-data also shows a range of positive indicators, or enablers, which underpin the 
efficacy of existing tools and approaches. These include context-specific opportunities, such 
as the highlighted use of White Hat Hacking students and IS faculty expertise, in addition to 
the ongoing information exchanges pertaining to information security with other institutions 
within the sector. Furthermore, the threat climate was described as moderate when 
compared to other, more turbulent sectors (i.e. financial) given the non-monetary nature of 
most of the informational capital. The absence of clear monetisation pathways serves as a 
disincentive for a number of threat actors. In addition, an institutional commitment to the 
issue of information security was visible. While the previously described conceptual 
limitations of cyber risk constructs are not explicitly addressed within the case, key staff, 
including decision makers and risk analysts demonstrated an awareness of their effects.  
 
Such limitations include defining actor behaviour in terms of assumed normative 
behavioural pathways (addressed within the literature review as actor ‘rationality’), assumed 
environmental linearity and sensible predictive consistency, and a difficulty in reconciling 
incentive misalignments and informational asymmetries. In response to these limitations, the 
role of individual expertise is emphasised over shared heuristics and frameworks. Thus, the 
latter primarily become communication and knowledge externalisation tools, usable to 
simplify otherwise complex information.  
 
At an abstract level, the inferential mechanisms of the core explicit heuristics (i.e. formal 
quantitative risk assessments) are replaced, or at least supplemented with decision-maker 
dependent tacit heuristics (subjective risk assessments), which are implicitly qualified as more 
effective for the task, while the explicit structure is maintained to codify knowledge claims 
and enable action triggers. In simpler terms, if the risk analyst can formulate a more nuanced 
and contextually adequate interpretation of the problem situation based on available insight 
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and experience than that yielded by the use of formal frameworks, the latter will be used in 
a limited manner, as exemplified by the case. However, this raises issues such as scalability, 
variable pace of change, cognitive and epistemic limitations, and informational opaqueness 
for other knowledge-network nodes. The following chapters will discuss the conceptual and 




5. Framework Development: The Strategic 
Knowledge Problem 
 
The framework development section addresses the final research objective by leveraging 
the outputs of the previous sections towards the development of a practice-oriented 
contribution. This is accomplished through two sub-chapters. The first explores the patterns 
of convergence between the theoretical content of the literature review, the conceptual 
framework and the case findings. These patterns are then used to outline the requirements 
and implications of the study for the development of a novel framework that employs an 
theoretically consistent/adequate set of systemic and behavioural assumptions regarding 
organisational cybersecurity. Subsequently, the second sub-chapter integrates these 
patterns as the foundation of an epistemic conceptualisation of Adaptive Cyber Risk 
Management. More specifically, it encapsulates a gradual process of theory consolidation, 
as each dimension of the framework is progressively introduced. The chapter is concluded 
with a commentary addressing the rationale behind the framework generation process, and 
the potential applicability of this final research output for practitioners, as a function of 
compatibility with existing standards/guidelines, flexibility to the characteristics of the 
implementation, and potential utility once implemented. 
 
The third objective of the study is to create a prescriptive framework which addresses the 
theoretical (context-construct) gap identified through the literature review and the 
subsequent empirical exploration. The nature and generality of such a framework are both 
predicated on the validity of its assumptions concerning the ontological mechanisms 
manifested in a defined context as the basis for inferred value. Thus, the discussion of the 
practical implications of the study’s findings, will be preceded by a brief revision of the 
progress.  
 
The study’s primary assertion informing all subsequent progress is a diagnosis of a problem: 
organisations are poorly equipped from a conceptual standpoint (construct) to deal with 
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cybersecurity in a top-down, strategic manner (context). While broad, this statement is 
supported by an exploration of the hostile epistemic landscape navigated by decision-makers, 
whose inferences shape the choice of strategic pathways. The literature-informed individual 
patterns which underpin said hostility are conceptualised in three dimensions: the ontological 
non-linearity of cybersecurity dynamics, the behavioural heterogeneity exhibited by actors, 
and the contextual potential (in)adequacy of broad Risk-based heuristics and models which 
inform uncertainty navigation strategies. These dimensions are used to re-frame the premise 
of the study: a need to explore cybersecurity as a phenomenon-derived knowledge problem.  
  
While seemingly dystopian, the picture of uncertainty and (inherently limited) knowledge 
painted through this frame of analysis also carries prescriptive meaning. It calls for contextual 
adaptation in the implicit epistemology, conceptual tools, and underpinning assumptions 
which inform top-down organisational understanding and behaviour. In light of this, the case 
provides a lens for the evaluation and consolidation of the postulated mechanisms driving the 
dynamics of the problem, as it presents an in-depth perspective of the interaction between 
context and tendencies. At the point of interaction between the theoretical foundation of the 
study and the case data lies a mix of general and local patterns. Both were briefly highlighted 
in the previous chapter. The distinction and elaboration of these patterns sets the ground for 





5.1 Patterns of Convergence: Case and Theory 
5.1.1 Ontological Complexity 
 
 The first such pattern lies in the non-linear dynamics view of the cybersecurity ontology. 
This has direct implications over the uncertainty faced by organisations, as it affects the 
nature, predictability, and emergent demi-regularities exhibited by security incidents. Given 
the scope of cross-hierarchy interaction, cyber complexity is inherent in most organisations 
from the perspective of the conceptual framing. Notable exceptions include circumstances 
where the business model, operational scale, resource availability, or security orientation 
significantly constrain such interactions. Indicators of complexity within the case are found 
across the case groups, as anecdotes, views, or procedural descriptions. Briefly, these include: 
the lack of predictability of incidents; the reliance on subjective measures of likelihood 
evaluation, absent grounds for objective measures (i.e. probabilities); the difficulties 
associated with impact assessments given the networked nature of systemic behaviour; the 
centrality of adaptation as a function-specific strategic objective; the plurality of competing 
adaptive pressures and feedback streams, which are often dichotomous, as well as their 
context specificity; and, the emergent patterns of demi-regularity which are level-specific and 
lack a pragmatic mechanistic understanding.  
 
A second point of convergence addresses the role of temporality in the manifestation and 
understanding of organisational cybersecurity phenomena. If bound by action towards a 
desired effect, knowledge concerning cybersecurity, as a highly dynamic non-linear 
phenomenon, is in itself temporal, rooted in a specific configuration of representations. The 
sustained adequacy of these representations which underpin strategic inference relies on 
their adaptation at a pace that matches that of the change in the environmental segment they 
describe. Alternatively, this can also be achieved if they describe consistent regularities of said 
environment (i.e. mechanisms). Distinguishing between the two carries significant 
implications on the calibration of feedback cycles, and the architecture of implementation for 
risk constructs. This point is made in a less abstract manner within the case on the topic of 
change, and ‘knowledge validity’, and constitutes an important prescriptive implication of the 
theoretical perspective taken.  
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Thirdly, the theoretical stance can be used to infer a need for emphasis on Adaptation and 
Adaptivity as strategic objectives, given the role of non-linear dynamics and temporality. This 
emphasis is also reflected in the interview data as decision-makers frame adaptation as a 
central objective. However, the data provides limited insight for how this is/can be achieved. 
From a top-down perspective, a high-level view of adaptive mechanisms entails a mix of 
interrelated epistemic concepts, such as knowledge, feedback stream architecture and 
functional ‘meta-cognition’. Analogous to its original meaning in cognitive disciplines, the 
latter concept is used to describe an organisation’s critical awareness of its epistemic 
processes. Within the context of cybersecurity, this implies an ability to establish the grounds 
for inference, understand the limitations of available knowledge, and link it to the outcomes 
of behavioural pathways. It also corresponds to the previously introduced adaptive-toolbox 
construct (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009) in its structural archetype for developing and 
adapting heuristics in complex, evolving environments. A meta-cognitive analogue is 
particularly important in reconciling adaptive pressure plurality, manifested as dichotomies 
within the case. It is also important in retrospectively distinguishing environmental 
determinism, i.e. outcomes that are independent of the organisation’s pragmatic choices, (i.e. 
breach due to 0-day exploit) from actionable feedback. 
 
However, an emergent limitation of the conceptual framing — more specifically of the 
complex/systemic view of the organisation, lies in the ‘hard’, high-level view of social systems 
behaviour, through emphasis on coordination and foresight. While not invalidated by the case 
data, this approach seems to lack flexibility when describing the cybersecurity phenomenon 
at multiple levels of conceptual granularity. More specifically, it fails to provide a nuanced 
picture of the ‘softer’ aspects of (lacking) coordination, including power-structures, culture, 
and incentive misalignments, as it offers no direct account of any such phenomena. 
Furthermore, an isolated, high-level view of foresight in social systems could also make it 
seem like a relatively homogenous (social) systemic property. This, unsurprisingly, conflicts 
with the case data, which indirectly presents foresight as an actor-based property that is 
epistemically conditioned and structurally moderated to yield an organisational capability. 
Again, this is not incompatible with the Panarchy heuristic, but it is also not clearly implied by 




5.1.2 Bounded Rationality  
 
A key area of enquiry grounded in the literature review is the critical stance on assumed 
actor ‘rationality’. March (2006:202) argues that, organisational studies use 'rationality' to 
describe action “derived from a model-based anticipation of consequences evaluated by prior 
preferences…”. The term is used throughout the study to describe the implicit 
representational models used to infer actor behaviour in relation to cybersecurity. The data 
collection strategy addressed such models both explicitly, through direct questions over 
normative behaviour patterns, perceptions of bias and heuristics, as well as implicitly, by 
comparing the direct and indirect assumptions that each interview group made about the 
others.  
 
The case data and the theory converge in a variety of areas, which include the declared 
presence and concern over bias within cybersecurity decision-making, as well as the 
predicted and encountered variability and opacity in actor behaviour (understanding, and 
perspective). These indicate the limited inferential power of processes and systems as 
behavioural predictors, and justify the perceived utility of heuristics as tools within the 
uncertainty presented by cybersecurity. Furthermore, the Business Knowledge dimension of 
cybersecurity procedures within the case relies on behavioural representational models, in 
the form of role and process descriptions. The degree of perceived accuracy that these 
present was described by actors as dependent on the maturity and linearity of the task, the 
expectations of the role, and on the tendencies and attributes of the individual. These points 
reflect a need for integrating a behavioural variable of analysis within prescriptive models — 
especially when the aim is to establish the likelihood of behaviour-moderated anomalous 
events. 
 
However, as a topic of enquiry, ‘rationality’ (as defined) has been difficult to explore within 
the case. This difficulty was most visible when querying participants’ views and experiences 
on constructs such as biases in cybersecurity decision-making. Questions presume a shared 
foundational understanding of the constructs they address. While the absence of such an 
understanding can be mitigated against by including an overview of the concept within the 
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interview, this process can also bias responses, and prime participants’ stance, especially 
when the topic presents an implicit (negative) affective response — i.e. bias. As a result, a 
more colloquial interpretation of the constructs was used, shaped by the participants’ 
understanding. In relation to ‘bias’, this has enabled the capture of a different, context rooted 
description. The construct was most notably seen as a tendency to favour specific courses of 
action beyond what is externally or ‘objectively’ perceived as reasonable. The resulting view 
positions biases as not only a function of (deviation from) normative cognitive processes, but 
also of epistemic availability, incentive structures, and of contextual awareness. This 
interpretation is pragmatically useful, as it accounts for the epistemic context of the decision-
maker, which is relevant when exploring knowledge networks and behaviour through an 
organisational lens. Despite its perceived presence and significance for cybersecurity 
decision-making, the construct is not explicitly accounted for, or mitigated against in decision-
making support structures and procedures.  
 
Another point of convergence between the assumptions brought forward through the 
conceptual framework and the in-case findings consists of the (declarative) importance of 
‘intuition’. Again, the construct has been taken out of its cognitive-science conceptual context 
in an attempt to explore its perceived importance for cybersecurity decisions made by actors. 
Intuition, in a colloquial sense, was unanimously seen as present for at least some decisions 
affecting cybersecurity. However, the sentiment on this issue was mixed, ranging from a 
positive view of intuitive insight, to a negative perception of intuition as a shortcut and a 
failure of ‘rationality’. Even within the context of Risk Analysis, intuition was presented as a 
potentially valuable epistemic navigation tool, given the high levels of uncertainty faced. 
However, its role in reaching a specific conclusion is masked, even when the Risk Analyst is 
aware of the function it plays for given epistemic outputs.   
 
When discussing the idea of Risk as a product of Likelihood and Impact of an unwanted 
event, the inability to calibrate for local agency-derived behavioural variability emerged as a 
core limiting factor of cyber risk frameworks. In a volatile, high pace, high impact domain, 
agency-induced deviation can have disproportional effects, even if assuming it to be a low-
frequency occurrence. This highlights the importance of epistemic support mechanisms that 
are anchored in the local parameters of the problem they address. Subsequently, it justifies a 
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move beyond implicit assumptions within the analytical process, whereby incident-based 
calibration is subjective, and prone to hindsight bias. While the case study is potentially 
limited in the depth it can provide on issues of cognition and awareness through direct 
participant engagement, the implications of a behavioural lens for prescriptive construct 
development must include a procedural recognition of intuition, heuristics, and agency. In 
addition, the potential discrepancy between analytical outputs (knowledge claims) and 
actor/analyst position (beliefs) further highlights the relevance of organisational cybersecurity 
‘meta-cognition’ to moderate feedback and support adaptation. 
 
5.1.3 Cyber Risk Constructs 
 
The final dimension of the conceptual framework relates to the role of risk frameworks in 
organisational cybersecurity. Given the methodological variability associated with cyber risk 
analysis, emphasis will be placed on general, framework agnostic points raised through the 
literature review and the case study. The first pattern of prescriptive significance lies in the 
functional boundaries of cyber risk as described within the literature review. Based on the 
ontological framing and agency-associated behavioural variation, the core components of 
likelihood and impact are limited by the (deep) uncertainty of the events they describe. 
Within the case, a critical awareness of this dynamic was exhibited, particularly within the 
dedicated cyber risk function, where a heuristic interpretation of risk is employed. Even at a 
sector level, institutions pursuing an accredited cyber (IS) risk framework are a (growing) 
minority. However, risk assessments are perceived as useful communication and prioritisation 
tools — a structure to externalise and disseminate insights. In addition, risk management 
terminology was used by the interviewees to describe relevant phenomena. This indicates 
the permeability of the risk archetype as a mental model used to interpret and contextualise 
cybersecurity related occurrences. 
 
The second pattern of prescriptive significance lies in the epistemic dependencies of risk 
constructs. Given their reliance on contextual operational knowledge, as well as an 
understanding of relevant threat activity, the utility of risk analysis outputs is dependent on 
the effective navigation of a knowledge network. The availability, scale, and properties of such 
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a network all seem local to varying degrees based on hierarchical granularity (i.e. sector 
networks converge through institutional nodes, such as JISC). However, while implicitly 
acknowledged, this epistemic substratum of risk analysis is not explicitly accounted for within 
the context of procedural feedback. As a result, the properties of the information stream used 
to produce cyber risk knowledge claims are largely internalised by the analyst. This process 
restricts the operationalisation of epistemic metrics to guide the adaptation of inferential 
procedures (i.e. risk analysis). Furthermore, the absence of an explicit association between 
the epistemic composition of core knowledge claims and subsequent risk assessments limits 
the development of a shared 'meta-cognitive’ intuition of epistemic confidence, and 
procedural consistency.   
 
The deep uncertainty posed by cybersecurity as a phenomenon constrains the probabilistic 
potential of the risk archetype. Nevertheless, risk constructs hold utility as a communication 
tools, heuristics for effort prioritisation, and overall knowledge claim construction 
procedures. Given the in-case emphasis on communication, the pragmatic value of the risk 
archetype is clear. However, as the dynamics of cybersecurity entail complex inferences, a 
context-appropriate heuristic interpretation of risk, coupled with an emphasis on its 
underlying epistemic dynamics present an opportunity for formulating a theoretically 
coherent cyber risk-based approach of adaptive inference. Such an interpretation requires an 
awareness of the epistemic network required by effective inferences within the domain, the 
boundaries imposed by deep uncertainty, an orientation for adaptive mechanisms, and a 
nuanced view of the convoluted environment of incentives, awareness, and intent driving the 
behaviour of individual actors within the space. Furthermore, this also entails a meta-
cognitive function, with the aim of gathering feedback on the organisation’s cybersecurity 
epistemic performance (assumptions, knowledge and uncertainty). 
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5.2 Formalising Adaptive Cyber Risk Management 
5.2.1 Risk and Complexity: Heuristic Underpinnings 
 
Accounting for complexity, deep uncertainty and social dynamics in decision-making 
approaches involves a shift from a priori, model-based structure, towards the integration of 
adaptive mechanisms (i.e. Cox 2012). March (2006) provides a critical outlook on the 
assumption that strategic action must involve a model-based evaluation of likelihood, 
outcomes and preferences. In accordance with the outline of risk-based constructs, the 
author presents three core components of the “technologies of rationality” built from this 
view: abstractions/models (representations) of the objects of analysis and their causal 
relationships, and the range of choices they present; data, which contains a history of the 
organisation, and its environment; and, finally, decision rules (procedures), whereby intended 
outcomes are associated with a course of action. While March’s (2006) critique of 
technologies of rationality is largely based on their inefficacy in complex settings, he also 
highlights that adaptation seeking strategies as an alternative can result in a counter-
productive myopic risk aversion (i.e. maintaining status quo).  
 
As the central requirements of adaptation are the reproduction of ‘success’ and the 
generation of variety, experiential learning, imitation, and selective replication strategies all 
favour the local preferences, threats, opportunities and outcomes of the adaptive agent, 
rather than those of the ecosystem. From this perspective, variation-seeking can be locally 
maladaptive while globally adaptive. The selection criteria conflicts faced by the adaptive 
agent must also be accounted for when attempting to deconstruct selective performance. 
This phenomenon is shown by the dichotomies described within the case, and the incentive 
misalignments described by the cybersecurity economics literature. Given its secondary role 
in value generation, agent-level cybersecurity adaptations can yield a lower short-term 
selective advantage than primary function achievement adaptations. So, purely adaptive 
approaches are likely to under-react to possible cyber threats, and over-react after a breach 
has occurred. This behaviour was also anecdotally highlighted at a sector level within the case-
study. Furthermore, agent/actor adaptive pressures within organisations are structural, 
functional, and level-specific, so they are likely to favour same-level, as opposed to holistic 
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adaptations. This yields a contextual necessity for hybrid approaches/constructs which enable 
adaptivity while maintaining inferential mechanics. (March 2006) 
 
5.2.2 Adaptive Risk Management: Principles 
 
At the intersection between adaptation seeking strategies and technologies of rationality lie 
approaches like adaptive management. Given its emphasis on empirics, learning, and 
uncertainty mitigation, adaptive management is presented within the literature as a notable 
approach for managing complex systems — most commonly in ecological/environmental 
studies (Linkov et al. 2006, Wintle and Lindenmayer 2008). As per March’s (2006) archetype 
for technologies of rationality, adaptive management entails establishing management 
objectives that are revised on an ongoing basis, (competing) models of the system, a set of 
strategic choices, outcome monitoring and assessment, and a platform for stakeholder 
involvement and learning (Linkov et al. 2006). This enables accelerated learning cycles, a set 
of evolving models of the systems, hypothesis testing and a pragmatic linkage between the 
range of strategies, competing system models, hypotheses and outcomes. In addition, the 
various implementations are closely monitored, which reflects the recognition of uncertainty, 
and the low degree of confidence in assumptions. (Linkov et al. 2006) 
“The important point that we need to reflect on is that such apparent powers of 
prediction, as implicit in deterministic models, is only real if, and only if the assumptions 
made in achieving it are in fact true. In other words, the real uncertainty that may 
characterise the long-term evolution of an ecology, economy, market or firm is only 
banished by assumption. In this light therefore, we must admit that understanding and 
predictions will only hold until things change and our expectations are confounded. “ (Allen 
and Boulton 2011:173) 
 
Thus, adaptive management is indeed a technology of rationality, but one that recognises 
the fluidity of complex systems and their context, and the effects that it has on model-based 
decisions. At its simplest, adaptive management involves the incorporation of mechanisms 
for perpetual feedback seeking, and explicit validation procedures for the assumptions made 
to mitigate the uncertainty faced in applied, complex settings. As a result, it has been deemed 
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both compatible with, and potentially complementary to risk analysis (Wintle and 
Lindenmayer 2008, Bjerga and Aven 2015). This intersection results in Adaptive Risk 
Management, which is methodologically premised on the application of the previously 
mentioned components of Adaptive Management to expand and manage the measures of 
Likelihood and Impact/Outcome within deep uncertainty (Bjerga and Aven 2015). However, 
the practical implications of this convergence are not well explored within the literature. 
Furthermore, given the colloquial nature of the terms, and the conceptual utility of 
associating adaptivity and risk, “Adaptive Risk Management” approaches, like Baracaldo and 
Joshi (2013), can employ the notion without adhering to a conceptual lineage.   
 
This results in the absence of a shared understanding concerning what Adaptive Risk 
Management entails prescriptively. For example, Ulieru and Worthington (2006) propose an 
Adaptive Risk Management System built around the cyclicality of the Risk Management 
process, which, through interaction with “risks, infrastructure and support holarchies”, 
accomplishes continuous improvement. The emerging concept is seemingly envisioned as a 
(potential) software product to be used by critical infrastructure organisations, which 
leverages their properties as Complex Adaptive Systems. However, the systemic autonomy 
in conducting and adapting the risk management process envisioned by the authors is a 
significant departure from the in-case ‘reality’ of risk-constructs explored in the previous 
chapters.  
 
In contrast, ‘Adaptive Risk Management’ is also used to describe the final ‘Implementation 
Tier’ of the NIST (2018) Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. The 
document positions 'tiers' as indicative of the sophistication of cyber risk practices, but not 
as necessarily representative of their maturity. Within it, an Adaptive Risk Management 
implementation is characterised through: cybersecurity practices that account for previous 
lessons and predictive indicators; continuous improvement supported by ‘advanced’ 
cybersecurity practices and technology; active adaptation and timely response to the 
changing cybersecurity environment; an organisation-wide commitment to risk-informed 
practice concerning cybersecurity events; an evolving risk culture supported by an awareness 
of relevant information, and system activity; and active information sharing and consumption 
practices across the stakeholder/partnership network. As the scope of the Framework is 
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practice oriented, and the overview provided is purely descriptive, the perspective provided 
is limited in its potential contribution to the establishment of an academic Adaptive Risk 
Management narrative, beyond offering a point of reference for what an effective 
interpretation of the construct might entail. (NIST 2018) 
 
Thus, in spite of their shared stated outcome, the scope of Adaptive Risk Management 
practice varies significantly across sources. Bjerga and Aven’s (2015) description of the 
concept supplements traditional Risk Management (Likelihood and Impact, or Consequence 
and a measure of Uncertainty) by explicitly emphasising the strength of knowledge which 
conditions the analytical outputs. In addition, they present the adaptive risk management 
process as an active one (as per the Linkov et al. (2006) distinction between active and passive 
adaptive management) where the background knowledge can change as a result of the 
process actors and their ability to engage in targeted knowledge seeking and validation. This 
results in a continuous rather than discrete interpretation of both the epistemic foundation 
informing risk analysis, and of the Risk Management process itself.  
 
Moreover, by explicitly establishing the measure of Likelihood as inferred from, and thus 
conditioned by a specific knowledge configuration, the specific behaviour of the system can 
be linked to explicit claims, thus serving as an epistemic validation mechanism. Furthermore, 
assessments built on weak knowledge can be differentiated and managed accordingly. At an 
aggregate level, the emerging assessment of cybersecurity knowledge and its efficacy in 
driving action towards set outcomes is functionally analogous to meta-cognition. Knowledge 
about the existing and potential performance of epistemic processes is central to the 
functional (cybersecurity based) pursuit of balancing exploration with exploitation — a 
central requirement of effective adaptation (March 2006). 
 
5.2.3 Adaptive Cyber Risk Management: Situational Awareness Through a 
Knowledge Network 
 
At the intersection between the NIST (2018) descriptive account of Adaptive Cyber Risk 
Management, the methodological insights proposed by Bjerga and Aven (2015), and the 
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overview of the case study, lie the systemic requirements and the potential utility of such an 
approach. A first core insight produced by the case which affects adaptive cyber risk 
management practice is the non-locality of cybersecurity knowledge. As the respective loci 
of the ‘threat knowledge’, ‘business knowledge’ and ‘mitigative knowledge’ are not 
necessarily convergent, an adaptive understanding of risk as conditioned by knowledge 
entails a recognition of its relational, networked nature. This principle is compatible with both 
adaptive management and risk management, yet it is not inherent in either construct. A 
knowledge-network view entails that the utility of knowledge depends not only on its 
availability but also on its spatiotemporal positioning and accessibility for other nodes. The 
pace at which changes are recognised, abstracted and communicated conditions the 
responsiveness of the adaptive risk (re)analysis procedure.  
 
So, the efficacy of analytical procedures and heuristics which are knowledge dependent and 
employ models of cybersecurity phenomena within organisations is bound by two factors. 
The first factor is the presence of a technical infrastructure which facilitates the acquisition 
of necessary data — the second component of March’s (2006) ‘Technologies of Rationality’ 
triad — as well as its management and sharing. The second factor consists of the cognitive 
dimension responsible for higher order interpretation (within adequate, dynamic 
representational models) and subsequent action. These two high-level dependencies 
correspond with Franke and Brynielsson’s (2014) overview of Cyber Situational Awareness as 
a dual strategic construct which encompasses a technical and a cognitive dimension.  
 
Situational Awareness theory has been established in recognition of the cognitive demands 
imposed by dynamic, complex systems on decision makers (Endsley 1995). In spite of its initial 
actor-level conceptualisation, the construct is also used in a scale-agnostic manner in relation 
to cybersecurity decision-making within macro-systems. This is evident in its explicit role in 
national cybersecurity strategies (Franke and Brynielsson 2014). Thus, its malleability is 
attributable to its explicit systemic orientation: “Situation awareness is gained by a system…” 
(Barford et al. 2009:4), and is a “state of knowledge” (Endsley 1995:36) achieved through a 
series of processes which are described as ‘Situation Assessment’. The development of such 
an epistemic state is central for functional ‘sense-making’, which further shapes the 
representation of the operational context, the adaptation of inferential pathways, and the 
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interpretation of real-time occurrences — all central components of Adaptive (Cyber) Risk 
Management. 
 
At a high level of abstraction, these processes are consistent with previously described 
decision-making archetypes. They consist of an epistemic progression through three core 
steps: situation recognition, situation comprehension, and situation projection (Endsley 
1995, Barford et al. 2009). Recognition entails framing the situation and identifying relevant 
elements; comprehension positions otherwise disjointed elements in representational 
models; and projection is an act of conditional inference to establish action-pathways which 
lead to the desired outcomes. However, the (Cyber) Situational Awareness perspective 
presents distinct tools and insights complementary to the emerging Adaptive Cyber Risk 
Management narrative and supported by the empirical findings of the case-study. These 
include the centrality of decision makers and the role of cognitive constraints, the 
spatiotemporal confines of the situation assessment, the nested nature of cyber situational 
awareness within the larger, systemic situational awareness, and the necessity of fusing and 
assessing heterogeneous data. From a technical point of view, this entails the establishment 
of an Adaptive Information System, which can act as a central node, exerting and 
accommodating epistemic feedback. 
 
The process of data fusion is central to the cyber situation assessment, placing significant 
emphasis on the role of information systems and decision support technologies. On this 
point, Franke and Brynielsson (2014:20) note: “Situational awareness by necessity involves 
both technical and cognitive challenges in that the basic data used for developing situational 
awareness comprises some kind of underlying estimate of the state of the world which, in 
turn, is the result of some kind of data processing”. As a result, the epistemic transition 
between scattered data and actionable knowledge is conditioned by information quality, and 
on the success of the fusion procedure. So, central to the efficacy of projections based on 
situational awareness lies an understanding of both the validity of data as a descriptive input, 
and of the completeness/sufficiency of existing situational comprehension. This principle is 
aligned with the view of Risk as conditioned by knowledge proposed within Bjerga and Aven’s 
(2015) conceptualisation of Adaptive Risk Management. However, the (C)SA view enables 
expanding the principle through evaluation/validation based on the data, the fusion process, 
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the representations developed, and (potential) efficacy of inference. Furthermore, a 
knowledge-network based view consolidates the primacy of epistemic ‘fusion’ in a central 
function for establishing and maintaining Adaptive Cyber Risk practices.   
 
An important attribute of modern Cyber Situational Awareness literature is its primarily 
operational focus. This is distinguished from the arguably broader scope entailed by Adaptive 
Cyber Risk Management. Network monitoring, operational indicators, sensors, visualisation 
techniques, and automation algorithms are all envisioned as key sense-making tools 
necessary for establishing a real time Situational Awareness of the situation (Barford et al. 
2009). As a ‘situation’ is manifested in spatial and temporal confines, its understanding is 
argued to present procedural regularities. In this context, Tadda and Salerno’s (2010:17) 
definition of understanding entails enough knowledge to infer the situation’s potential 
consequences, and predict patterns. From this perspective, the ‘cyber’ domain is not seen as 
inherently distinct.  
 
 “What is real is the continual change of form: form is only a snapshot view of a transition.” 
(Bergson 1911 in Allen and Boulton 2011:167) 
 
However, both the conceptual framework-derived diagnosis and the in-depth case study 
challenge the assumption of a sufficient degree of ontological regularity required for 
achieving such an understanding across scales of analytical granularity within an 
organisational cybersecurity environment. The efficacy of prediction and pattern forecasting 
within the domain is inherently conditioned by non-linear dynamics, actor induced variation 
form model behaviour, capabilities, resources, competing adaptive pressures, lack of 
adversary specificity, threat vector variety, and ‘unknown unknowns’. Given this picture of 
deep uncertainty, the emerging prescriptive model positions the function of Cyber Situational 
Awareness as nested within an Adaptive Cyber Risk Management archetype, which enables 
philosophical consistency. This encourages an explicit critical stance on the local efficacy of 
inferential outputs, to supplement the validation of inputs and assumptions, in-line with the 
previously described meta-cognitive analogue function. A high-level overview of this model 





Fig. 7. A high-level view of ACRM 
 
 
5.2.4 Accounting for Bias in Schema-Based Agents and Structures 
 
Both the case study and the literature-based conceptual framework highlight the necessity 
of accounting for and mitigating against bias in cyber risk prescription. In spite of 
heterogenous anecdotal outlines of bias and the variety of theoretical approaches to 
‘rationality’ and its limitations, the case study and the literature present a regularity in 
defining the construct. As per the literature review, bias entails a contextual failure of 
heuristic judgements, whereby the (more accessible) heuristic attribute used yields an 
inadequate representation of a ‘judgement object’ (Kahneman and Frederick 2002). So, bias 
represents a situational discrepancy between the heuristic attribute, and the target attribute. 
Extrapolating on this perspective, bias can occur both as a cognition/agent, and as a social 
systemic phenomenon, as it entails a failure of schema-based environmental navigation. The 
two are interdependent, as an actor’s role, epistemic grounding, and available action 
pathways are supported by systemic/network structures and mechanisms. Similarly, these 
structures and mechanisms are shaped by actors, through intent and coordination. As a 
result, there are two interacting scales of analysis at which bias as an epistemic phenomenon 
can be addressed. From the perspective of the participant division used within the data 
collection strategy, cognitive bias is a concern regarding risk analysts and decision makers 
involved in the adaptive cyber risk management implementation, while systemic bias is 
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holistic and includes general actors. 
 
The grounding of cognitive bias in heuristic, often opaque mechanisms is consistent across 
dual process theories (Kahneman and Frederick 2002) and interactionist/argumentative 
accounts of rationality (Mercier and Sperber 2011, Sperber and Mercier 2012). These 
perspectives recognise the essential role of cognitive efficiency imposed by the limitations of 
human perception, and thus position bias within the domain of heuristic mechanisms. When 
discussing cybersecurity prescription, the notion of bias is pragmatic. In other words, the 
trade-off between efficiency and accuracy which results from the unavoidable use of a 
heuristic attribute to navigate a complex, uncertain situation, can only be evaluated in line 
with its applied outcomes. Organisations, as hierarchical systems, can present multiple, often 
competing measures of performance across scales. So, as previously established, locally 
effective heuristics can be globally maladaptive. Formal decision support frameworks 
manage the resulting uncertainty through assumptions — implicit, and explicit — as heuristic 
attributes (Allen et al. 2007). These include often intuitive judgements of the situation 
dynamics, relevant elements, model schemata, as well as epistemic judgments, including 
differentiating value of competing data streams, perception of knowledge state, and 
implications of historical performance. As these factors converge, the potential for bias in 
highly uncertain, complex circumstances, is considerable.     
 
“Objectivity is gained by making assumptions explicit so that they can be examined and 
challenged, not by vain efforts to eliminate them from analysis.” (Heuer 1999:41) 
 
Cognitive (rather than systemic) bias mitigation is presented within the literature (Kahneman 
and Frederick 2002) as a pluralist objective that generally entails the use of critical reasoning 
(System 2) to identify errors of judgement, while recognising the potential of heuristic 
intuitive decision-making in complex environments (Mercier and Sperber 2011, Bingham and 
Eisenhardt 2011). Practically, implied approaches vary from an argumentative exploration of 
the judgement, to an investigation of the scope of misused intuition, and the calibration 
(training) of the implicit heuristic model within a given context (Gigerenzer and Brighton 
2009). However, for cybersecurity decision-making, cognitive bias mitigation mechanisms are 
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conditioned by the efficacy of the pluralist behavioural selection processes, feedback cycles 
across the organisational hierarchy, and the scope of hindsight bias. The first two factors are 
interrelated, and address an ability to establish a link between a heuristic output, its local, 
and its global effects.  
 
Furthermore, Schwarz and Vaughn (2002) highlight the significance and persistence of 
hindsight bias, whereby knowledge concerning the outcome of an event is integrated within 
its representational model. This creates the impression of outcome inevitability, coupled with 
an unjustified belief that the outcome should have been anticipated, and the post-hoc 
alternation of memories which exaggerate what was known. As a result, causal feedback is 
distorted, preventing effective adaptation. It is important to note that negative or unexpected 
outcomes absent erroneous judgement are not a product of bias. Retrospective bias 
correction relies on an ability to distinguish between general negative outcomes and 
reasoning flaws. 
 
Within the context of intelligence analysis, Heuer (1999) presents a range of mitigative 
strategies against such mechanisms/tendencies. These include the establishment of 
competing hypotheses with a distinguishable epistemic configuration (assumptions, intuition, 
data) — a technique also found in adaptive management, the subjection of the externalised 
analytical rationale to collective critique, the selection of context appropriate analytical tools 
(i.e. lynchpin analysis), and the recognition of common bias tendencies. Once made explicit, 
epistemic configurations can be subjected to a systematic evaluation of both components and 
effects. Cognitive bias mitigation can also rely on the relative positioning and architecture of 
the epistemic network. Attributes like the format, scope, and affective impact (Slovic et al. 
2005) of the information that is accessible by actors can affect decision-making. These issues 
were also identified within the case-study, as 'cybersecurity knowledge' has been presented 
as a construct with contextually varied forms: abstract, in-depth for experts, narrative-based 
for users.  
 
Similar to cognitive bias, systemic bias entails undesirable collective behaviour patterns and 
tendencies which result from inadequate representational models or inferential procedures. 
In principle, this can be corrected by maximising the adaptive architecture of the system 
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(Benbya and McKelvey 2006a), or by adjusting the relevant inferential configuration. Most of 
the examples of bias described within the case-study were manifestations of systemic bias, 
whereby a local heuristic is produced based on myopic sub-system representations. So, 
potentially conflicting objectives such as the pursuit of cybersecurity and cost-cutting, or 
openness are misrepresented to favour the locally advantageous heuristic — a phenomenon 
which can be amplified by structural power dynamics. In this sense, such misrepresentations 
can only be discussed as erroneous within their systemic context. Furthermore, through the 
social dimensions of agency (role, norms, culture) globally maladaptive heuristic beliefs can 
be reinforced and disseminated, becoming a function of the system rather than the actor.  
 
An example of this phenomenon was provided within the context of University X’s subsidiary, 
where the main described source of bias relating to cybersecurity was the organisation’s 
primary orientation for profitability. Such an absolute preference is neither uncommon, nor 
inherently erroneous for a commercial venture — an essential determinant of bias as a 
construct. However, the representation of profitability as an absolute priority to an 
organisation can prove to be locally maladaptive as a source of neglect for amassing 
vulnerabilities and threat actor presence. If the complex environment of the organisation 
changes to include other significant threats, a static heuristic preference can indeed lead to 
systemic bias. Furthermore, in the event of a breach, the effects can be broad, difficult to 
gauge, and potentially span beyond profitability (Thomas et al. 2013). Systemic bias must also 
be distinguished from Risk Appetite. The latter involves an informed, intentional exposure to 
risk in the pursuit of an objective, whereas the former is a product of epistemic failures 
resulting from the system design, its dynamics, and tendencies.   
 
Within the context of Adaptive Risk Management practice, correcting and mitigating against 
systemic bias involves an ability to link embedded representational models and inferential 
procedures with patterns of behaviour and outcome variance/deviation. Distinguishing 
between uncertainty based variance, and inferential error is a highly contextual task, making 
general prescription challenging. However, by externalising shared intuitions, beliefs and 
assumptions, a broad range of epistemic validation procedures can be put into place. 
Instances of externalised inferential epistemic outputs are most notably described by McElroy 
(2000, 2003) as 'Knowledge Claims'. These are defined as a product of learning, and consist 
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of "conjectures, assertions, arguments, or theories about which potential actions might lead 
to desired outcomes" (McElroy 2003:7). Subsequently, they can have a descriptive, 
explanatory, predictive, or evaluation-centric form (Peters et al. 2010).  Knowledge Claims are 
introduced as part of a wider framework — the Knowledge Life Cycle — and are compatible 
with a collective, relational interpretation of knowledge. Furthermore, in their formulation, 
they manifest a convergence of available Data, Information, Knowledge and Wisdom for a 
given situation (Faucher et al. 2008). While functionally congruent with ‘competing 
hypotheses’ within Adaptive (Risk) Management, Knowledge Claims benefit both from a 
robust conceptualisation as an externalised unit of conditional/inherently incomplete 
knowledge, as well as from an epistemology-derived evaluation toolkit (Peters et al. 2010).  
 
5.2.5 Knowledge Claims as Adaptive Triggers 
 
The understanding of action-pathway selection under uncertainty as conditioned by 
available and emerging knowledge is central to Adaptive Cyber Risk Management. Knowledge 
Claim validation can occur both passively through positive feedback (McElroy 2003), and 
actively through Knowledge Claim Evaluation procedures. Both approaches are conducive to 
epistemic adaptation in response to learning and environmental changes. Furthermore, the 
evaluation process is presented by Firestone and McElroy (2003) as the key differentiator 
between information and knowledge. Literary approaches to Knowledge Claim Evaluation are 
divided based on their epistemological stance. Most notably, Peters et al. (2010) identify three 
core stances: a ‘Managerial’ approach, centred around justification on grounds established 
by top management; an ‘Entrepreneurial’ approach, based on intuitive, coherence seeking 
validation, at the expense of systematic justification practices; and, finally, an ‘Open’ 
approach, based on Knowledge Claim testing through epistemic criteria, which include 
“logical consistency, empirical fit, systemic coherence, simplicity and heuristic quality”, while 
incorporating procedures of “falsification and error elimination” (Peters et al. 2010:251). 
Amongst its characteristics, the Open perspective is based on a recognition of the untenable 
nature of absolute knowledge and certainty given organisational dynamics. It also holds 




Amongst the three approaches, Open KCE is both philosophically and prescriptively 
consistent with the emerging conceptual framework, and complements the critical epistemic 
awareness. Within the stance, knowledge claims operate as World 3 constructs, able to 
influence World 2 beliefs (Popper 1978, Firestone and McElroy 2003). Given the emphasis on 
epistemic evaluation, the progression/evolution of knowledge claims is documented in the 
form of meta-information (Peters et al. 2010). This approach corresponds with Heuer’s (1999) 
mitigative prescription concerning hindsight bias, whereby actions should be traceable to an 
explicit configuration of epistemic building blocks. Access to a clear link between 
underpinning knowledge, action and outcome can be used to improve the efficiency of 
epistemic adaptation, while compensating for cognitive distortion and post-hoc 
rationalisation. The construct of meta-information is central to the systemic ‘meta-cognition’ 
function described in the previous chapters, as it enables the calibration of certainty and the 
evaluation of localised inferential prowess. Within the Knowledge Life Cycle model (McElroy 
2000), the KCE stage can classify Knowledge Claims as Validated, Invalidated, and Non-
validated — each position being accompanied with the production of meta-information.  
 
Within the context of Adaptive Cyber Risk Management, the validation status of knowledge 
claims coupled with the meta-information can be used to elaborate Bjerga and Aven’s (2015) 
Knowledge Strength matrix. It also enables targeted investigation, enquiry and information 
management, while providing insight into the need for epistemic exploration or exploitation. 
Heuer (1999) identifies four operations of information acquisition within the context of 
intelligence analysis. These are: Additional details about an existing variable; Identification of 
additional variables; Updated value of existing variables; Information about variable 
importance and (inter) dependence. These operations form the basis of an active approach to 
KCE, whereby non-validated Knowledge Claims can be supplemented, before being subjected 
to another cycle of evaluation. They also enable consistency in Knowledge Claim formulation 
as the Open KCE approach encourages the normalisation of competing knowledge claims. 
This entails ensuring completeness, consistent specificity, continuity with previous knowledge 
claims (path dependency). (Peters et al. 2010) 
 
In spite of its contextual merits, the Open KCE approach also presents a number of 
epistemology-derived limitations for cybersecurity applications. From a philosophical 
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standpoint, the commitment to a critical-realist stance centred in truth-seeking can be 
problematic when it conflicts with organisational pragmatism. Instances of the prioritisation 
between Usefulness and Truth were highlighted previously based on the literature on the role 
of cognitive/collective heuristics and systemic exaptation. The teleological function of 
organisational cybersecurity is one of loss mitigation/avoidance within which its truth seeking 
functions are nested. This calls into question the assumption of truth seeking as an inherently 
superior long-term strategy, regardless of context. As a result, ACRM prescription should 
recognise the role of power-structures, management, and expertise in reconciling conflicting 
narratives into an actionable worldview. Furthermore, the role of heuristics, intuition and tacit 
expertise in uncertain circumstances should also be recognised as epistemic drivers. Both of 
these considerations are exemplified within the case study where the function of leadership 
in a cybersecurity context is based on the reconciliation of dichotomies. Additionally, analyst 
intuition was presented as an active driver of prescription, in spite of it not being explicitly 
described as such within tangible outputs, i.e. risk reports. 
 
The two examples are, however, different epistemic instances. The first involves 
representational calibration under uncertainty, whereby leaders reconcile potentially 
conflicting representations of reality. This is indeed a truth-seeking operation and involves 
competing Descriptive/Representational Knowledge Claims (DKC). Even when subjected to a 
Managerial KCE approach, such an operation involves socially moderated epistemic 
validation. In contrast, the latter exemplifies an instance of predictive inference based on 
existing Descriptive Knowledge Claims. The resulting ‘Risk Knowledge Claim’ (RKC) is 
usefulness oriented, and can be subjected to heuristic assessments, i.e. contextual 
ecology/adaptive toolbox. However, unlike its counterexample, it is inherently incomplete, 
conditional and probabilistic, describing eventualities, which limits the utility of grounding 
epistemic validation solely in terms of truth through tools like falsification, simplicity and 
continuity. This distinction is meaningful as it enables a two-layer validation within the risk 
assessment process based on the type of the Knowledge Claim. DKCs require the primarily 
truth-oriented validation associated with Open KCE. This includes a description of known-
unknowns, uncertainty, and descriptive limitations as it emerges in the form of meta-
information. However, RKCs must explicitly account for analyst intuition/expertise as a source 
of procedural variation, managerial concerns and performance criteria, local risk mitigation 
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ability, and heuristic context. In simple terms, DKCs must be true, while RKCs must employ 
DKC configurations usefully. 
 
5.2.6 Knowledge Claim Parameters: Adaptive Risk Quantification and Meta-
Cognition 
 
A foundational prerequisite of selection-based adaptive strategies is the ability to distinguish 
contextually successful units of adaptation (March 2006). Managing Knowledge Claims as 
adaptive units enables the homogenisation of the various epistemic streams (Threat 
Knowledge, Business Knowledge, Mitigative Knowledge) into a consistent output, with a 
modular, relational structure. In addition, a Knowledge Claim-oriented Adaptive Information 
System can incorporate Benbya and McKelvey’s (2006a) first principles of adaptivity. These 
include: the maximisation of positive feedback by adjusting the weight of various inputs based 
on recorded inferential performance histories; the identification of adaptive tensions, as 
made visible in the knowledge claim formulation, normalisation and evaluation procedures; 
the inclusion of variation by design in competing interpretations of data; and the pacing of KC 
production-evaluation-adaptation loops based on changes in the representations, as 
identified through the CSA function. Validated KCs can also form the basis of collaboration 
within the epistemic network. Through a normalisation procedure, inter-organisational KC 
conflicts can be directly explored as a potential source of feedback. Finally, a re-emerging 
theme within the case was the difficulty caused by unknown unknowns. Within the proposed 
models, the pragmatic scope of the unknown resides in the gap between expected and actual 
inferential performance. As a result, the granularity of effective prediction/projection can be 
assessed and accounted for in both spatial and temporal parameters.  
 
Maximising knowledge claim adaptation within the proposed approach to cyber risk KCE 
raises the issue of structural differentiation. Firestone and McElroy (2003:152) identify 24 
types of ‘Knowledge Claims’, which range from factual statements, to application software, 
data models and methods. Within the current context, these are seen as inputs/modules for 
Descriptive Knowledge Claims, or Risk Knowledge Claims, based on their function and scope. 
For example, a descriptive, threat-based knowledge claim entails structural coherence 
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through a range of potential inputs which include data, models, and statements. Because of 
its composite nature, structural modularity, and its associated meta-information, it can be 
compared with competing knowledge claims that are built on different inputs, or are a 
function of different nodes in the knowledge network. Subsequently, KC structural archetypes 
are central to the functional integration of KCE within an Adaptive Cyber Risk Management 
framework. Furthermore, in the proposed interpretation of Adaptive Cyber Risk 
Management, KCE is distinguished from CSA-based data validation and information 
production, outputting epistemic structures able to adapt based on heterogenous feedback. 
This proposed sequential evaluation process is illustrated in fig. 8.  
 
 
Fig. 8. The Adaptive Cyber Risk Knowledge Claim Evaluation Sequence 
 
As RKCs aim to represent contingencies which vary in likelihood, complexity and scope, 
cyber risk quantification consistency — an issue raised in both the case and the literature 
review — must explicitly incorporate measures of systemic ‘meta-cognitive’ awareness. This 
entails an understanding of both representational model accuracy/truthfulness, achievable 
through KCE, and of the procedural efficacy of projection/inference through available DKCs 
at various degrees of granularity. In other words, decreasing cyber risk analysis 
subjectivity/variability entails a procedural evaluation of how accurate the claims describing 
the organisational reality are, and of how well these descriptions can be used to infer patterns 
of likely behaviour. Based on the process of knowledge claim normalisation, whereby 
competing knowledge claims are structurally consolidated, metrics can be introduced for 



























As a result, informational inputs can be distinguished based on locally established evaluation 
parameters like their type, source, and the degree of systemic coherence they present (a 
broader range of such parameters is proposed in fig. 8. Through positive feedback, high 
performing inputs can benefit from a proportionally increased weight in the KCE process. By 
gradually expanding and adapting the base of DKCs employed, the worldview addressed 
through the risk process evolves. 
 
Furthermore, having access to such an explicit configuration of support parameters for 
competing knowledge claims enables mitigation for hindsight bias, provides a critical 
understanding of the epistemic conditionality of specific risk claims, and maximises the utility 
of post-incident feedback/calibration. The dual KCE process also enables organisations gauge 
both their descriptive and, respectively, their inferential ability within a cyber risk setting. A 
low confidence DKC-base can be an indicator of necessary adjustments to sense-making 
strategies and infrastructure. Similarly, the degree of systemic uncertainty can be 
extrapolated based on the relationship between RKCs and their supporting DKCs. Once the 
scope of complexity-based uncertainty is established, further strategies for uncertainty 
mitigation can be implemented at each relevant level of analysis. A visual representation of 
the proposed framework which incorporates the proposed Adaptive Information System is 
provided in fig. 9, based on an expanded view of the previously introduced Adaptive Cyber 
Risk meta-model (fig. 7). 
 
The visual model expands on the sequential evaluation process within the context of the 
ACRM meta-model. In addition to providing a core taxonomy of inputs relating to the Threats-
Vulnerabilities-Impact triad, as well as process related data/information, the model 
introduces the information acquisition function predicated on Heuer’s (1999) classification. 
Acquired inputs are evaluated and introduced into the Adaptive Information System where 
the CSA-derived Fusion proceeds — a precursor to knowledge claim formulation. Initially, 
Descriptive Knowledge Claims are evaluated, and classified into Validated, Non-validated, and 
Invalidated Knowledge Claims, as per McElroy’s (2000) Knowledge Life Cycle model. As part 
of the DKCE process, actions, such as using the data acquisition function, or acting on 
descriptive insights, are enabled. In addition, the distinct epistemic configuration and meta-
information of each evaluated knowledge claim is fed back into the Adaptive Information 
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System, shaping future iterations of the process. Finally, Risk Knowledge Claims are made 
primarily based on configurations of validated Descriptive Knowledge Claims. Again, through 
the RKCE process, actions can be triggered. Finally, following their evaluation, the validated 
RKCs form the basis of Risk Assessment, being reviewed and updated based on changes in 
their underpinning assumptions, inputs, and supporting evidence. Given the relational nature 
of this progression, the implications of downstream (i.e. core data/information) changes can 
be highlight the necessity of updating the relevant Knowledge Claims. Based on use efficacy 
and local best-practices, the pace of feedback cycles can be optimised to match the dynamics 















































































































































































































































































































































































5.2.7 Formalising an Epistemic Framework for ACRM 
 
Throughout the previous sections, Adaptive Cyber Risk Management was introduced as a 
versatile prescriptive framework/conceptual archetype which can address the core 
requirements and considerations raised through both the literature review and the case 
study. Most notably, these include the high-uncertainty and environmental dynamics 
presented by the cyber domain, a low efficacy of static system models, a potentially high level 
of agency-induced systemic variation, and a need for effectively engaging local epistemic 
networks. However, given the relative novelty of applying Adaptive Risk Management within 
cybersecurity, several considerations were raised. These include the necessity for positioning 
the framework in a systemic context, where the utility of the implementation is conditioned 
by epistemic processes and (technical) infrastructure, as well as by cognitive, analyst related 
dimensions. Both the temporal sensitivity of adaptive triggers and feedback, and the effects 
that it has on risk models highlight the importance of real-time sense-making capabilities and 
situational awareness. These points were addressed through the incorporation of Cyber 
Situational Awareness theory as a complementary construct which places emphasis on the 
technical dimension of data-collection and interpretation, on the implications of agency, and 
on real-time response capabilities.  
 
In addition, the ‘Knowledge Claims’ construct was introduced as a unit of epistemic 
adaptation. As per Bjerga and Aven’s (2015) conceptualisation of ARM, risk is used to quantify 
heterogenous epistemic events. An ability to understand and represent epistemic differences 
between Knowledge Claims is central to a more nuanced description of Risks. This ability is 
supported by a contextual formulation of Knowledge Claim Evaluation processes, which allow 
Knowledge Claims to expand the function of hypotheses in Adaptive Management, by 
distinguishing appropriate validation tools based on the function of they hold. They also 
enable the incorporation of adaptivity maximising approaches, such as Benbya and 
McKelvey’s (2006a) first principles of adaptation. Once validated, defined in scope, and 
prescriptive utility, Knowledge Claims can serve as a malleable foundation for communication 
and collaboration strategies, as they can be transposed in the form of narrative, or in the 
form of data-inputs, based on use-case. The ‘open’ approach to DKCE also enables user 
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input/feedback from across the hierarchy for the formation and adaptation of 
internal/business representational models, used to establish vulnerability and impact 
assessments. Finally, the framework also enables the retrospective use of competing 
heuristic approaches, and risk quantification methods as a historical record of available 
knowledge (claims) is generated. 
 
Through the above, the framework prescriptively addresses the context-construct gap 
diagnosed in the earlier chapters of the thesis, while also better equipping organisations to 
locally deal with the epistemic challenges of cybersecurity as a knowledge-problem. More 
specifically, the (meta-)framework is predicated by an awareness of the relational knowledge 
networks predicating knowledge in cyber risk management by acknowledging and leveraging 
the role and attributes/requirements of epistemic nodes in the production of units of 
adaptation (knowledge claims). It also proposes a technical infrastructure for epistemic 
convergence, feedback maximisation, and selection in organisational sensemaking. The 
potentiality and the effects of deep uncertainty are also central to the framework, which 
incorporates adaptive mechanisms underpinned by processes for distinguishing between 
epistemic operations (description and inference), for retrospective procedural and 
representational calibration, and for a ‘meta-cognitive’ awareness of the environmental 
uncertainty faced. At an axiomatic level, a nuanced level of ‘rationality’ is used, which enables 
the identification and recognition of the potential causal role presented by multi-granular 
‘soft’ dimensions of social systems, like cognitive tendencies and mechanisms, incentives and 
culture within cyber risk practice. By doing so, the conceptualisation/formulation of Adaptive 
Cyber Risk Management put forward presents promising novel avenues for both research 





5.2.8 Framework Development: A Commentary 
 
As a product of its preceding stages of analysis, the Adaptive Cyber Risk Management 
framework aims to embed a series of systemic and epistemic mechanisms under an 
organisational risk paradigm. Its development relies on the explicit recognition of adaptivity 
as a necessary attribute in a cyber risk context. This is supported by the claim that the 
estimations of likelihood and impact for potential cybersecurity events in a specific systemic 
setting are conditioned by knowledge, and are primarily used to trigger adaptive responses. 
Moreover, the framework attempts to address systemic non-linearity and behavioural 
dynamics in a coherent manner, as persistent yet underrepresented drivers of organisational 
cybersecurity outcomes. The development of the framework in response to the theoretical 
and empirical findings of the study (as described in sections 5.1 and 5.2) loosely follows three 
stages. Firstly, the baseline meta-structure is identified, which grounds the framework 
objectives, and its structural/operational logic. Secondly, the a high-level overview of the core 
functions that are necessary to achieve these objectives is provided. Thirdly, a more in-depth 
perspective concerning the epistemic structure of the framework is developed, which aims 
to mitigate against behavioural (i.e. biases) and systemic (i.e. stochastic uncertainty) 
tendencies affecting efficacy of risk analysis/management. 
 
The baseline structure of the framework is derived from its positioning at the intersection 
of technologies of rationality and adaptation seeking strategies. This entails a preservation of 
the simplified structure of the former —  i.e. basic relational models of the problem, data, 
and decision rules — while placing additional emphasis on the basic conditions for 
adaptation: reproduction of success, and generation of variety. Such a structure enables the 
framework to be compatible with existing risk guidelines and standards (a necessity, given 
the highlighted organisational reliance on risk as a paradigm), while also providing avenues 
for methodological novelty. Adaptive Management derives from a conceptual lineage 
positioned at this intersection, balancing structured, model-based outcome anticipation with 
an embedded adaptation seeking mechanism.  
 
While traditionally associated with complex environments and deep uncertainty, the 
literary presence of Adaptive Management does not directly address the challenges 
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presented by organisational cyber risk, nor does it place particular emphasis on the social 
dimension of systems. It does however provide a blueprint for epistemic adaptation through 
model/claim variation (competition), selection, and success replication. In spite of the 
absence of a clear theoretical lineage, Adaptive Risk Management (the convergence between 
Adaptive Management and Risk Management) emerges as a flexible, balanced perspective, 
which places emphasis on the epistemic conditionality of risk claims — i.e. event 
identification, likelihood and impact estimates. The lack of a widely accepted interpretation 
of the concept (ARM) also presents opportunities for accommodating compatible 
observations and findings from the previous chapters.  
 
Most notably, in a centralised risk analysis/management function, risk profile/posture 
adaptation is not directly triggered by relevant environmental changes, but by specific 
informational exchanges concerning said changes. In addition, the cyber risk function 
employs a relational knowledge network in order to develop adequate representational 
models. Furthermore, models in a risk setting are discrete representations of continuous 
cross-hierarchy systemic interactions. Subsequently, their adequacy is constrained by spatial 
and temporal attributes which underpin both their adaptive tension, and the overall 
sustained adequacy of the practices which they inform. And, operationalising an epistemic 
perspective must account for knowledge as a structurally moderated trigger of action (i.e. 
can be subjected to a usefulness continuum in a given setting, based on the fitness of 
resulting actions). Finally, following the systemic complexity framing suggested by the 
literature review and the case study, adaptive heuristic formulation to identify and exploit 
manifested ontological demi-regularities can prove to be an effective strategy, even in the 
absence of complete system models. As a result, this first stage of framework formulation 
provided a foundation of assumptions and desired outcomes, following the theoretical 
analysis and the case study.  
 
The second stage of the framework formulation process consisted of constructing a model 
of core functions which can accommodate the necessary information architecture/exchanges 
in an Adaptive Cyber Risk Management implementation. This broadly entails building upon a 
relational information flow model which covers Framing, Input, Analysis, Decision, Action and 
Outcome as discrete functions shared by main risk management methodologies (Appendix 
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5). These generic functions are adapted in order to maximise adaptive potential and support 
bias mitigation/heuristics formulation techniques. So, the framing function manifests an 
explicit configuration of assumptions — a world view — which serves as a foundation for the 
identification and reproduction of adaptive success. As competing knowledge claims with 
modular, formal epistemic validation structures are used to inform decision-making, the 
outcomes they are linked to, and the framing assumptions that they are based on must both 
be individually identifiable as a pre-conditions for replicating adaptive success.  
 
The explicit link between framing - claim - decision - outcome (relying on the proposed 
adaptive information system/knowledge claim evaluation sequence) is a prerequisite for an 
ability to gauge the adequacy of the underpinning worldview, and to engage in the 
retrospective calibration of each function in a manner that mitigates against hindsight bias. 
Furthermore, it enables a systemic interpretation of the ‘adaptive toolkit’ for heuristic 
formulation. Another primary dimension of the high-level view of the framework is the 
integration of Cyber Situational Awareness as a concept. Through its technical and cognitive 
dimensions, it is able to provide a balanced perspective on the pre-requisites for developing 
and maintaining a systemic state of awareness. This is achieved through a representational 
schema that accounts for both infrastructural/technological and cognitive/behavioural 
dimensions of uncertainty navigation in a cyber setting. From a framework perspective, a 
functional representation of cyber situational awareness has a dual role: it introduces a 
potentially real-time feedback meta-function, based on the inputs of the technical 
infrastructure (i.e. sensors, firewalls, network monitoring capabilities); and, through the 
concept’s substantial literary presence, it provides procedural and technical guidance for 
developing and improving such a systemic state of awareness. Finally, through its perspective 
on data fusion, the CSA perspective influences the formulation of the Adaptive Information 
System component as a prerequisite for centralised risk model formulation and coordination. 
By doing so, it provides a structure for the epistemic progression between data, information 
and knowledge claims, and it is able to accommodate a variety of mechanisms and strategies 
which support the framework’s objectives.  
 
The third stage of the framework formulation process consisted of building upon the 
emerging structure and relational logic, to maximise epistemic adaptivity, mitigate bias and 
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implicitly improve heuristic formulation/adaptation, while also adding an additional 
dimension to the risk claim generation function. This has leveraged the knowledge 
perspective of the study, introducing stage appropriate evaluation and validation procedures 
throughout the epistemic progression between raw data and risk knowledge claims. 
Emphasis is also placed on the knowledge claim formulation and evaluation processes, where 
the meta attributes resulting from each stage (i.e. classification of knowledge claims as 
validated, invalidated or non-validated) are used as feedback points reinforcing epistemic 
inputs, formats and fusion procedures. At each stage, this feedback can be used to trigger 
the information gathering functions, while also calibrating the evaluation practices, and 
providing aggregate indicators concerning the coherence and adequacy of the risk framing 
foundation/worldview. The combination between these operations, inputs, and attributes 
serves as a foundation for the modular knowledge claim configuration proposed to achieve 
adaptive epistemic strategies (introduce variation, and identify/replicate success). Through 
the literature on knowledge claim evaluation approaches, the descriptive and inferential 
dimensions of risk analysis were identified as interlinked yet distinct. This presents an ability 
to distinguish between the descriptive efficacy of the representational models informing the 
later stages of risk analysis, and the utility of subsequent inferential procedures relying on 
specific configuration of descriptive knowledge claims, which serve as the output of risk 
analysis. As a result, the relationship between the descriptive and inferential dimensions of 
risk analysis can be evaluated from the perspective of specific outcomes, as a basis for 
adaptive efforts.  
 
While the mitigation of specific cognitive biases derived from the literature review, i.e. 
hindsight bias, is explicitly addressed by the previous chapter, the framework more generally 
addresses bias as a failure of heuristic attributes, both at a systemic and a behavioural level. 
As a result, mitigation is seen as a function to identify heuristic failures at the level of specific 
epistemic operations, and relies on an adaptive mechanism able to generate alternatives 
(variety), while leveraging positive feedback. An important emergent function of the 
additional epistemic layer proposed by the framework, is described as a meta-cognitive 
analogue — an epistemic awareness of inferential acumen/performance able to distinguish 
between inherent uncertainty and procedural and, more broadly, informational failures. 
Through the introduction of lifecycle specific epistemic metrics which feed into the CSA and 
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the Framing functions, anomalies, expected performance levels, and improvement areas can 
be highlighted in a contextually anchored, evolving manner. As a result, the Adaptive 
Information System model, through its explicit system of knowledge claim encoding and 
evaluation, can be used to support, assess, and adapt the efficacy and scope of knowledge-
sharing practices throughout the epistemic network, while framing the performance of the 
cybersecurity function in a wider organisational context.  
 
5.2.9 Framework Implementation Applicability 
 
Despite the fact that the previous chapters have addressed the framework from a primarily 
theoretical/conceptual perspective — i.e. a step removed from implementation — the 
potential implementation-level applicability of the proposed interpretation of Adaptive Cyber 
Risk Management has also been considered throughout its stages of development. This will 
be briefly explored in three dimensions: Compatibility with existing frameworks and 
guidelines; Flexibility to varied organisational settings; and, Utility at an implementation level. 
It must be highlighted that the following is structured as a commentary. Subsequently, it aims 
to clarify and support the previous sections, and reflects the researcher assumptions and 
intentionality at the time of writing. Each of the points raised can potentially be subjected to 
amendment as a result of follow-up empirical work.  
 
From a compatibility perspective, the framework was constructed to support, supplement, 
and expand the scope of existing risk management practice. As a result, it avoids rigid 
methodological prescription and highly context-specific guidance, while also avoiding 
emphasis on Cyber Risk Management areas which are either not directly affected by the 
theoretical/empirical findings (i.e. risk treatment strategies), or are exhaustively covered by 
industry standards (i.e. threat/risk taxonomies, likelihood evaluation approaches). 
Furthermore, through its conceptual framing (Panarchy/hierarchical coevolutionary 
organisational-environment relationship) the output shares the definition of cyber risk, and 
its nested character within enterprise risk with the major industry standards covered in 
Appendix 5. Through its functions, the framework enables both the ISO/IEC (2018) and the 
NIST (2012) risk management process, while expanding the speed, scope and structure of the 
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inter and intra process feedback. And, while it has not been a focus of the study, the 
framework and its underpinning theory could assist with managing other, similarly volatile 
dimensions of enterprise risk in a holistic manner. Given its mechanism-oriented formulation 
process, the framework is designed as a guide rather than a rigid structure to adhere to. As a 
result, in addition to a functional overview, it provides direct references to additional 
supporting documentation and literature for each construct it employs (e.g. Cyber Situational 
Awareness). While limiting the depth of prescription, this non-specificity enables greater 
implementation level flexibility, and avoids a potentially restrictive interpretation of key 
concepts.  
 
Given its mechanism-centred approach, the framework is relatively context agnostic. While 
the scope of a potential implementation is indeed likely to be largely shaped by its specific 
organisational context (scale/structure/operational model), the functions and their 
relationships are seen as broadly applicable, assuming a susceptibility to cyber risks, and a 
formal risk management process. So, a limited version of the framework can be implemented 
even in organisations which are either small, or operate in a low hostility cybersecurity 
climate. In such settings, the use of Adaptive Cyber Risk Management proposes the 
integration of adaptive mechanisms, an systematic approach to support cyber risk centric 
communication, and the development of a formal approach to gauge the sustained validity 
of framing assumptions and representational models. Thus, it can mitigate against changes 
in threat climate and operational model, while also providing the means to gauge decision 
maker bias/shared representational model adequacy on the topic of cyber risk. It should be 
noted that this is a point of conceptual departure from the interpretation of Adaptive Risk 
Management found in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (2018), where the term is used to 
denote the top implementation tier, and is thus applicable to a subset of the organisational 
population. While not in direct conflict, the proposed interpretation of the term entails a 
mechanism for bias and (domain) complexity mitigation through adaptive epistemic 
structures, which aim to highlight the effects of ‘unknown unknowns’ and support the 
sustainability of existing risk practices. Thus, they support a dynamic understanding risk 
appetite, and decrease the potential scope of incidents due to unforeseen, inadequately 
assessed, or changing risks. Subsequently, when combined with a flexible formulation, the 
proposed framework is seen as widely applicable to a variety of organisational contexts, as it 
 
179 
accommodates variety in the scope and structure of each interpretation.  
 
Finally, the implementation-level utility of the framework has been argued for throughout 
section 5. A summary of the main points raised so far includes: an explicit set of strategies 
and epistemic functions to address the highlighted domain specific complexity; an adaptive 
mechanism supported by an explicit emphasis on input-process-outcome epistemic 
configurations which underpin the targeted variation, and success replication efforts 
required; a process for heuristic formulation and calibration/adaptation through positive 
feedback, which addresses bias at both a decision-maker and at a systemic level; an transition 
towards explicit heuristic formulations, emergence and coevolutionary hierarchies for both 
explanatory and inferential operations, better informing decision makers. Based on its 
theoretical underpinning, the framework plays a direct role in building contextually adequate 
assumptions about ‘rational’ actors in risk analysis, from a dual perspective — as decision 
makers, and as causal drivers of incidents/systemic behaviour. More broadly, it provides an 
evolving procedural structure which identifies high-performing epistemic configurations and 
pathways through positive feedback. This presents users with an ability to reinforce 
organisational learning efforts with a systematic history of the relationship between 
outcomes and epistemic configurations, including specific sources, interpretations, data 
fusion procedures, and so on. Finally, given its reliance on positive feedback and explicit 
epistemic progression pathway reinforcement, aspects of the framework could benefit from 
automation and machine learning/artificial intelligence (i.e. KCE validation and formulation 
criteria/configuration selection through machine learning). As a result, the study could 
contribute towards the development of novel technical solutions to support organisational 





6. Conclusion  
6.1 Objectives and Findings 
 
Organisational cybersecurity is a multifaceted, trans-disciplinary, emerging domain of 
academic enquiry with distinct attributes and challenges for practitioners. Amongst the latter 
lie under-explored epistemic barriers that are specific to the domain, and affect construct-
assisted foresight and adaptation efforts. The previous chapters have aimed to critically 
explore this premise as a rationale for enquiry that was formulated through two interacting 
structural/heuristic metaphors: the cybersecurity ‘context-construct gap’, and the 
‘knowledge-problem’. This has entailed a theoretical analysis of the research context as the 
basis for building the conceptual framework (sections 1 and 2), an empirical investigation 
consisting of an embedded critical realist case study (sections 3 and 4), and a prescriptive 
dimension where the emerging narrative is used to conceptualise an Adaptive Cyber Risk 
Management framework in response to the identified problems (section 5). 
 
The research objectives are also approached in a structurally clustered manner and support 
the overarching aim through the three dimensions: theoretical, empirical, and prescriptive. 
Objective ‘0’ was met through the theoretical analysis/literature review conducted in section 
two, resulting in a multi-granular conceptual framework which also informed the nature, logic 
and topics of enquiry. Objectives 1 and 2 were both met through the methodology chapter, 
which enabled grounding the scope of empirical enquiry in an explicit philosophy and 
developing a conceptually-consistent research strategy, and through the multi-level 
embedded case-study. Subsequently, the case data enabled the calibration/validation of 
theoretically postulated mechanisms, while also indirectly providing an empirical grounding 
to the ‘knowledge-problem’ and the ‘context-construct’ heuristics. Finally, through the 
theoretical and empirical foundation of the study, objective 3 was addressed in Section 5, in 
the form of a novel framework for Adaptive Cyber Risk Management that is predicated on 





6.2 Contribution and Implications 
 
The study’s contribution to knowledge is primarily theoretical, with significant practical 
implications. Firstly, it addresses a literary knowledge gap for phenomenon-based, trans-
disciplinary theory which converges with empirical findings as the basis for prescription in 
organisational cybersecurity. In this sense, the heterogeneous conceptual framework 
provides an early theoretical contribution towards developing a multi-granular conceptual 
toolkit which can advance enquiry within the field. Due to the attributes of the case setting, 
the availability of context data, the plurality of perspectives captured, and the efforts made 
to represent event hierarchy/verticality, the case itself provides an arguably important 
empirical contribution towards the organisational cybersecurity literature. Given the relative 
novelty of cybersecurity as a meta-technical area of organisational concern and academic 
study, the research is among the first which aims to address the inferential dynamics of the 
domain through multi-level, in-depth case-work. Furthermore, the merits and implications of 
an epistemic view of organisational cybersecurity have been argued throughout the thesis, 
which serves as an initial contribution in this line of enquiry. Most notably, it enables going 
beyond the ‘human’ and the ‘technical’ dichotomous division of cybersecurity management, 
towards a holistic direction where the emergent potential of the interaction between these 
two aspects is addressed through an epistemic common denominator. 
 
Secondly, from the perspective of its main heuristic/structural metaphors, the study 
presents a diagnosis and a bottom-up organisational cybersecurity-specific analysis of the 
‘context-construct’ gap. In this sense, it goes beyond previous efforts of acknowledging the 
significance of systemic complexity in cybersecurity, or the extent of the behavioural 
variability presented by actors for inferential constructs. Instead, it provides an integrated 
approach rooted in a series of ontological mechanisms which are found to be significant in 
driving domain dynamics and tendencies. Given the modularity and the explicit chain of 
inferences presented by the conceptual framework, it presents a promising, malleable 




The organisational ‘knowledge-problem’ is also explicitly targeted through the proposed 
conceptualisation of the Adaptive Cyber Risk Management framework, which aims to 
maximise epistemic adaptivity, develop a functional ’meta-cognition’ analogue, increase the 
responsiveness to time-sensitive positive feedback streams, and enable knowledge operation 
differentiation (i.e. description vs. prediction) in a manner that can be calibrated to both the 
resources and the levels of uncertainty faced by individual organisations. Thus, through 
Adaptive Cyber Risk Management, additional epistemic vectors for the measurement of 
competing risk eventualities are integrated in the analytical process in a manner that is locally 
adaptive and suited to the variability and heterogeneity of cybersecurity events. This presents 
an opportunity for a more nuanced representational system of cyber risk which can 
evolutionarily select for locally fit information streams, heuristics, practices and procedures, 
while also illustrating potential deficiencies in inferential performance. 
 
Organisational cybersecurity management practice can also benefit from the functional 
framing and findings of the case-study. By providing a clear link between problem diagnosis 
and framing, postulated explanation, empirical description and inferred prescription, the 
proposed Adaptive Cyber Risk Management framework can accommodate additional 
investigation, inputs, and setting-specific adaptation efforts. Finally, the applicability of the 
findings is rooted in their mechanism-oriented generality. This means that the framework can 
be operationalised in a wide variety of organisational settings by adjusting it to the local 
manifestation of its underpinning mechanisms. It should be noted that while the proposed 
interpretation of Adaptive Cyber Risk Management is practice oriented, its formulation within 
the context of the study was not geared for direct implementation. Instead, the link between 
arch-structures, components and mechanisms was emphasised, which entails a higher 
degree of abstraction than a methodological, practitioner-oriented framework.  
 
6.3 Limitations and Further Study 
 
In spite of the significant levels of institutional support and access made available for the 
study, some pragmatic constraints were faced due to the nature of the project. Given the 
role of doctoral structures and processes, the research was conducted under defined 
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operational boundaries, including duration, scope, and resources. Such constraints are both 
unavoidable and, in this context, potentially useful for defining the boundaries of the 
investigation. Concerning the research outputs, as the trade-off between 
abstraction/generality and implementation specificity is inherent given the nature of the 
knowledge-gap addressed by the study, an emerging operational limitation is that the scope 
of the framework is a step removed from practice. This also presents an opportunity for 
further developing Adaptive Cyber Risk Management in a manner that is directly addressed 
to practitioners. In addition, methodologically, the single in-depth study can be 
supplemented with comparative case data as an opportunity for additional testing and 
calibrating the outlined mechanisms, while exploring their implications in various operational 
settings. The study also presents technological development opportunities for 
products/applications, i.e. to support the Adaptive Information System architecture 
suggested by the framework. Beyond the broad conceptual fit, gauging the feasibility of the 
output as a foundation for adaptive cyber risk management technologies requires further 
study.  
 
Generally, the proposed direction of enquiry — a phenomenon-based view of 
organisational cybersecurity management, and the subsequent role of ACRM — requires 
additional perspectives on the descriptive claims put forward, and on the comparative 
pragmatic value derived from the study’s prescriptive outputs. The former entails a 
conceptual exploration of the study’s core framing and premises, and their descriptive merits, 
i.e. representational fidelity of the organisational cybersecurity function as a dimension of a 
systemic hierarchy. Most notably, this would benefit from a shift in the context of the study 
by exploring the merits of the explanatory lens in varied organisations, sectors and even 
nations. Such a pluralistic perspective could introduce dimensions of analysis aiming to 
strengthen the generalisability of the theoretical framework. In contrast, the latter entails an 
implementation-level evaluation of the principles put forward. This raises an emerging 
research area: bridging the framework’s current conceptual form, and an application-
oriented interpretation. More specifically, valuable implementation-level contributions could 
be made addressing operational context-dependencies such as: considerations for context 
specific compliance with regulatory bodies and standards; gauging the local effects of 
variables such as organisational scale, operational model, and macro context; establishing 
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the compatibility with wider governance frameworks; identifying emerging barriers and 
implementation difficulties; and presenting potential emergent limitations of an ACRM 
implementation. 
 
A direct structural/methodological implication of the approach used to develop the 
Adaptive Cyber Risk Management framework is the absence of an explicit post-formulation 
validation stage (an issue also discussed in section 3.3.3.5). This is a product of several 
interacting dimensions of the study, which include the relationship between the theoretical 
analysis and the empirical investigation, the philosophy, and the attributes of the area of 
enquiry. More specifically, the case-study supplements the initial literary/theoretical analysis 
as a process of empirical exploration, calibration and validation of axiomatic assumptions and 
macro observations. However, the subsequent framework does not attempt to resolve a 
setting-specific problem, and instead is predicated on the case-moderated conceptualisation 
of interacting mechanisms as a source of validity. While the mechanism postulation process 
used to link the case data to a non-case specific framework is compatible with the research 
philosophy and methodology, it presents a potential point of wider contention and can be 
seen as a significant limitation. Indeed, the line of reasoning is not one of generalising the 
anecdotal, but of inferring mechanisms based on the intersection between macro-
tendencies, theory (both covered in the literature review), and an exemplary case. Thus, 
neither the explanatory model nor the proposed framework result solely from the case study, 
and neither exclusively address case-specific dynamics. Subsequently, case participants 
provide at best a limited vector of prescriptive validation. Furthermore, establishing the (non-
inferred) pragmatic ‘validity’ of a heuristic construct entails evaluating its comparative 
implementation performance. This introduces a series of causally significant 
variables/contingencies ranging from the attributes of the implementation, to the orientation 
of the framework, epistemic attributes of the events faced, metrics of performance, and the 
comparative baseline expectations. Such practical challenges to experimental design are 
common in real world settings, and while they exceed the pragmatic boundaries of the thesis, 
they also present an opportunity for follow-up research. 
 
Finally, given the cross-disciplinary approach taken, some of the key terms used throughout 
the study could cause potential confusion due to a variation in their contextual meaning. For 
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example, terms such as ‘adaptive’ (cyber risk management) are used in accordance to 
contextually defined parameters, in the absence of a monolithic conceptual lineage to adhere 
to. While efforts have been made to ensure a theoretically rigorous interpretation of adaptive 
mechanisms within the context of Cyber Risk Management practice, the term ‘adaptive’ 
could conceivably be used as a methodological qualifier which indicates different dimensions 
than those suggested in earlier chapters — particularly under the colloquial interpretation of 
‘adaptation’. In light of this, efforts have been made to identify and address such instances in 
relation to the interpretation used within the project (e.g. In section 5.2, where preceding, 
varied literary interpretations of ‘adaptive risk management’ are briefly described). This same 
multi-disciplinary approach presents opportunities for methodological advancement in 
cybersecurity management. Based on the research framing, there is a methodological 
opportunity at the intersection between complexity studies and behavioural sciences . This 
convergence point presents methodological avenues which, while not deemed appropriate 
or feasible for the current study, are promising and potentially innovative in addressing 
organisational cyber risk questions. For example, this includes the potential of integrating 
experiments for agent-level insight, and agent-based models for exploring systemic 
tendencies and emergent trends in Adaptive Risk Management problems.  
 
6.4 Research Journey 
 
The attempt to engage the topic of organisational cybersecurity management in a flexible 
manner across disciplines, scales, and frames of analysis has yielded a tumultuous journey. 
As the discipline-agnostic nature of the research problem became clear, establishing an 
adequate methodology able to capture and engage the applied manifestations of the core 
constructs and mechanisms has involved many cycles of trial and error. Unsuccessful 
iterations have included attempts to explore the dynamics of the problem through 
techniques ranging from Agent-Based Modeling, which is native to Systems/Complexity 
science, supplemented by behavioural questionnaires, to a Soft Systems Methodological 
approach in a critical infrastructure setting. While all (except one) have at least partly failed 
to yield the desired output, each iteration of the research narrative is in some way embedded 
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into the thesis, having brought to light new issues and aspects which, once addressed, 
became part of the subsequent problem framing.  
 
Another significant challenge has been the construction of a heuristic structure able to 
support and communicate the potential complementarity of otherwise heterogenous 
constructs. The need summarise to stakeholders how an epistemic focus of organisational 
cyber risk management must also account for a behavioural dimension introduced by 
‘rational’ actors in socio-technical systems, and for the patterns, tendencies, and attributes 
introduced by the complex interaction dynamics within said systems has placed significant 
pressures for the selection of efficient language, constructs and metaphors. Again, through 
trial and error, some ways of framing the narrative presented themselves as more effective 
than others. Similarly, while the conceptual lenses used to discuss the research problem have 
initially introduced a large number of associated constructs, as the project matured, most 
were eliminated.  
 
The logic of a ‘knowledge problem’ seemed axiomatic through its counterfactual: a 
hypothetical organisational environment where cybersecurity decisions and strategy are not 
bottlenecked by epistemic considerations is one where traditional management and/or risk-
based conceptual tools/models offer consistent and sufficient inferential support, leading to 
reasonably predictable and manageable outcomes. In contrast, the anecdotal and aggregate 
evidence concerning the role and attributes of cybersecurity efforts indicate a very different 
organisational dynamic than that postulated in this counterfactual. By following this line of 
enquiry, a picture of the relationship between objectives, mechanisms and epistemic 
structures which underpin this epistemic hostility is formed. Subsequently, a more general, 
theoretical problem is inferred: a gap between the emerging description/explanation of the 
context dynamics and the embedded assumptions of risk frameworks which are reiterations 
of approaches native to other traditional facets of risk. This diagnosis in itself has been 
problematic — given the plethora of risk frameworks, any reference to a monolithic approach 
is susceptible to exceptions and imprecision. Nonetheless, the effort to highlight and address 
the necessity for adequately representing the epistemic dynamics of organisational 
cybersecurity in prescriptive constructs/frameworks has been expressed through the 
‘context-construct gap’ heuristic. By the end of the project’s lifecycle, an explicit line of 
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philosophical, theoretical and empirical claims have been made to conceptualise the study’s 
contributions. These are also an expression of researcher growth as an iterative process of 
trial and error, and express future research ambitions which could assess, validate, and 
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Appendix 1: Informed Consent Form 
Conceptualising Adaptive Cyber Risk Management: 
 
 
Project Summary: Organisations face unprecedented pressures to defend their assets base, while leveraging 
technology in order to maximise and sustain value generation. The effective formulation of Cybersecurity 
Management strategy, which generally relies on risk frameworks, is predicated on an overarching knowledge 
problem: how can the net benefits of cyber presence be maximised without exposing the organisation to 
unforeseen existential threats? The current project aims to conceptualise a Risk based framework addressing 
the Knowledge-Uncertainty dimension of cybersecurity management through a meta-analysis of current 
approaches, an empirical investigation of the problem in a complex organisational environment, and the 
development of an alternative chain of inference regarding operational assumptions to account for non-linear 
dynamics, bound rationality, and meta-disciplinary novel risk perspectives. Following the literature review, six 
topics have been identified and used to guide data collection: Change/Dynamics, Rationality, Knowledge, 
Uncertainty, Risk and Adaptation. The empirical theory building process is inductive, following an embedded 
case study which aims to capture a hierarchy of actor perspectives in relation to the proposed topics. 
 
  Please initial 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet (insert 
version number) for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 








4. I understand that I also have the right to change my mind about participating in the 




5. I agree to be recorded and for anonymised quotes to be used as part of the 










Name of participant:    
 
 
Signature of participant:    
 
 









Appendix 2: Participant Information Sheet 




What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The project is a PhD thesis which aims to explore how cyber resilience and effective cybersecurity 
decision making can be supported through Adaptive Cyber Risk Management. More specifically, the 
models proposed within the study are designed to optimise how organisations navigate the 
uncertainty and predictive limitations which shape cybersecurity as a knowledge problem.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
 
You have been invited to contribute due to your role, experience and expertise with aspects of the 
research problem.  
 
How do I take part? 
 
Upon confirming your decision to participate in the study, you will be contacted to establish a 
favourable time and setting (i.e. e-mail, Skype, or face to face) for an interview. This interview will 
consist of a series of open questions, which have been formulated around six conceptual themes in 
relation to cybersecurity management: Change, Rationality, Knowledge, Uncertainty, Risk and 
Adaptation. Your views will be recorded and safely stored (using hardware encryption) while the data 
will be anonymised. The series of interviews will then be used to develop a study, which will 
supplement theory for the development of a conceptual framework for Adaptive Cyber Risk 
management.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No. Participation is on a purely voluntary basis. Furthermore, you can withdraw from the study at any 
point prior to 1st December 2017. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
Upon giving your explicit agreement to participate, you will be contacted via e-mail or telephone in 
order to establish a suitable date, time and place/platform (i.e. Skype, FaceTime, e-mail, or telephone) 
for the conversation/interview. Once the logistical details have been arranged, the interview can 
proceed, and is expected to last approximately 45 minutes.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
 
There are no foreseeable disadvantages or risks which could occur as a result of the participation 
Before collecting any notes or recordings, explicit consent will be sought, and all collected data will be 
kept confidentially, and encrypted (256 bit AES) prior to storage. Personal identification data will be 
anonymised. Furthermore, you are encouraged to skip any question which may lead to disclosing 




What are the possible advantages of taking part? 
 
In addition to providing a valuable contribution based on your expertise, electronic copies of the final 
project can be delivered to you at request, upon its completion.  
 
What if something goes wrong? 
 
In the event of any anomaly, or discomfort, the interview can be temporarily or permanently 
interrupted, based on the nature of the circumstances and the desire of the participants.  
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
While general attributes such as the primary area of expertise/parameters of the role will be kept to 
contextualise the feedback, no uniquely identifying personal information (i.e. Name, Age, or Affiliated 
Institution) of the participants will be disclosed or used within the study.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The data will be used for the purpose of informing a doctoral thesis and academic publication. 
 
 












Appendix 3: Interview Topics and Questions 
 
In order to obtain ethical approval and stakeholder feedback, the base set of questions aimed to be exhaustive 
and self-sufficient in terms of its direction/meaning. In practice, the interview narrative was adapted for each 
participant, based on their role and experience, as a way to support a conversational dynamic. Based on the 
early interviews, a colour coding framework was developed in order to be able to maintain structural consistency 
without relying on a set body of text. As a result, grey text covers question narrative and qualifiers, or low 
priority/efficacy questions; Black text highlights the full question body; Red text covers key words and questions, 
which can be identified at a glance in a conversation.   
 
Group 1: Strategy & Decision-making  
 
n Rationale of enquiry (Top-down view): How Cyber Risks are positioned in a wider decision-making 
context; How Risk Assessments are perceived and utilised to inform policy and action; How 
adaptation is pursued.  
 
Theme Questions 
Change • A unique attribute of cyberspace, and, implicitly cybersecurity (cyber risk), is the elimination 
of boundaries in space (geography) and time which would otherwise constrain possible 
interactions. As a result, organisations have to defend a highly dynamic asset base against 
an ever-changing set of cyber threats. Is this pace of change a concern for decision-making? 
Does it affect the implementation of existing decision support methods – i.e. risk 
management? 
• How do macro-governance/cyber policy initiatives impact the cybersecurity climate of (your) 
individual organisation(s)? How should they? 
• The issue of cyber resilience has been increasingly addressed as a priority for both 
organisational and national security. However, the number of organisations which have 
visibly collapsed due to a cyber incident is still limited. How do you perceive cyber resilience, 
in relation to organisational resilience? 
• Available figures – i.e. aggregate cost of cyber incidents to the economy, or average annual 
cost for organisations – indicate a sense of predictive consistency and linearity. Nonetheless, 
when looking at attribution and forensics at an incident level, it seems that, absent hindsight, 
defenders face a much less consistent reality. How predictable are cybersecurity 
phenomena? Is there a discrepancy between different levels (macro/micro)? 
• There are a number of conflicting views concerning the nature of cybersecurity assessments. 
For example, a mechanistic view entails a problem which can be deconstructed into its 
components without significantly diminishing the effectiveness of the analysis, whereas a 
holistic perspective would indicate that such a deconstruction would neglect essential 
features of the system as a whole. Which, in your view, is a more adequate approach? 
• Within your industry, to what extent do you perceive the cybersecurity phenomena faced 
by your institution as general, or context-specific?  
Rationality • Does intuition play a role in cybersecurity strategy formulation and decision making? Should 
it? Can intuitive contributions be distinguished and (retrospectively) evaluated?  
• The literature on the use of Heuristics/Rules-of-thumb in situations of deep uncertainty is 
divided, placing them as both potentially effective in situations of uncertainty, particularly 
within the context of strategy, as well as a source of potential bias. How do you view the use 
of Heuristics within Cybersecurity decision-making?   
• Are biases and perceptual limitations an explicit concern for decision making? (If yes: how 
are they mitigated against)? 
• Assumptions are a key part of modeling and mitigating uncertainty. In your view, how 
relevant is the externalisation of assumptions outside of the risk analysis/modeling stage? 
• How can cybersecurity risk outputs be best communicated, given their abstract nature, 





Knowledge • How relevant is cybersecurity knowledge for organisations within your industry? How can 
such knowledge be acquired?  
• How would you position sector-wide cybersecurity knowledge availability in relation to other 
aspects of organisational risk? 
• What are the key criteria one could use for validating such knowledge? 
• Can the strength of the knowledge used to generate various risk assessments be 
differentiated? Does such a differentiation play an explicit part of the decision-making 
process?  
• Knowledge sharing has been presented as a potential method of mitigating the uncertainty 
faced by organisations in relation to their cybersecurity. However, given the sensitive nature 
of the information that would need to be shared for this to be useful, the adoption of such 
measures is still not significant in many industries/regions. Is knowledge sharing feasible 
within your context? To what extent? (stakeholders, or wider industry) 
Uncertainty • When compared to other aspects of organisational decision-making, how would you classify 
the uncertainty faced within cybersecurity management? Why? 
• What approaches for uncertainty mitigation could prove to be effective within your 
industry? (i.e risk/resilience management)  
• In your view, how would you expect this uncertainty to evolve in the near/mid-term? Why? 
Risk • Risk frameworks are presented by industry research bodies as the dominant approach for 
driving Cybersecurity Management efforts. In spite of their popularity, they also have critics 
who question the utility of risk concepts in given the extent of the uncertainty faced by 
decision makers in Cybersecurity. How would you assess the utility of risk frameworks in 
your organisation’s context, based on your role and experience?  
• What role do Risk frameworks play within the scope of the wider decision-making 
landscape?  
• Can an effective implementation of Risk be distinguished from less effective alternatives? 
How?  
Adaptation • To what extent do macro-environmental trends (i.e changes in threat patterns, or additional 
support through policy) affect the local ‘reality’ faced by your institution/industry? In what 
ways? 
• What distinguishes, in your view, an effective Cybersecurity strategy? 
• What potential sources/strategies of feedback inform the evaluation of strategic 
performance?   
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Group 1*: Decision Making and Sector Oversight  
 
n Rationale of enquiry (Macro-view): How sector wide bodies perceive and engage with 
Cybersecurity phenomena; their role and the scope of their support; their experience with 





Theme Questions/Topics of Discussion 
Change • Role of [Oversight Bodies] in relation to sector CS; 
• Perception of CS in the sector– Change/Evolving; 
• In your experience, how is CS viewed by HE/FE institutions? Is it Homogenous? Is it 
Changing? 
Rationality • Communicating Risk: Given its abstract nature, how can Risk be communicated effectively? 




• What does CS Knowledge look like across institutions? 
• How can it be validated/evaluated (strength of knowledge)? 
• Level of Uncertainty faced by Decision makers; 
Risk • What is the prevalence of Risk Frameworks at a sector level? 
• What sets apart an effective implementation of Risk Management? 
Adaptation • What sets apart an effective CS Strategy? 
• What sources and strategies of feedback are in the relationship between [Oversight Body] 
and individual institutions? 
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Group 2: Risk & Analysis 
 
n Rationale of enquiry: How Cybersecurity decision-making is supported; How Risk outputs are 
conceptualized; How uncertainty is analysed and managed.   
 
Theme Questions 
Change • At an interdisciplinary level, the popularity of ‘Risk’-based constructs has gained significant 
momentum throughout the last decades. However, this has produced a variety of 
approaches to risk, which depend on its disciplinary/industrial context. Do you view 
Cybersecurity as a distinct application-setting for Risk thinking? In what ways? 
• What are the most defining trends which, in your view, shape current Cybersecurity 
practices. How have these changed throughout your experience with Risk?  
• Factors such as the interdependencies, high pace and non-locality which characterise the 
interaction between actors in Cyberspace indicate highly complex potential interaction 
patterns/scenarios. How can Risk practitioners mitigate against unmanageable complexity? 
• Converting a continuous phenomenon into discrete sections can be important for 
structured decision making and modeling. However, it can also lead to the misidentification 
of patterns and regularities. Can the variable pace of change/system dynamics be 
accounted for in Cyber Risk assessments? How?  
• One of the defining features of Cyber Risk is the disproportionality between cause and 
effect. Seemingly small actions and vulnerabilities can lead to very significant effects. Is this 
disproportionality apparent in your experience? How does it affect the Risk modeling 
process?  
Rationality • What is your perception concerning the role of intuition in the risk assessment process? Can 
it be explicitly used as an input? 
• In your experience, is the chain of inference (sequence of logical steps and assumptions 
used to construct a risk assessment) made explicit? If yes, is it used to inform decision 
making by actors outside of the process? 
• In his analysis of the 2008 financial crisis, the Executive Direct of of Financial Stability for 
the bank of England (Haldane 2009) has attributed the lack of foresight concerning the 
likelihood of such an event to an oversimplified representation of rationality and behaviour 
in Risk Analysis models. How can a Risk analyst model human behaviour and rationality? 
Can Risk models account for biases and irrationality?  
Knowledge • In your view, how important is an organisation’s Cybersecurity knowledge base for Risk 
Assessments? What sources could be used for knowledge base Supplementation/growth?  
• Can Knowledge strength be distinguished as part of the Cyber Risk Assessment process? 
How?  
• Are external information feeds available for the Cyber Risk Analyst? Are they useful? From 
this perspective (information feeds), how does Cyber Risk compare to other areas of 
organisational risk? 
• What role does Information System Design play in relation to Cyber Risk Management – 
more specifically, the production and communication of knowledge?  
• How can real-time Cyber Situational Awareness be integrated with Cyber Risk 
Management?  
 
Uncertainty • Is the uncertainty faced by Cybersecurity Risk Analysts distinct form other facets of 
organisational risk? If yes, how?  
• What are the main challenges which derived from the uncertainty faced within 
Cybersecurity Risk Modeling and Strategy formulation?  
• Significant efforts are made for the development of resources (products and services) 
designed to manage uncertainty within cybersecurity. On the other hand, the growing 
infrastructure of interconnected devices can indicate an increased attack surface, with new 
potential vectors of attack. In your view,  how will the uncertainty that cyber risk analysts 





Risk • In spite of some consistencies, the meaning of Risk and Risk Management can vary based 
on the context of its application. How would you define Cyber Risk? How about Cyber Risk 
Management?  
• Do you find quantitative or qualitative approaches to Risk Assessments as more suitable 
within the context of Cybersecurity? (if qualitative: How can subjectivity be mitigated? Are 
there any communication challenges imposed by the abstract nature of the topic? If 
quantitative: What is the efficacy of probabilistic techniques? How can data reliability be 
strengthened?) 
• The actual cybersecurity incidents track-record of organisations can largely depend on the 
specific threats they have faced, which blurs the use of ‘number of incidents’ as a direct 
metric of performance. How can ‘good’ implementations of Cybersecurity Risk Frameworks 
be identified? 
Adaptation • Adaptation, Resilience and Risk are tacitly presented as interlinked in a range of 
Cybersecurity policy initiatives. Based on your experience, are these concepts related? In 
what ways? 
• What is the role of feedback for the Risk Analyst? What is the basis of potential feedback?  
• Based on your perception, what are some of the current developments which are likely to 
push the utility of Cyber Risk frameworks forward? 
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Group 3: General Actors  
 
n Rationale of enquiry (Bottom-up view): How general staff (i.e. with no direct Cybersecurity 
decision-making oversight) perceive Cyber Risks; How their perception of cybersecurity within 





Change • Increased efforts from governing bodies, media coverage and a series of high-visibility 
incidents have raised the awareness concerning the potential effects of Cybersecurity 
breaches. Do you perceive cybersecurity to be of concern within your role? In what ways?  
• Are your computing choices (i.e. software selection) and behaviour autonomous, or are they 
the result of institutional policy? What is your perceived degree of freedom of choice 
concerning your ‘cyber’ behaviour, in relation to your role?  
• Have there been any noticeable changes in the norms, role, or day to day action due to 
Cybersecurity efforts/concerns?  
Rationality • As part of Risk Assessments, the various systems, roles and actors (employees) within an 
organisation are evaluated in order to identify vulnerabilities, and estimate the impact of 
potential breaches. In order to manage the complexity of this process, assumptions and 
models are often used. What aspects of your role, if any, do you perceive as prone to 
misrepresentation within a Risk Analysis? 
• Given its inherent dichotomies, such as system accessibility and security, Cybersecurity can 
rely on nuanced choices which balance the potential gains of an action with the potential 
costs/ramifications. Do you view intuition as a potentially effective selection mechanism for 
such choices? Rules of Thumb? 
• How would you describe the Cybersecurity climate/culture within the industry? 
Risk • Is Cybersecurity a criterion for your choices in technological behaviour? How can you 
validate a specific choice from a Cybersecurity perspective?  
• Have you ever noticed cyber vulnerabilities in the systems, processes or individuals that you 
interact with? Are you confident in your ability to identify and report relevant changes and 
anomalies? 
• How do you perceive the current sector-wide cybersecurity risk climate? 
Adaptation • A key pre-requisite for adaptation is the replication of effective behaviour. Within your role, 
how can one distinguish effective cybersecurity practice? 
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Appendix 4. Ethics Form 
 




Appendix 5. A Risk-Centric Overview of Relevant Industry Standards 
& Frameworks 
 
5.a) ISO/IEC 27000 Family 
 
Overview – (International) Information Security Management Systems Standards; 
ISMS: “consists of the policies, procedures, guidelines, and associated resources and activities collectively 
managed by an organization, in the pursuit of protecting its information assets. An ISMS is a systematic approach 
for establishing, implementing, operating, monitoring, reviewing, maintain and improving an organization’s 
information security to achieve business objectives. It is based on a risk assessment and the organization’s risk 
acceptance levels designed to effectively treat and manage risks.” (ISO/IEC /IEC 27000 2018:11) 
 
Risk Conceptualisation: effect of uncertainty (deficiency of information related to, understanding or knowledge 
of, an event, its consequence, or likelihood); 
 
Context – Risk management as a ‘Planning’ dimension of Information Security Management Systems; 
Information Security specific implementation of ‘Risk’; consistent with ISO/IEC 31000 – ‘Risk Management’ 
family of standards; 
 
Risk management process (loop): 
(based on ISO/IEC 27005* Guidelines):  
• Risk identification: Assets; Threats; Existing Controls; Vulnerabilities; and, Consequences 
• Risk Analysis: Qualitative (scale for consequences and likelihood); Quantitative (measures & data for 
consequences and likelihood) 
• Risk Assessment: Relevant scenario considered based on previous dimensions; Outcomes assessed 
based on effects in asset confidentiality, integrity or availability;  
• Risk Evaluation: Risk values compared to previously set evaluation and acceptance criteria  
• Risk Treatment: Controls for based on risk modification (reduction), retention, avoidance, and sharing 
strategies; Yields residual risk. 
 
Notes: 
27005:2011 (second version)*/ Informed literature review, data collection, and framework development; 
Conceptually consistent with the third version of the standard. 
27005:2018 (third version) –  based on ‘asset, threat, and vulnerability’ risk identification method – no longer 
required by ISO/IEC 27001; 
NIST SP 800-12 and 800-30 included in the bibliography of ISO/IEC 27005:2018; 
Thesis discussion incorporates related standards: 
ISO/IEC 27000:2018 – Overview and Vocabulary 
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 – Requirements (Information Security Management Systems) 
ISO/IEC 27005 – Information Security Risk Management (Guideline) 
 
 
5.b) NIST SP 800(-39:2011/-30:2012) – Managing Information Security Risk & 
Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments  
 
Overview: (US Based) SP 800 Series – “guidelines, recommendations, technical specifications, annual reports” 
addressed towards the “computer security community”; 
Guidance publications; 
SP 800-39 ‘Managing Information Security Risk’ 
SP 800-30 ‘Guide to Conducting Risk Assessments’ -- aimed to ‘amplify the guidance’ in SP 800-39, specifically 




Context: Risk management presented as Multi-tiered:  
• Organisation View: Governance, Risk Executive Role, Risk Management Strategy, Investment strategies 
• Mission/Business Process View: Risk Aware Business Processes, Enterprise Architecture, Information 
Security Architecture 
• Information Systems View: Integrated Risk Management in Information Systems Lifecycle 
 
Risk Conceptualisation: “A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance 
or event”; Function of the impact of said event, and the likelihood of its occurrence; 
 
Risk Management Process:  
• Frame: Describe context, and establish a risk management strategy for the following stages; 
• Assess*: Identify the Threats, Vulnerabilities, Harm/Impact (if threats exploit vulnerabilities), and 
Likelihood;  
• Respond: Develop organisation-wide response to risk frame – Develop alternative courses of action, 
evaluate alternatives, determine appropriate action, and implement the selected response; 
• Monitor: Determine effectiveness of responses, Identify relevant changes to the information systems 




*Risk Assessment methodology further elaborated in SP 800-30, as a product of the Organizational Risk Frame, 
to include Risk Assessment process, Risk Models, Assessment approach and Analysis approach; Compatible with 
pluralistic risk assessment methodologies based on time frame, the complexity and maturity of the business 
process, the stage of the information system in its development lifecycle, and the sensitivity/importance of the 
information/information system; 
References ISO/IEC 31000, 31010, 27001, 27005 – explicit goal for the ‘harmonization of standards’, to reduce 
burden for organisations conforming to both ISO/IEC and NIST standards; 
No updates to the frameworks have been made throughout the duration of the study. 
 
5.c) NIST Cybersecurity Framework (Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity)– 2014 (v.1.0)/2018 (v.1.1) 
 
Overview: Risk-Centric Framework which presents a common structure for organising cybersecurity efforts 
through existing standards, guidelines, and practices.  
 
Context: Primarily focused on, but not restricted to, critical infrastructure organisations. Entails three 
components: 
• Framework Core – consists of concurrent and continuous functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, 
Respond, Recover; Each presents ‘Categories’ (function specific grouping of cybersecurity 
outcomes), ‘Subcategories’ (division of category into specific activities), and ‘Informative 
References’ (documentation to support each subcategory); 
• Framework Tiers – describe the characteristics of the risk management approach chosen by 
the organisation. Consist of: ‘Partial’, ‘Risk Informed’, Repeatable’, and ‘Adaptive’; 
• Framework Profile – Alignment of the framework core with the organisational-specific risk 
context. Profile comparison (i.e. Current vs. Target) can underpin development plan. 
 
Risk Conceptualisation: NIST SP 800-*: “extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or 
event”. Function of likelihood and impact of said event. 
 
Risk Management Process: Describes risk management as an “… ongoing process of identifying, assessing and 
responding to risk”. No specific process included; instead, the framework aims to be compatible with “a broad 
array of cybersecurity management processes”, including ISO/IEC and NIST. 
 
Notes: References include ISO/IEC 31000, ISO/IEC 27001 & 27005, NIST SP 800-39, and COBIT 5. 
V 1.0 (2014) of the Framework informed the literature review and conceptual framework development. None 
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of the changes brought by version 1.1 (2018) are found to affect the validity/applicability of the sections 
referencing the framework.  
 
5.d) COBIT 2019 
 
Overview: ISACA Enterprise Level “I&T Governance Framework”/ Enterprise Governance of Information and 
Technology (EGIT); ‘IT Related’ Risk integral dimension of framework. 
 
Context:  
• Identifies Alignment to ‘Major Standards’ as a key principle for a governance framework, alongside it 
being ‘Based on a Conceptual Model’, and it being ‘Open and Flexible’;  
• IT-related risk integrated within enterprise risk management (emphasis on holism);  
• ‘Risk Profile’ alongside ‘Threat Landscape’ as an enterprise governance system design factor; Proposes 
IT 19 Risk Categories for establishing the Organisational Risk Profile; 
• Integrates ‘Ensured Risk Optimization’ as part of the Core Model Governance and Management 
Objectives and Purpose. 
 
Risk Conceptualisation: Implicit –  “Risk management focuses on the preservation of value”; Contrasted with 
value creation 
 
Risk Management Process:  
Management Objective AP012 – Managed Risk*: 
• Collect data: identify/collect data necessary for following risk identification, analysis and 
reporting; 
• Analyse risk**: gain ‘substantiated’ perspective concerning IT risk; 
• Maintain a risk profile: inventory of risks and attributes (frequency, impact, responses), as well 
as relevant resources, capabilities and controls for risk items; 
• Articulate risk: communicate relevant outputs to stakeholders; 
• Define a risk management action portfolio: manage risk reduction opportunities as a portfolio; 
• Respond to risk: timely response to materialised risk events. 
 
* includes example metrics, suggested activities, related guidance publications, and detailed references 
** consistent with ISO/IEC and NIST Risk Analysis: Likelihood/Impact per risk IT scenario, accounting for existing 
controls; 
 
Notes: Includes references to NIST SP 800-37/53, NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity, and ISO27000 family of standards 





Appendix 6. Data Analysis Excerpt 
 
I. Table of the nodes generated through the coding process:  
 
Name Sources References 
des.Effective CS - Decision Making and Strategy 10 13 
des.Awareness and Communication 10 22 
des.CS in Sector 8 21 
des.Institutional Risk Practices 8 26 
des.Communication Strategies 7 12 
des.CS Perception 7 20 
des.Institutional Change 6 8 
em.Attitude towards institution_leadership_culture 6 10 
des.Knowledge in CS_Definition 6 8 
des.Compliance 6 9 
hyp.Knowledge_Problem 6 12 
des.Rationality_Heuristics 6 8 
des.ICT Freedom of Choice 6 9 
des.Openness and Freedom 5 7 
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des.Adaptation and Adaptative Capacity 5 10 
  des.Feedback sources and strategies 8 11 
  des.HolisticvsMechanistic 4 6 
des.Rationality_Bias 5 9 
des.Role Transparency&Homogeneity 5 10 
des.Partners and Collaborators 4 18 
des.Risk - Effectiveness 4 11 
des.Knowledge in CS_Validation 4 6 
iv.Not-quite-there-yet 4 8 
iv.Need to change 4 7 
des.Uncertainty in CS 4 5 
des.Pace of Change 4 4 
em.Intuition_Positive 4 5 
em.Trust_Lack of 4 5 
des.CS Event Predictability 3 6 
des.Role of Macro Bodies 3 6 
  des.JANET 5 8 
 
220 
  des.Role of Macro Bodies_GDPR 4 7 
  des.[MACRO BODY] 1 13 
    des.[MACRO BODY] CCERT 1 2 
    iv.[MACRO BODY] Structure 1 3 
    iv.[MACRO BODY] History 1 1 
    des.[MACRO BODY] Process 1 1 
    iv.[MACRO BODY] Services 1 6 
hol.PrivacyvsSecurity 3 4 
des.Case Description 3 4 
  des.Anecdotal Evidence 10 58 
    des.Anecdotal Evidence - Vulnerability 10 29 
    des.Anecdotal Evidence_Computing Behaviour 7 9 
    des.Anecdotal Evidence_Threats 6 17 
    des.Anecdotal Evidence_EHS 3 3 
  atr.Role Description 8 13 
des.Risk - Definition 3 3 
des.Approaches to Change 3 3 
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des.Sector Comparison 2 3 
des.Security Paradigms 2 2 
  des.Security Dichotomies 7 12 
hol.Cultural Behaviour 2 2 
too reliable [reliant] on… on computers 2 2 
des.Defence Limitations 2 4 
iv.Own Device 2 2 
em.Emotions and Decision Making_Fear 1 1 
des.Business Ecosystem 1 2 
iv.Culture of security 1 1 
iv.The system has to be robust. 1 1 
des.Industry Change 1 1 
des.ENT 1 12 
 iv.Reactive Service_Enterprise 1 1 
 des.Case Description_Enterprise 1 8 
iv.ENT_own enterprise 1 2 
des.Stakeholders_ENT 1 1 
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iv.Challenge_for_the_leadership 1 1 
iv.Beyond IT 1 1 
iv.Cyber Citizenship 1 1 
iv.Business Architecture 1 1 
iv.Tools in IT Department 1 3 





II. Redacted* version of the matrix display; 
 
*The structure has been simplified and adapted to fit the appendix format; Actual quotations were excluded 
due to research ethics constraints (approval for direct quotation reserved solely for case narrative) and space 
considerations; The excerpt reflects a working document designed for internal use, and maintains acronyms, 
references to other documents and notes, keywords, and interview material; A complete (transposed) version 
of a sample of individual nodes has been included in the Data Analysis chapter. Additional nodes and quotations 
(i.e. In Vivo/Descriptive for the Case and for the Actors) were not included in the matrix, as they address 
individual instances/require no context/are self-sufficient/are anecdotal; but they have been included in the 
case narrative where deemed appropriate; The corresponding research objectives precede entries (i.e. 1.), and 
are further divided into subobjectives (i.e. 1.a)); Each node is followed with a respective aggregate nodes entry, 
which has been excluded from the table format.  
 
The redacted headers are consistent across the tables, and as a result have not been copied into individual 
nodes. These are: 
 




1. Identify how Knowledge relating to Cybersecurity is produced, used and adapted at 
various levels within an organisation 
 
1.a) How Cybersecurity Knowledge is Defined;  
 
Knowledge in 
CS - Definition 
Charlie 
AN: Knowledge unit 
varies based on 
audience 
Collectivist pragmatic perspective 
of knowledge; 'what it looks like' 
heavily determined by 
dissemination and assimilation 
mechanism. No universality in 
specialisation-based 
environments, instead 
contextuality is proposed. 





view of knowledge. 
Beyond that, "not 
important" 
(abstractly individualist) 
Collectivist pragmatic - relational 
perspective of knowledge. Given 
the high level of DM, individual 
issue depth of awareness is 
delegated. High level context and 
'relevant' awareness are instead 
favoured, which entails a reliance 
on organisational 
structure/hierarchy and 





AN: Knowledge as a 
function of experience, 
intuition and action. 
"Hands on" & "Grey 
matter" (Abstraction) 
Individualist pragmatic 
epistemology of operational actor 
(to be contrasted with DM's 
collectivist view). Knowledge as 
personal enabler of action -- 
function of previous experiences 
that were internalised to form 
intuition, which is deeply valued 
by interviewee. (! = Actor 
definitions of knowledge are 





Emphasis on probabilistic 
knowledge vs. truth "where 
breaches are likely to come". 
"Minimise the Unknown 
Unknowns" which is a theme. The 
UU paradigm only works on a 
foundation of pragmatism. 
Alex 
AN: CTO: Pragmatic, 
Collectivist, Risk Based. 
Functions of Knowledge 
in CS: Threat analysis 
(Outsourced), Internal 
operational awareness, 
and Paths of 
action/response. 
The description follows the T-V-
I+Response Risk Management 
structure. This patterns seems to 
indicate the permeation of risk 
constructs as heuristics in security 
thinking. Again, collaborative, 
pragmatic. Distinct emphasis on 
awareness of business functions 
for vulnerability understanding, 
impact estimates and adequate 
prescriptions. This emphasis 
seems role-based. Emphasis on 
regulatory knowledge indicates 
adaptive separation, yet it is still 
bundled. 
Rudy 
AN: IS/CS Practitioner 
Knowledge - Risk Based, 
Pragmatic, Collectivist 
Collectivist pragmatic 
epistemology, More specifically, 
knowledge is presented as 
enabling defence, and entails 
awareness of threats, vulnerability 
mitigation (training and policy 
development), and process (how 





Notes: The most common definition tends to be collectivist/pragmatist - but this seems 
skewed by the sample; Managers'/DMs responsibilities tend to have a meta-operational 
dimension to them, and involve coordinating a multitude of individuals and capabilities; In 
contrast, a less KI/highly specialised role would entail localised beliefs and abilities. However 
even such a role requires a context, and entails delegation of other tasks. 
 
1.b) How Cybersecurity Knowledge is Validated 
 
Knowledge in CS 
- Validity 
Charlie AN: Valid knowledge must be 'Up to Date' 
Temporality as a criterion for 
knowledge validation; Interviewee's 
definition of knowledge is again 
pragmatic, "what could happen? 
How do I prevent it? What do I do if 
it does happen?" - this anchoring to 
action makes particular 'knowledge 
claims/objects' bound to a spatio-
temporal context. I.e. are not 
abstractly true/consistent in their 
ability to answer the questions and 
lead to action 
Alex 
AN: Knowledge 
validation - An 
adaptive iterative 




Process outline: The structure of the 
process of validation is described, as 
iterative, collaborative and bias-
mitigative through the involvement 
of a 'different set of eyes'. Emphasis 
on empirical testing/feedback, 






Trust in source as a heuristic 
mechanism; proxy validation (trust 
the source -> trust the information -
> trust the knowledge). The concept 
is also indicative of consideration to 








Again, trust as a criterion to validate 
knowledge strength. Similar to Ash, 
another senior DM role. Could be 
quantified based on a perpetually 
training model. I.e. X 
employee/Decision maker has a 
'trust factor' of… 
 
 
Notes: Value of knowledge validation is undisputed amongst the interviewees. Methods for 
validating knowledge include: consideration for temporality and contextuality, iteration and 
collaboration with external entities, empirical testing, trust in source; 
 
1.c) Role of Knowledge: Uncertainty in Cybersecurity 
 
Uncertainty in CS 
Charlie 
AN: Uncertainty in CS 
is Distinct due to 
Speed and Breadth of 
impact 
Uncertainty due to Pace and 
Breadth of impact (variance). Ties 
in Knowledge with Change as 
Topics. Also consistent with 
risk/systems theory assertions 




Unknowns are the big 
challenge 
Uncertainty due to lack of internal 
visibility and deviation from 
established protocol. 
Ash 
AN: Most threats are 
predictable. The 
unpredictable ones 
are 'likely to catch 
you' - UU. 
This ties knowledge with 
mitigation against Unknown 
Unknowns. 
Alex 
AN: CS Uncertainty 
'Special' due to 
potential impact of 
UU 
This validates the Knowledge 
Problem hypothesis. It also entails 
DM in CS must be conducted 
under DU 
 
Notes: Uncertainty in CS distinct due to: Speed and breadth of impact, scope of 'Unknown 





predictable at a high 






Ties in to the UU narrative - hit by the 
threats that were not predicted. 








The patterns that do exist indicate 
emergence: i.e. ratio between attack 
types in a taxonomy, which is 
indicative of complex system macro-
behaviour. Not linked in the sense of 
traditional causality. The perspective 
is also different from Val's, and 
anchored in a more operational 
interpretation of CS DM. Given lack 
of homogeneity/linearity - DU is 
present, and this leads to reliance on 
Assumptions and Intuition. No 





2. Critically analyse the role and epistemic requirements of Cyber Risk Management  
 
2.a) Change and Cybersecurity 
 
Pace of Change 
Charlie 




approach - Rigidity 
('Security Conscious' 
Approach) is not 
effective 
This also ties in with the panarchy 
argument - the institution does not 
exist to be secure, but to add value. 
This generates a tension between its 
primary value adding activities and 
security. Senior management which 
are risk + change adverse are 
perceived unfavourably given the 
exogenous pace and type of change. 
Consistent with Val's 'do everything 
safely' paradigm. 
Val 
DES: Very fast pace of 
change. Trying to 
keep up is the issue 
(with CS). AN: 
Challenge - prevent 
CS from being a 
disabler of 
adaptation. 
Consistent with Charlie's point. 
Industry is rapidly evolving (KI), and 
both Threats and CS practices can 
inhibit an organisation's adaptive 
practices, through policies, 
processes and technologies. 
Dichotomy between security and 
'agility' 
Rudy 
DES: IS Staff - 
Suspicious 'never 
sure' of knowledge, 
given pace of change. 
As the attributes of Risk components 
are rapidly changing in the 
organisation, this affects the 
knowledge base, and the confidence 
in inferential procedures which rely 
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on it. This also shapes 'institutional 
risk practices' 
 
Notes: Consistency in the characterisation of pace: very fast, implications on knowledge, 







and Perceived Threat 
Activity 
The attitude of operational 
employees towards CS 
policy and the institution is 
also of interest. In this case, 
it seems to be very positive - 
which ties in well with the 
participant's declared 
preference towards security 
vs. openness. The 
participant also mentions 
explicitly he trusts the 
institution and its systems. 
Kendall 









In contrast to Eli, Kendall 
does not have a positive 
view of the institution's CS 
efforts and pressures, nor of 
its capabilities. At the same 
time, he views CS as a 
constant which cannot be 
'solved', and does not trust 
technology. He cares about 
'getting job done' regardless 
of process. Themes include 





DES: Technical Actor: 
Institutional Change 
driven by Incidents 
and problems 
(internal and 
external); AN: New 
senior members 
indicate a change in 
stance on CS, 'taking 
security much more 
seriously' 
The interviewee sees 'the 
industry' as having more IPR 
to protect -- sector 
comment. This indicates a 
low visibility of the data 
pockets that Rudy 
mentioned. The recruitment 
of a security-focused head 
of IT appeared as a theme in 
multiple interviews (i.e. 
Charlie), and was perceived 
as an 'interesting' turn of 





from 3-4-10 years 
ago. Continuously 
changing topic puts 
learning pressures. 
Interesting claim in relation 
to Kendall, who has a very 
substantial history within 
the organisation, having 
joined >20 years ago. 
Rudy 
DES: Increased 




The availability and value of 
new solutions which employ 
automation, machine 
learning and artificial 
intelligence has also been 
highlighted by Alex. 
Rudy* 
DES: Any system 
change modifies the 
architecture - brings 
new risks 
Interviewee highlights an 
analytical limitation, based 
on change: any system 
change reflects in the 
architecture and modifies 
the parameters of existing 
risk assessments. Given the 
institutional scale, such 
changes occur with high 
frequency. 
Fin 





The actor has been with the 




Notes: Significant perceived changes in the institution which include: increased management 
pressures, training, procedures, formalised stance/policy, and more active visible threats, 
awareness, 'over-caution'; leadership recruitment patterns (IT), reliance on automation, 




DES: Amount of 









Oversight body CS role. 
At a sector level, 
significant 





on their interaction 
and awareness. 
 
Notes: At a sector level, significant increases in threat activity; varied response from individual 
institutions based on their interaction and awareness. 
 






AN: Adaptive is Key: 
Awareness, Speed and ability 
of response; [Not there yet]. 
Adaptation seen to entail 
Gathering and sharing of 
Knowledge through the wider 
value network. Change 
manifested in systems/policy. 
Etc. 
Very positive view of the 
potential of 'adaptive cyber 
risk management' - not 
necessarily based on exposure 
to the specifics of such an 
approach - only on briefing 
documents offering a high-
level representation of the 
research narrative. Also 
presents adaptation as a 
function of knowledge, and 
ability to produce relevant 
changes at appropriate scale 
and pace. 
Val 
DES: Both sides (Threats-
Vulnerabilities) are inherently 
dynamic; An internal 
dichotomy also exists between 
preferred pathways - 
Leadership must 
reconcile/manage/compromise 
on such tensions 
The point on the dynamic 
between individuals who push 
for security vs. individuals 
who push for openness is also 
highlighted by Charlie in the 
description of witnessed 
approaches to CS decision-
making. Attack-defence 
engagement is also inevitably 
dynamic, and largely zero-
sum, raising the issue of 
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adaptive response on both 
sides. 
Ash 
DES: Constantly seeking in 
order to stay on top of risk; 
Awareness of limitations in 
knowledge 
Loosely ties adaptation with 
knowledge and risk. Only does 
so at a pretty obvious level. 
Alex 
AN: Adaptation 'learn by doing' 
while maximising sources of 
potential feedback, and, thus, 
mitigating bias.  AN: Resilience 
is foundational, "The key to 
doing risk is adaptability" - 
Pace of change imposes 
adaptation as a selection 
criterion. 
The overarching pattern 
across the theme is a highly 
favourable perception of 
adaptivity/adaptation, 
especially in relation to 
knowledge and risk. The 
dynamics of adaptation are 
tied to: 'lack of certainty' - 
awareness of unknown'; 
'maximising feedback 
streams'; 'balancing pace and 
ability to respond'; 'acquiring 
and deploying knowledge at 
an adequate pace, given the 
local parameters of the 
problem', ' an ability to 
manifest intent, in accordance 
with problem perception - i.e. 
perception of selective 
pressure appropriately 
translated and implemented 
into action' 
 
Notes: CS seen as an inherently continuous process; very favourable view of the maximisation 
of adaptivity as an objective; Activities include: gathering and sharing knowledge through the 
wider value network, continuous 'scanning' and awareness optimisation, 'learn by doing while 
maximising source of potential feedback', and re-positioning oneself on key dichotomies – 












policy learn from 
where breaches have 
occurred. Importance 
of awareness of what 
needs to be reported. 
DES: Adaptability 
based on Sharing and 
Knowledge. AN: 
Needs to be a 
knowledge gathering 
and analysis function 
exploring policy 
analysis, events, 
networking; used to 
adapt risk 
management policy 
and tweak systems 
While this overlaps with a previous 
use of the second part of the quote 
- feedback and adaptation go hand 
in hand. Charlie finds that there's a 
need for a function to integrate 
feedback and perpetually adjust 
policy and systems in response. 
This function fits the characteristics 
of an adaptive information 
system/knowledge system. 
Eli 
DES: Feedback for 
operational actors is 
internal, and function 
oriented 
IT Guys' are expected to guide 
behaviour internally. This indicates 
an intra-organisational point of 
reference, and re-emphasises the 
point that knowledge has to be 
translated based on its audience. 
Selective pressures are manifested 
between layers of a hierarchy, and 
generally do not skip stages 
Kendall DES: Feedback - Use the experts 
Again, operational actor with the 
same outlook as Eli. The core 
difference is that Kendall wants to 
address the experts, and in his 
examples, he mentions academic 
colleagues with expertise rather 
than members of the IT function. 
Nonetheless, there is a theme of 
operational actors looking at the 
institutional structures and 
functions for a clear cut direction of 
behaviour. There is also an implicit 
assumption of right and wrong, and 
of homogenous expertise 
concerning what needs to be done 
in a given situation. 
 
233 
Brooklyn DES: [SECTOR BODY] Feedback Provided 
Covers the various methods of 
feedback and information sharing 




feedback comes from 




Unlike other levels, the seeming 
role of leaders in CS is to reconcile 
a position on dichotomous 
spectrums that enables the 
maximised generation of net value. 
As the developers of policy, their 
pressures are less about 
compliance (unless liable for 
certain measures in relation with 
macro-bodies) and more about 
top-down direction setting. The 
content of the feedback must, thus, 
be already synthesised and 
presented within the context of 
strategic objectives - making 
specific points of action and policy 
less important than the holistic 
view. Key tensions and concerns 
seem to arise from dichotomies 
more than anything else. The sense 
of 'the right answer' had by 












DES: Hard measures - 
Business outcomes; 
Soft measures - 
sentiment and 
perception of service; 
External feedback and 
benchmarking. 
Openness as key for 
gathering feedback 
IT (Functional) leadership's view of 
feedback reflects an intermediary 
point between Val and Rudy. Views 
CS objectives as highly pragmatic 
and nested within the grander IT 
strategy, which is also the source of 
KPIs. External network and 
collaborations seem more 
accessible based on functional 
divisions  (i.e. IT in HE). 
Ash 




informal networks are 
seen as the most 
viable source of 
feedback. Subsidiaries 





A centralised Adaptive Knowledge 
function could also be used to 
selectively support subsidiaries and 
partners exposed to the same 
causal forces. The link between 
sources of input and resources is 
evident. Informal networks are 
favoured, and seen as powerful 
sources of insight (this should be 
reflected in modular KCs). 
 
Notes: Feedback: level dependent; importance of format and awareness of what needs to be 
reported in order to lead to change in behaviour; feedback for actors is internal and function 
oriented (i.e. IT); Macro-bodies like [SECTOR BODY] aggregate and provide feedback as a 
service; technological feedback is essential to calibrate policy and positioning, feedback in 
terms of hard measures (business outcomes) and soft measures (perception/sentiment); 
'Openness as key'; Scale shapes available feedback – ENT 
 
 2.c) Risk Analysis: Actor Behaviour 
 
Role Transparency 
& Homogeneity Eli 
DES: Policy and 
Process Adherence 
Go Hand in Hand 
The overall characteristics of the 
interviewee are noteworthy, 
including the strong confidence 
presented in the institution and 
its ability to ensure security, and a 
preference for security over 
openness when presented as a 
dichotomy. The interviewee also 
primarily engages with teaching - 
a very mature activity in the 
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institution. This maturity could 




to process and 
procedure to 'Get the 
job done' 
Kendall is altogether different 
than Eli, having little confidence in 
the institution's ability to deal 
with the challenges posed by CS. 
He presents his behavioural 
variability as useful for the 
wellbeing of the business sub-
unit, and objects to the depth of 
some security practices, i.e. spam 
filtering. Unlike teaching, the role 
is less mature, and thus the 
processes are less likely to provide 
an accurate portrayal of the day-
to-day requirements . 
Remy 
AN: A technical 




The size of the organisation is 
presented as an indicator of how 
unlikely behavioural homogeneity 
is for predictive purposes. Part of 
this is attributed to a vast 
capability variance, and the 
nature of academic openness as a 




descriptions are in 
tension with the top-
down dynamics 
(policy and strategy) 
and bottom-up 
(changes in) nature of 
the work ; require an 
understanding of the 
business in order to 
be comprehended 
Relevant as it sets a conditional 
foundation for disciplines such as 
enterprise architecture. 
Understanding risk is also 
predicated upon understanding 
the asset-vulnerability-impact 
dynamics. Staff behaviour is 









Admin and teaching are seen as 
trivial, routine-type activities and 
are thus more likely to be 
predictable based on an 
understanding of the process. 
Research is different. 
 
Notes: Process adherence and role transparency seems to vary based on personal perception, 
culture, role maturity/knowledge intensity, accuracy and understanding of the role within the 
context of its representation; Effectively employing this knowledge (i.e. business architecture) 





DES: Loads of things 
that we are doing 
different in the UK 
The actor perceives UK HE to provide 
less 'freedom and flexibility' than 
other universities. This also affects 
adherence to formal policy from staff 
members that are not from the UK. 
HE is highly multi-cultural, so this 
issue of cultural variability could play 
a larger role than in other 
sectors/industries. 
Fin 
DES: 'Freaked out 
with procedures and 
bureaucracy'; Not 
perceived as effective 
based on breach 
occurrence. 
This echoes the previous argument - 
multiculturalism shapes how policy is 
perceived and followed. As a 
secondary point, the actor seems to 
see 'being freaked out' with policy 
and procedures as ineffective for 
improving the overall security stance. 
 
Notes: In the context of a prescriptive model, culture is not distinctly useful, given its 
ambiguous boundaries and limited malleability. Instead, (explanatory) awareness of the 
potential role of culture can help in the development of localised heuristics for procedural 
deviation likelihood. Data on Uni X staff/student origin and nationality available in 'Additional 
Data' folder 
 
Intuition Kendall DES: Intuition - Extremely Valuable 
Intuition is deemed as explicitly 
essential in decision-making, and in 
Knowledge (tacit). Furthermore, it is 
equated as the product of 




Remy DES: "My intuition - good; others, clueless" 
Again, explicit trust is placed in the 
value of intuition in decision-
making. Like Kendall, Remy 
perceives his own intuition attuned 
and relevant, which is contrasted 
with 'other people'. 
Rudy 
DES: Intuition is part 
of formal risk analysis. 




language' as a way to 
reflect the lack of 
certainty. 'Hard to 
define' 
The value of intuition is also 
perceived by IS RM participant, 
who, again, has a positive view of 
his ability to implement it 
effectively. However, intuitive 'gut 
feelings' are not communicated as 
such, and instead are masked 
through communication strategies, 
i.e. wording choices and phrasing 
that are not particularly precise. 
Accuracy vs. Precision in phrasing 
risk claims. 
Fin 
DES: Operational actor 
computing choices  - 
rational, not intuitive. 
The nature of operational actor 
decision-making in relation to CS 
seems to be distinct, and more 
surface-level. As a result, the 
necessity of intuition is not 
explicitly recognised. The potential 
division over the semantics of the 
terminology is noteworthy. 
 
Notes: Generally positive view of intuition as a source of CS DM; Part of formal risk analysis, 
but not made explicit; communicated through vague language to reflect lack of certainty 
 
Rationality_Heuristics Charlie 
AN: Heuristics - Useful; 
at an institutional level, 
they require centralised 
data/communication; 
This is not present at the 
time of the interview 
The interviewee is familiar 
with the role of heuristics in 
the decision-making (unlike 
most other participants), 
and perceives this to be 
positive, through the effects 
on individual attitude 
towards risk. However, an 
argument is made that at 
 
238 
the time of the interview, 
the absence of a centralised 
information sharing 
function made the idea of 
institutional heuristics 
inapplicable. !Need for 
specialised, centralised 
information acquisition and 
sharing functions 
Remy 
AN: Individual heuristics 
are a useful baseline for 
protection 
Generic answer. Individual 
heuristics are seen as 
beneficial when part of a 
broader range of defensive 
'tools' 
Sage 
DES: Example of Security 
Heuristics used; 
Indicative of the low 
direct scope of concern, 
and awareness. 
The participant was not 
aware of the notion of 
heuristics, so the answer 
seems post-hoc, not 
necessarily reflecting a 
voluntary approach. This 
lack of awareness might be 
attributed to the narrow 
nature of CS decision-
making for an operational 
actor (given contrast 
between category 1 and 
category 3 awareness). 
Alex 
DES: Heuristics are 
essential (for DM) given 
scale of operations. 
Perceived value of 
heuristics and machine 
learning 
Heuristics are correlated 
with informational volume - 
a view that is consistent 
with the literature on the 
topic. The development of 
appropriate heuristics for 
operational cyber defence 
is seen as part of the future 
defence strategy, when 
coupled with machine 
learning. 
Ash 
AN: Heuristics are 
'pragmatic'; way to cut 
cost. 
The more cost-oriented 
focus of ENT is reflected in 
this answer, which is 
consistent with Alex's view, 
but has a different 
justification. So, the scale is 
less of a concern (ENT 
infrastructure is significantly 
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smaller), but cost is 
prioritised. Different driver 
for the pursuit of efficiency 
(cost) vs. effectiveness 
(scale). 
 
Notes: Also worth noting that Heuristics and Biases are totally disconnected in the stance of 




DES: Bias not explicitly taken 
into consideration. DES: 
Broad capability gap in CS for 
Decision-makers. AN: It 
would be useful to consider 
bias 
The participant 
highlights that decision 
makers across levels vary 
significantly in their skills 
and awareness in 
relation to CS, and 
attributes these 
capabilities with 
inherent bias/lack of 
awareness. !Useful for a 
system to highlight bias. 
Brooklyn 
DES*: Industry level 
tendency to under represent 
risks pre-breach, and 
overestimate it after an 
incident. 
The observation is in 
accordance to the theory 
on R&B. It is not based 
on the case itself, but on 
tendencies observed 
through direct exposure 
at an industry level. 
Val 
DES: Biases seen all the time 
(in CS). They generate 
dichotomies. AN: Exposing 
and managing these is the 
role of leadership 
For leaders, supporting 
any view when expertise 
clashes is strongly 
dependent on the 





DES: No perceptual 
homogeneity in (subjective) 
risk assessments. DES: 
Current (institutional) Risk 
Assessments do not account 
for biases and 'irrationality' 
Important to notice the 
difference in nuance 
when defining bias 
across participants; 
!mitigating for 
'irrationality' and bias is 
perceived as desirable 
Ash 
DES: Enterprise branch is 
cost/profit driven, with less 
financial buffer. 'Bias' vs. 
prioritisation/incentivisation 
Reflects very well Val's 
description of bias; the 
heavy emphasis on cost 
can shape the 
perception of what is 
required from the 
perspective of security. 
Existential selectors on 
finance vs. security. 
 
Notes: Variability in defining bias, but the pattern of viewing it as a concern, and as 
unavoidably present in decision-making is consistent. The idea of existential selectors on 
security distinguishes higher education as an area of emphasis versus other industries. 
 
2.d) Cyber Risk and the Knowledge Problem 
 
CS Dichotomies Charlie 
DES: Tension in 
Senior Management 
perceptions of CS, 




This tension feeds into the bias 
discussion, and Val's arguments on 
the challenges faced by leaders. It 
also justifies centrality in 
informational availability. Phase 
tension; 'Security through 




AN: "balance is very 
important"; "Security 
trumps openness" 
This is antithetic with the overall 
tone and view of Charlie who 
pushes for openness as a way to 
maximise security - by minimising 
what defence efforts are 
concentrated on. It seems to be a 
cultural attribute, and reflects a 
point on the continuum. 
Remy 
DES: SysAdmins, Devs 
and Programmers 




'awareness […] not 
great', and face 
organisational 
pressures which lead 
to 'pragmatism' and 
compromises. User 
awareness also 
perceived as low. 
Remy is technical in his 
capabilities. Perceives technical 
capabilities, and awareness as a 
determining factor of the stance 
on the security - openness 
continuum. Highlights how 
technical functions and decision 
making may differ from broader 
organisational functions in that 
they are single goal driven - i.e. 
secure system, which can conflict 
with the numerous other 
objectives and tensions manifested 
within the organisation as a whole. 
Val 
DES: Very quickly, you 
get compromises 
about openness and 
safety'; These are 
moments when 
speed of change and 
'cyber' grind 
together. DM is about 
finding the right level. 
The dichotomy is presented as 
continuous. The pace of change is 
brought into the discussion, as key 
when facing a crossroads on 
openness vs. security. Actually 
being able to determine what is 
'acceptable' relies on assumptions, 
within the case, this seems to boil 
down to trust and direct 







ideas of security, data 
protection and the 
university culture. 
"It's how you actually 
draw the line" 
Supports the panarchy view, and 
the knowledge problem 






While important, security is 
perceived as an operational 
inhibitor. 
 
Notes: Dichotomies and tensions, both internal and external, are central to the discrepancy 
between an abstraction of organisational behaviour and its real manifestation; CS is 




AN: Risk = (likelihood 
x impact) negative 
event 
Textbook definition. 
Rudy AN: Cyber risk = Vulnerability 
Vulnerability centric definition of 
risk 
Alex AN: Threat-Impact 
The risk is the threat, and it is a 
threat because of the impact it can 
generate 
 
Notes: Together, the three definitions cover the full spectrum of reasonable definitions: 
likelihood, threat, vulnerability, impact. 
 
Risk Effectiveness Charlie 
AN: Risk Effectiveness 
is meaningful to 
people. 
The point made relates to two 
dimensions: effectiveness and 
suitability of policy and measures, 
and meaningful impact for the 
actors within the organisation. The 
latter is underwhelmingly 




AN: 'tick boxes' i.e. 
policy and procedures 
do not equate 
'responsibility' 
An actor perspective on the point 
made above: 'tick boxes' are 
limited, and conditioned by the 
impact of the topic on the 
individual actors. 
Rudy 




(very very simple). 
AN: "Would love 
some sort of 
consistent algorithm 
where you could asses 
a data base, say, and 
put a figure, a number 
on the risk based on 
number of records 
held, how sensitive 
the data contained is, 
who would have 
access. Nothing like 




cannot be defined. 
Only good until 
breach 
The point will most likely be 
repeated in the need to change 
category, but Rudy describes IS 
Risk Analyst requirements to 
overcome excessive subjectivity 
and perceptual heterogeneity of 
risk assessments. Consistent with 
Remy, anecdotally arguing that the 
role and capabilities of an 
individual are likely to shape their 
view of CS. 
Alex 
DES: Effective Risk 
must be 
communicated in 
'business terms' - job 
of IT leaders. Must 
have empathy with 
business rather than 
pure IT: panarchy 
(prev Remy) Risk is a 
'coms tool', (implicit - 
low accuracy) and 
helps prioritise; Good 
risk management: 
hierarchical, from 
Given simplicity, Utility of risk as 
'communication and prioritisation' 
tool, rather than knowledge 
formation or deep uncertainty 
management. Importance of 




process, to IT service, 
to systems, to 
business risk 
 
Notes: Risk as a communication, and prioritisation tool; low level inferential load; Impactful 
communication and risk; simplistic and pluralistic in likelihood; importance of understanding 





DES: DM use of risk in 
institution 'individual 
and contextualised'. 
'Not seen a general 
approach towards 
risk', only copyright, 
DPR, IP, ethics, 
Health and Safety 
The maturity of risk processes 
tends to revolve around mature 
components of the business. 
Cyber might be seen as an enabler 
of those, rather than a standalone 
dimension. 
Brooklyn* 
DES: Industry level - 









Organisation-wide cyber risk 
framework proliferation is a lot 
lower at an industry level than 
other, general reports would 
indicate. It also depends on how 
'risk frameworks' are defined - 
ISO/IEC vs. just a localised risk 
assessment. The maturity of cyber 
risk practices is seemingly low at 
an industry level. This might also 
indicate, as with the case data, 
using risk constructs for 
communication and low-level 





DES: Risk is used to 
contextualise the CS 
occurrences and 
awareness. In spite of 
this, technical staff 
does not reference 
any sort of formal 
structure. Risk as a 
heuristic 
What drives the point of risk utility 
is the finite set of resources which 
underpin defence efforts. 
Contextualising and 
comprehending threats within the 
wider context of the business is 
essential for structuring a pro-
active, or adequately reactive 
approach., 
Val 
DES: A colloquial 
description of risk 
planning and 
response strategies. 
No formal structure is mentioned 
but it is clear that decision-making 
at the highest level is risk-
informed, at least in terms of 




DES: A description of 
the Risk Assessment 
process from the IS 
FUNCTION. Audit vs. 
health check. Extends 
onto third parties 
through privacy 
impact assessments, 
and legal framework 
establishment 
In case, the IS Function seems to 
be the function in which 
Information Security Risk is taken 
into consideration. ITS seem to 
focus on 'cyber' . No proof of 
awareness concerning the 
opportunities presented by a 
centralised knowledge base, 
including for 'strength' 









diligence and instant 
reporting. DES: ITS - 
own security work. 
DES: Knowledge 





AN: IS likely to be 
similar across sector. 
'case' set up different 
than other 
universities, IS 
FUNCTION outside of 
IT. IS Risk analysis 
conducted by 'non-IT 
people' 
Alex 1 
DES: two streams of 
risk: university level - 
policy and risk 
assessment. IT risk 
assessment  - 
different risks, 
system vulnerability 
and likely hacks. 
Differentiates the IS Function Risk 
analysis which falls under the first 
stream from the IT stream. Not 
fully clear how the two are 
different, as IS entails network 
monitoring and defence, in 




how the business 
operates is essential 
to quantify risk. DES: 
IT Risk assessment 
done in impact and 
likelihood - two 
numbers for each, 
one through nine, 
multiplied 
The description of the IT Risk 
analysis practices supports the 
previous view of no formal 
framework, but risk driven efforts 





DES: ENT global Risk 
Analysis - Uni based, 
with no formal feed 
down. Two levels of 
security: network 
integrity and security, 
and student personal 
data. 
Lack of certainty is presented as a 
driver of agility and adaptation. 
Environmental scanning and 
knowledge acquisition/validation 
is conducted informally. No formal 
feed-down from the university, in 
spite of perceived reliance. Risk 
frameworks are seen as 
potentially dangerous if they 
generate over reliance - ties in 
with uncertainty and predictive 
power (ontology). Ash 2 
DES: Reputational 
Damage, biggest 
concern for ENT. No 
formal risk 
framework; AN: The 
bigger the 
framework, the larger 
the likelihood of 
overconfidence in its 





Notes: Difficult to summarise; re-read in entirety 
 




AN: Effective risk: 
Contextual, 
appropriately 
communicated, part of 
a conversation with 
stakeholders, clear 
action-plan 
communicated to key 
people. 
Communication is presented as 
central to effective risk 
management - a point that is 
consistent with the idea of 
organisations as coordination-





AN:'Actor' - Effective 
CS - policy and 
procedure, supported 




A lot of emphasis on system 
resilience and systemic properties. 
Explores CS as a systemic 
phenomenon. Implicitly, it 
delegates/spreads the role or 
responsibilities of the individual in 





A different angle on the Charlie 
view of communication as central 
for strategic efficacy. Reflects 









AN: strategy starts 
with understanding 
specific level of risk; 




balancing risk with 
cost 
A broad range of activities 
predicated upon the idea of 
balancing risk with cost - two 
dimensions of the 'knowledge 
problem' narrative. 
Val AN:  Enabling safe value generation 
Ambiguous - supports the 
panarchy hypothesis; 
Rudy 
DES: Policies (great) 
exist with built in 
ISMS, 'not applied - 
people don't even 
know the way they 
should be behaving' 
DES: Challenge 
education and training 
Goes back to Charlie's point on 
communication. The existence of 
policy, regardless of its quality, is 
irrelevant if it is not able to guide 
actor behaviour. This requires 
communication, contextualisation, 




AN: Efficacy requires 
the integration of 
technically 
capable/oriented 
individuals in the 
business, to fully 
understand measures 
and impact. 
Business architecture is central to 
the definition of an effective IT-
based cyber strategy. Issues with 
business architecture (partially 
addressed in emphasis on 
integration rather than just blindly 
using documentation and 
procedures) 
Alex 2 
DES: Integration to 
business models and 
operational lifecycle. 
Tied to the IT strategy, 
and therefore 
Corporate Strategy. 
DES: Process of 
formulating the 
strategy 
The process of CS strategy 
formulation, which includes 
interviews with stakeholders, and 
is seen as nested in the IT strategy, 
which is nested in the corporate 
strategy, and overall business risk. 
CS - 'same questions' into different 
'focus space' 
 
Notes: Operationalising strategy? Communication and policy; implementation holism, 







DES: 'Adaptivity' will be 
key; Need speed of 
response and 
awareness. Not there 




understanding of risk 
Your word 'Adaptive' is going to be 
really key - Demands for Adaptivity 
maximisation. This would be 
materialised in the form of 
increased awareness, better internal 
communication, faster response, a 
stronger understanding of the scope 






DES: Holism in 
approach is desirable, 
but not currently 
practical given maturity 
of CS in the case. 
Holism should be 'end 
goal' 
The idea of holism vs. mechanism 
for the conceptualisation of CS has a 
series of implications for the 
analytical granularity and scope of 
conceptualising the problems 
perceived. Any attempt at holistic 
approaches presupposes an 
exploration of both top down and 
bottom up phenomena. Also, 
communication structures so that 
feedback can be effectively 
communicated amongst levels of 
the hierarchy. 
Rudy* 
DES: 'Wish' there were 





immature in the 'CS' 
space. AN: Knowledge 
validation - a concern; 
tied to maturity 
Knowledge validation as a capability; 
The perpetual classification of the 
organisation as immature in relation 
to CS raises the issue on what are 
the main indicators of maturity - 
highly technical organisation, 
dedicated functions both inside and 
outside of IT, concern and debate at 
board level on the topic, explicit 
know-how, unique opportunities 
(i.e. Ethical Hacking) students, 
accreditation orientation at an 
individual level, profitable and 
investment-oriented, numerous 
layers of support, including macro-
bodies like [SECTOR BODY]. 
Ash 
DES: ENT Small 
organisation - depends 
on security expertise of 
parent; 'we'd love to 
have someone (sic) 
scanning the horizon' 
In this context, the lack of dedicated 
structures and staff is attributed to 
organisational size, and these are 




Notes: Current systemic approach not optimised for adaptivity due to limitations in 
coordination and awareness (communication, speed of response, and understanding of risk 
as an expression of internal and external obscurity); An effective holistic conceptualisation of 
CS is tied to the maturity of efforts; Difficult to manage Non-linearity; CS Immaturity 
manifested in knowledge validation limitations; in ENT, CS is non-core for financial growth - 






DES: Holism in 
approach is desirable, 
but not currently 
practical given maturity 
of CS in the case. 
Holism should be 'end 
goal' 
Both quotes used for 
previous theme as well. 
Brooklyn* AN: CS Strategy must be holistic 
Alex 
DES: IT Strategy 
Approach - more 
'holistic' - Risk based is 
the platform for holism; 
vs. Gap analysis. AN: 
Can't get too hung up 
on [Risk Assessments] - 
given mechanistic 
scoring which can hide 
meaning. 
The notion of holism is not 
perceived consistently across 
actors. Alex sees current 
conceptualisation as holistic, 
unlike Charlie. Each justify 
their view. Furthermore, 
Alex argues that 'risk based' 
is the holistic alternative to 
the mechanistic gap analysis 
per system. 
Ash* 
AN: too much reliance 
on something 




Again, quote previously 
used. Ash sees formal 
frameworks as potentially 
counterproductive given the 
potential scale of their 
output which makes it easy 
to miss relevant phenomena. 
Could be why no formal 
frameworks are pursued at 
an institutional level. Ash 
also argues that, for ENT, 
more structure would be 
beneficial in relation to CS. 
 
Notes: Perceptions on how to define and employ an adequate level of conceptual granularity 







DES: Because you 
don't know about 
threats, […] not 
enough information 









Knowing about threats and the 
internal levels of awareness and 
types of behaviour encountered 
are both key for the pursuit of 
effective adaptive behaviour. 
Throughout the interview, Charlie 
highlights a rationale for the 
Knowledge Problem narrative, 
and the maximisation of 
Adaptivity. Part of that is 
underpinned by education, 
awareness, communication and 
openness. 
Eli 
DES: Actor -  Limited 
awareness of the 
scope of CS; Self-
perceived efficacy 









previous years, and 
well supported. 
There is a sense of a limited 
awareness of the actor's 
description of his preparedness in 
relation to CS, based on the 
training received. The scope of 
this training seems to be very 
basic, based on anecdotal 
evidence. 
Kendall 
DES: Actor - 
Confident in 







Again, the confidence of the actor 
in his ability to detect 
vulnerabilities is not underpinned 
by a familiarity with a procedure, 
distinct training or awareness of 
CS structures and procedures. Nor 
is it supported by previous 









more aware of the 




response, and less 
satisfied, on 
average than 
Colleges. ["Could be 
from a position of 
ignorance"].  
Posture depends on 






on attack history 
The link between awareness and 
self-evaluation is pretty evident in 
the data as well; Kendall/AN's 
confidence in their ability to 
identify threats is not justified by 
any visible capability on this 
specific task. Managerial 












Very technical view, associating 
scale with process and 
training/education. 
Sage 
DES: in training, 
staff interested in 
technological safety 









DES: Policies are not 
known to everyone; 
AN: 'No one wants 
to be involved in a 
breach' DES: people 
'very busy' - ' 
security isn't top of 
mind'; DES: Very 
hard to instil a 
culture of security 
Procedural opaqueness seems to 
be a reoccurring theme. Pockets 
of knowledge and awareness 
prevent more effective user 
defensive behaviour, and also 






is essential; 'must 
speak business-
speak'; 'must 




DES: Expectation of 
inherent safety with 
available platforms. 
Seemingly more 
aware than other 
actors of awareness 
limitations. 
Delegated liability 
for most selection 
to the institution. 
No familiarity with 
any mechanism of 
addressing 
vulnerabilities 
Justifies concerns over 
education/transparency for this 
segment. The one way nature of 
the interaction between IS 
FUNCTION/IT and users is 
problematic as it relies on 
anticipation, audits and detection 
rather than staff feedback based 























Notes: Policies not known to everyone. High value of feedback obtained through informal 
means; ‘ICT Risk’ must be translated to business speak; Breaches occur in spite of intent, not 
because of it; Anecdotal evidence of staff interest in technological safety (Sage); 
Organisational size means that ‘it —communication — depends on process’; Asymmetry in 
staff capabilities (ENT) and awareness; Posture depends on member of staff (technical or 
managerial); Actor awareness and self-evaluation ability seem limited; Limited threat 
awareness - bottleneck; Education deficit perceived 
 
